Reproduced from the Science of International Politics, with kind permission of the authors and the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University.
Preferences, Information and the Deterrence Game*
Corresponding author. Email: xianggh.03@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn
| The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. |
The doctrine of deterrence was a leading theory within the field of international security throughout the Cold War period. At one time it was regarded as social science's most influential theoretical innovation. At least three different approaches to the study of deterrence were developed during the Cold War period. They include the game theoretical approach pioneered by Thomas Schelling in the 1960s, a psychological approach developed by Robert Jervis in the 1970s, and a case study-based approach introduced by George Alexander. As the Cold War period drew to a close, conventional deterrence theory received renewed academic attention. Scholars began to apply statistical methods of testing deterrence theory's various empirical implications. A major conclusion reached in this research was that game theory has promising possibilities when applied to international security-oriented studies of deterrence, as deterrence involves a limited number of actors that strategically engage on the basis of respective interests.1
Consequently,
 |
An Analysis of the General Logic of Deterrence |
|---|
The Cost–Benefit Analysis Approach to Deterrence Theory
The Rational Choice Approach to Deterrence
Game Theoretic Approach to Deterrence
The Deterrence Game
Necessary Conditions for Credible Deterrence
An Extended Discussion of Credible Deterrence
|
Signaling Deterrence with Incomplete Information |
|---|
Basic Model of Deterrence with Incomplete Information
Signaling Deterrence
The Signaling Game and Types of Signals
Models of Deterrence Based on the Signaling Game
Equilibria of the Deterrence Game
Signaling Models of Compellence
|
Case Studies of Deterrence Games |
|---|
Strategic Interaction Between Iraq and the US prior to Desert Storm
Sino-US Strategic Interaction Prior to Chinese Entry into Korea
US–Soviet Strategic Interactions During the Cuban Missile Crisis
Strategic Interaction between Argentina and the UK in the Falkland Islands
|
Conclusion |
|---|
CiteULike 
Connotea 
Del.icio.us What's this?