The Efficiency of China's Policy towards the United States
* Corresponding author. Email: sunxf19{at}gmail.com
During the late 1980s, with adjustments in USSR foreign policy and the continued easing of US–Soviet tensions, the forces driving China–US cooperation against Soviet expansion gradually lost momentum. The divergence of Chinese and American strategy has become increasingly apparent, and China's posture towards the United States has adapted to changes in the strategic environment.
Since the 1990s, the changing nature of China–US relations and the restructuring of China's US policy have received extensive scholarly attention, resulting in a collection of high-quality research. This research can be divided broadly into three types:1 (1) analysing the external factors guiding China's US policy, and then positing recommendations;2 (2) describing China's US policy in the context of China's grand strategy, and then forecasting policy evolution or analysing policy rationale (most work uses this methodology)3 and (3) describing the course of Sino–American relations, and then critiquing aspects of China's US policy. There have been two ways in which to set temporal parameters. The first is to emphasize a particular phase or incident common to the China–US relationship, such as the Taiwan crisis of 1995–96.4 The second is to choose a longer time frame (of 10 years or more) in China–US relations.5
Broadly speaking, much of the research focuses on describing China's policies towards the United States and analysing the evolution of China–US relations. This approach largely overlooks the effectiveness of Chinese policies in practice, a subject that some have touched upon, but not deeply enough. This deficiency has produced the following concerns: the divisions separating various policies towards the United States are unclear, making it difficult to identify policy continuity and change; the criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of Chinese policy are vague, with most evaluations judging the policy at face value and failing to delineate general rules about effectiveness; the research lacks convincing analysis and interpretations because insufficient attention is granted to rules. Focusing on China's efforts to alleviate US foreign policy pressure since 1989, this article attempts to answer the following two questions: (1) How effective have China's post-Cold War policies towards the United States been? (2) What are the reasons behind the differing results of the policies?
The article is divided into four parts. The following section proposes methods for differentiating various forms of post-Cold War policies towards the United States, as well as standards and methods for evaluating their effectiveness. The subsequent sections critique the effectiveness of four cases in which China attempted to alleviate US foreign policy pressure and presents a theoretical examination of the differing results, while the last section summarizes the research and analyses other policy implications.
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Chinese Policies towards the United States: Basic Forms and Evaluation Standards |
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 Top Chinese Policies towards the... The Practical Effectiveness of...Theoretical Analysis on the...Conclusion |
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Policy Types
Foreign policies are the principles and plans that guide a nation's behaviour abroad; their objective is to protect the nation's rights and interests. Because the international system lacks a method of equally distributing wealth, every nation requires foreign support to achieve its objectives. An effective foreign policy must therefore be capable of influencing the behaviour of others.6 Exerting influence requires strategic assets, as well as channels through which to use them. There are two types of strategic assets. The first one being national security assets, such as military power, allies, international or security organizations, etc. The second one, economic assets, for instance economic power, market scope, market access, etc. In terms of their application, K. J. Holsti lays out six methods: using force, inflicting non-violent punishment, threatening punishment (the stick), offering rewards (the carrot), granting rewards and persuasion.7 But these six methods can be simplified into two categories: active guidance and passive punishment.
Under these two categories, China's policies towards the United States can be broken into four basic forms which promote gradual elimination of the US policies and behaviour that are harmful to China's interests: (1) Strategic conciliation: utilizing China's security assets to cooperate with the United States on issues that are of mutual interest, thereby exchanging benefits and altering the United States’ negative impression of China. (2) Strategic coercion: utilizing China's security assets to thwart the US objectives, including using or threatening to use force, forming alliances to curb US power and voting against proposals favourable to the United States in international organizations. (3) Economic inducement: utilizing China's economic resources, such as market size, market access, etc. to meet the economic needs of the United States and (4) Economic sanctions: utilizing China's economic resources to undermine US economic well-being through trade embargoes, trade barriers, etc.
It is necessary to clarify here that a country's policies will entail the implementation of many combinations of tactics, making it impossible to argue that any one of the above categories will be identical to any one of China's policies. One can, however, give an objective description of China's policy towards an issue and identify the dominant strategy, which will be the approach used in this research.
Standards and Methods of Evaluation
Kenneth Waltz argues that the ultimate measure in policy evaluation is whether it succeeds, which he defines as the implementing country both surviving and increasing in strength.8 This article applies his principle to post-Cold War China–US relations, proposing criteria that examine the influence of China's policies on US behaviour, particularly with regard to the degree of their effectiveness. Policy effectiveness is divided into three levels:
- Successful: The US unequivocally commits to ending threats to China's security or harm to China's development; concrete action is taken, such as reducing weapons sales to Taiwan or eliminating economic sanctions, etc.
- Partially Successful: The US reaffirms the commitments to China's security and development, like insisting on a one-China policy, and adopts a behaviour that eases the pressure on China, such as improving bilateral political relations; parts of its policies, however, still threaten China's security or harm its development, like continued weapons sales to Taiwan.
- Ineffective: The US either continues to threaten, or alters the policies that are beneficial to China's security and development; adopts measures that exert greater pressure on China, such as openly supporting Taiwanese independence, improving the quality of weapons sales, etc.
To guarantee that this article's measures of policy effectiveness are themselves effective and credible, the following methods are employed:
- Selecting the most overt phases of US pressure on China, when troubles between the two sides are most pointed and the policy decisions are explicit, such as the clear adoption or elimination of sanctions. This allows for an easy description of the initial policies and their changes, which improves the accuracy of the policy evaluation.
- Highlighting changes in US behaviour 1–2 years after China's implementation of a policy, trying as much as possible to eliminate the influence of other factors.
- Striving to use empirical evidence to demonstrate a policy's effectiveness, such as policy-makers’ behaviour or statements. Where such material is inadequate or unattainable, this article will make every attempt for high-level, mutual understanding to serve as the base of deductive analysis.
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The Practical Effectiveness of Chinese Policies towards the United States |
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This section will cover four cases.9 Two examples of strategic conciliation: ‘Shaking off isolation and sanctions’ (1989–92) and ‘Confronting the United States on Taiwanese independence’ (2000–04). An example of strategic coercion is provided in ‘Responding to changes in the US–Taiwan relations’ (1995–96) and an example of economic inducement is found in ‘Disentangling human rights and the most-favoured-nation status’ (1993–94).
Strategic Conciliation
A. Shaking Off Political Isolation and Economic Sanctions (1989–92)
After the Beijing political crises between the spring and summer of 1989, US President George Bush announced on June 5 and June 20, the imposition of sanctions against China, including: (1) the suspension of any arms sales or other US exports to China, (2) the suspension of exchanges between the US and Chinese military leadership, (3) the suspension of exchanges with officials at or above the rank of Assistant Secretary of State and (4) the postponement of any further aid or loan assistance from international financial institutions. In July, the G7 held a conference in which they endorsed the economic sanctions. After postponing the consideration of a $230 million loan to China, the World Bank postponed another loan program worth nearly $780 million.10
In the face of US sanctions, China held its ground and bided its time. It held ground by continuing its ‘reform and opening’ and maintaining stable economic development; it bided time by behaving within its means and not opposing the US hegemony, striving instead to retain national sovereignty.11 With this in mind, China took advantage of international events that were of strong concern to the United States, adopting a series of measures that promoted China–US cooperation.
- China did not oppose the US troops in the Persian Gulf. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the United States organized a multinational force to restore Kuwait's sovereignty. In order to acquire UN approval, the United States hoped that China would support its actions in the Persian Gulf. While China did not approve the use of force, it did not generate any determined opposition and developed a tacit agreement with the United States. From 2 August 1990 to 3 April 1991, the UN passed 14 resolutions regarding the Persian Gulf crisis, with China voting in support of 12. To grant the US-led multinational force the moral and legal basis for action, China abstained on Resolutions 678 and 686, both of which authorized the use of UN troops.12
- China signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction has been one of the most important objectives of US foreign policy since World War II. The United States began attaching even greater importance to this issue during the late 1980s and early 1990s in response to the regional conflicts that threatened US security. China's attitude towards the spread of these weapons completely changed after 1989: it no longer wanted to completely reject a comprehensive nuclear weapons ban. In August 1991, Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng announced that the Chinese government would join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, officially joining in March 1992.13 In addition, during November 1991, China welcomed the elimination of the three US sanctions in exchange for joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).14
- China advanced peace in Cambodia. In July 1990, the United States changed its primary objective in Cambodia policy to prevent the Khmer Rouge from returning to power. China historically maintained close relations with Cambodia, and even supplied weapons to those in the Khmer Rouge fighting the government of Prime Minister Hun Sen.15 In August 1990, however, after all five members of the UN Security Council decided on a framework to approach the Cambodia problem, China halted all military assistance. China announced that it would treat all parties in Cambodia equally16 by not interfering in the affairs of the Cambodian government, regardless of whether the Khmer Rouge regained power.17
China's responsiveness and cooperative posture were effective. In July 1989, the US Secretary of State James A. Baker met with the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, and later held talks with him at the UN and in Cairo. Although the United States did not seem to think so, these meetings symbolized the end of the ban on high-level talks.18 In November 1990, President Bush met with Minister Qian in the White House to express his gratitude for Chinese support in the Persian Gulf. This was the first time since the June 1989 sanctions that the US President had met with a Ministerial Head. Prior to this, the President vetoed the House of Representative legislation removing China's Most-Favoured-Nation status (MFN), a decision that undoubtedly reflected the need for China's grace in the Persian Gulf.19 President Bush indicated that ‘China has agreed to ... abide by the MTCR’ in March 1992, so under those circumstances, adding more conditions to China's MFN status would not have benefited US policy.20
After the US announcement in December 1989 that a portion of the economic sanctions would be eliminated, beginning the latter half of 1991, all of its sanctions were progressively removed or restrained. In November 1991, Secretary of State Baker visited China with no strings attached, signifying the end of the prohibition on high-level meetings.21 In January 1992, Prime Minister Li Peng conducted talks with President Bush at the UN General Assembly.22 At the end of 1992, the United States officially announced the removal of the ban on high-level contacts. Additionally, it ended another portion of its economic sanctions and international organizations gradually restored loan assistance. Thereafter, it used the chance of MFN status to pressurize China, but at that time the pressure never took the form of sanctions.23
B. Confronting the United States on Taiwanese Independence
In July 1999, while being interviewed by The Voice of Germany, Taiwanese President Li Denghui proposed the ‘Two Countries Theory’, saying explicitly that Strait relations were a ‘state to state, or at least a special state to state relationship’. In August, the ‘Two Countries Theory’ entered the Nationalist Party documents,24 and in March 2000, independence advocate Chen Shuibian of the Democratic Progressive Party was elected President. Chen first stated explicitly that Taiwan was a ‘sovereign, independent state’, in August 2002, adding that ‘Each side of the Taiwan Strait is a country. This should be clear.’25 As Taiwan accelerated steps towards legal independence, newly elected President Bush adopted clear pro-Taiwan policies. In April 2001, United States promised Taiwan four Kidd class destroyers, eight diesel–electric submarines and 12 P-3 Orion maritime control aircraft, a weapons sale of unprecedented quality. Bush stated in an interview that the United States would ‘do whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself’. Moreover, Bush never again promoted the last ‘No’ of President Clinton's ‘Three-No's’ policy, which was to withhold support on Taiwan's membership in the UN or any international organization of sovereign states. The President even guaranteed Taiwan that the United States would not raise the issue of cross-strait dialogue, at least through 2001.26
Faced with these changes in the US policy, China firmly expressed its determination to defend national unification while simultaneously exploiting opportunities to promote China–US cooperation. The primary ways in which China encouraged the United States to adopt substantive action constraining Taiwanese independence included:
- Showing Restraint. In response to a higher-quality weapons sales to Taiwan, China never retaliated or threatened retaliation. China's opposition to the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was also tempered.27
- Promoting Cooperation. After 9/11, the United States waged war on Afghanistan and Iraq. During the war against the Taliban, China gave its utmost support. And although it did not support the Iraq war,28 China did not take an antagonistic stance on UN Security Council resolutions. In November 2002, after intensification of the North Korea nuclear crisis, China carried out massive coordination efforts to facilitate the tripartite talks in Beijing during March 2003 and the six-party talks in August. Additionally, from August to November 2002, the Chinese government issued three successive arms control regulations, completing the transformation from administrative-based management to legally based management;29 this was not unrelated to the United States’ enhanced focus on nuclear non-proliferation post-9/11.
China's restrained and cooperative policies were effective, primarily in that political relations between the two countries achieved notable improvements.30 In terms of Sino–American joint constraining of Taiwanese independence, however, the results were less clear. During Bush's February 2002 visit to China, he never reiterated the US commitment to any of the three China–US bilateral agreements on Taiwan, and instead, on several occasions cited the Taiwan Relations Act legislation clearly beneficial to Taiwan.31 In March, Taiwan's ‘Defence Minister’ Tang Yaoming travelled to Florida to participate in a ‘National Defense Summit’ with the Assistant Secretary of Defense, which lasted for 100 minutes. Tang also held an ‘informal briefing’ with the Assistant Secretary of the State Department's East Asia and Pacific Affairs Bureau, an exceedingly rare event since the United States and Taiwan ‘severed relations’.32 Despite President Bush's firm opposition of Chen Shuibian's desire for a public referendum on independence, the US behaviour has been clearly pro-Taiwan. On 2 April 2004, under the extremely controversial circumstances of Taiwan's general election results, the United States nonetheless decided to sell Taiwan more advanced weaponry including ultra-high frequency radar.33 At the end of April, a high-ranking US official speaking in Singapore said that, while supporting the one-China principle, ‘the US does not oppose change of the status-quo in the Taiwan Strait, but any change must occur through peaceful, bilateral methods.’ This suggests that the US definition of the ‘Taiwan Strait status-quo’ is simply no war, a fundamental divergence from China's definition of maintaining the status-quo. Some scholars believe that this signifies the publicizing of United States pro-Taiwanese independence policy.34
Strategic Coercion: Responding to Changes in US–Taiwan Relations (1995–96)
After the end of the Cold War, the United States gradually restructured its Taiwan policy to be more pro-Taiwan. In September 1992, US President George H. Bush announced the sale of 150 F-16s, in clear violation of the August 1982 Joint Communiqué.35 After President Clinton took office, US–Taiwan relations went a step closer. In April 1994, Clinton signed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which included the Congressional signal that the Taiwan Relations Act took precedence over the Joint Communiqué. In July, the Clinton administration's Taiwan Policy Review announced a new framework for relations with Taiwan. Despite consistent US support for a ‘One China’ policy, its rejection of Taiwan's entrance into the UN, as well as its willingness to maintain only informal relations, the bulk of the substance is of obvious benefit to Taiwan.36 In December, US Transportation Secretary Pena travelled to Taiwan to hold official talks with Li Denghui and Qian Fu, the Taiwanese ‘Minister of Foreign Affairs’.37 On 22 May 1995, the US government publicly announced its support of Li Denghui's visit to a meeting of Cornell University's Alumni Association. For the first time in 16 years of the China–US relations. The United States allowed Taiwanese leaders to travel to the United States, and US–Taiwan relations were again pushed to a new level.38
China offered only limited protests to the sale of F-16s and the new Taiwan ‘framework’, believing that the United States still honoured the basic principle behind the Taiwan problem and that fluctuation in policy was reflective of government pressures to make compromises.39 It was Li's obtainment of a US visa that altered Chinese thinking and stance towards the United States became more assertive. In May 1995, China decided to postpone plans for its Defence Minister Chi Haotian's visit to the United States. After the US announcement, China immediately suspended the visits of State Council member Li Guixian and Air Force Commander Yu Zhenwu. On June 16, Chinese Ambassador to the United States, Li Daoyu, was summoned home for a report. From 21 to 28 July, Chinese PLA forces in the East China Sea launched surface-to-surface missile drills, and between August 15 and 25, live missiles and artillery exercises were conducted 90 miles north of Taiwan. In October, numerous exercises were carried out in Chinese territorial waters among the branches of the Chinese military. This continued in March 1996, with several more weeks of missile drills, live navy exercises and joint operations.40
China's forceful policies were effective. Realizing the dangers of Taiwanese separatism, the Clinton Administration had to curb it. Even the US Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, who had originally asked authorities, ‘Why not recognize Taiwan?’, changed his approach to one in which support for Taiwan was carefully managed.41 In March 1996, the United States put pressure on Taiwan, cancelling the Wanping and HanGuang 12 joint military operations in the Mazu region, which were originally planned for April and May, respectively.42 During late 1996 and 1997, the United States again closely examined its Taiwan policy, proposing the ‘Three No's’: no ‘Two China's’ or ‘One China, One Taiwan’ policy; no Taiwanese independence; no Taiwanese entrance into the UN or other international organizations consisting of sovereign nations. On many levels, this position began a transformation away from supporting Taiwan to maintaining the status-quo with Beijing.43 The United States still initiated movements towards improving Sino–American relations. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake's trip to China in July 1996 showed the US willingness to resume high-level exchanges. When meeting with China's President Jiang Zemin after President Clinton's re-election in November, Clinton expressed a willingness to establish a ‘strategic partnership’ with China.44 During subsequent visits in 1997 and 1998, Clinton publicly reiterated the ‘Three No's’ policy.
But some US action still threatened Chinese security. On 10–11 March 1996, the United States flexed its resolve in the Taiwanese crisis by dispatching two US aircraft carriers to international waters near Taiwan. The United States continued selling Taiwan weapons during 1997 and 1998, with the number of contracts and actual weapons continuing to rise. The US–Taiwan weapons contracts increased from $354 million in 1997 to $441 million in 1998, with actual weapons deliveries also rising from $216 million to $1.5 billion. The United States wishes to bring Taiwan into its East Asia security umbrella by virtue of its US–Japanese defence partnership and its plans for a theater missile defense system.45
Economic Inducement: Disentangling Human Rights and the Most-Favoured-Nation Status (1993–94)
In February 1993, newly elected President Clinton laid out the essence of his China policy, which was to use MFN status to promote improvements in human rights and democratization. In May, Clinton issued an executive order extending China's MFN status by a year, but making the following year's extension ‘dependent on whether China's efforts to improve human rights make overall, significant progress’. He listed seven requirements, including two ‘necessary conditions’ that China (1) substantially promotes the freedom of emigration objectives in the Trade Act of 1974; (2) complies with the 1992 bilateral agreement concerning prison labour; (3) takes steps in adhering to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (4) releases and provides an acceptable accounting for Chinese citizens imprisoned or detained for the non-violent expression of their political and religious beliefs; (5) ensures criminals humane treatment and permits international humane and human rights organizations to carry out inspections on prisons; (6) protects Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage and (7) permits international radio and television broadcasts in China.46
To weather this political pressure and further extend MFN status, China utilized economic measures to lower the China–US trade imbalance. In April 1993, before the United States decided on MFN status, China sent trade delegations to the United States that invested $1 billion in American cars and planes.47 China also actively encouraged American foreign direct investment. The Big Three car companies, Coca-Cola, General Electric, Motorola and others concluded a host of lucrative contracts during 1992 and the first quarter of 1993.48 At the same time, the expansion of China's economic diplomacy was luring other developed nations into China's market, making the United States realize the importance of the Chinese market to its economy. In November 1993, German Prime Minister Kohl traveled to China, during which time German companies bought more than $3 billion worth of goods. China also bypassed the US sanctions by looking to France, which became China's primary partner in building nuclear power plants.49
These economically driven policies had notable effectiveness. The huge economic benefits for the US companies in China forced them to think of ways to influence the China policy. Chairman of the US–China Business Council said, ‘American interests require stable China–US relations’, and ‘during the process of promoting the return to normal China–US relations, American industrial and commercial circles must actively participate’. About 800 companies urged the US government to extend MFN status in 1994.50 During 1992 and 1993, large German and French profits in China shocked US business circles, and US officials began realizing that the US allies were unwilling to pressurize China but more than willing to embrace business opportunities disregarded by the United States.51 Gradually discovering that using MFN status to pressurize China was not only disadvantageous to US interests but also put them in a rather passive position, Clinton announced the ‘severing’ of human rights from MFN status in 1994, in direct negation of the previous year's policy. His policy of using economic measures to force political change in China had failed.52 Human rights disputes between the two countries have eased, and human rights has been removed from the heart of US policy toward China since this change.53
The above case studies suggest the following:
- Strategic conciliation mitigated security concerns like the Taiwan problem, but the results were ambiguous. China's continued struggle to prevent Taiwanese independence since 2000 is a case in point, though this strategy has diminished some political pressure and has been slightly more effective than the strategy of the early 1990s.
- With regard to security concerns (Taiwan), China's experiments with moderate uses of strategic coercion were only partially successful, but were still superior to strategic conciliation. The Chinese response to changes in US–Taiwan relations during 1995 and 1996 is a compelling example of this success.
- Economic inducement showed obvious effectiveness in resolving economic disagreements as well as political issues, the most prominent example of which was the disentangling of human rights and MFN status; China never used economic sanctions in response to economic disagreements or political matters in China–US relations.
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Theoretical Analysis on the Efficiency of China's Policy |
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How should one analyse the different levels of effectiveness of China's post-Cold War policies towards the United States? This article takes the position that there are two essential factors to consider: first, post-Cold War changes in the structure of the international system, namely the dismantling of bi-polarity and the United States becoming the world's sole superpower; second, in this system of one superpower and many great powers, China's strength is growing the fastest of the great powers.
Post-Cold War Trends in Chinese and US Power
United States is dominant
After 1989, the relative superiority of the US power became more apparent every day, especially after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In terms of economic power, the US Gross National Product (GNP) exceeded 40% of the top seven military spenders in the world. After 1996, this proportion was still increasing, reaching 47.9% in 2002. Japan has always held the number two position, but even when the gap was at its smallest in 1991, the Japanese economy was only 62.3% of the US economy, and had fallen to 46.5% by 2002. With regard to military power, the US superiority is even more pronounced. After the fall of the Soviet Union, US military expenditure exceeded 60% of the top seven spenders, more than the next six largest spenders combined. Since 1991, Japan has continued to be second in military expenditure, though still only 15.7% of the US spending in 1998 when the gap between them was smallest.
China's relative capability enhancement
After 1989, China's power began rising the fastest and most pronounced of the six great powers. Statistics show that China's relative economic capability grew 2.4% in 1989 and hit 5.8% in 2002, averaging 7% domestic growth a year. For the other five great powers over the same period, France, Germany and UK averaged a growth of 0.2, 0.6 and 0.55%, respectively, while Japan and Russia experienced a negative growth, falling at an average rate of 1.3 and 7.8%, respectively. China's military expenditures rose at an annual average of 9.6%, increasing China's share of spending among the world's top seven spenders from 1.6% in 1989 to 5.4% in 2002, the largest percentage coming in 2001 at 5.7%. Of the other five major powers, French and Japanese spending rose at average annual rates of 0.18 and 2.2%, respectively. German, Russian and British expenditures fell at average rates of 1.6, 13.3 and 0.8%, respectively.
But the gaps between Chinese and American power are still considerable. In terms of relative economic capability, the Chinese economy was 12.1% the size of the US economy in 2002; military spending was only 7.9% of the US spending. Objectively speaking, China and the United States are not on the same level, whether it be economic or military strength (though the gap in military power is even wider). Even more important to recognize in post-Cold War China–US relations is that the difference between the two GDPs has actually grown in real terms. In 1989, the difference was $7.27 trillion, and this gradually increased to $8.83 trillion by 2002. Since 2000, there has also been a widening difference in the absolute military spending.
Changes in Relative Capability and the Impact on Effectiveness of China's Policy
Strategic conciliation
The US wariness of and diminishing need for China made it difficult for conciliation policies to mitigate security concerns.
Wary of China. China's heightening strength gave rise to enhanced the US vigilance, and China was gradually considered the greatest strategic threat to the United States. Commensurate with China's rapid economic progress after 1992, the United States began paying closer attention to the potential threats of China rising in status. In 1995, a senior official of the US Department of Defense stated, ‘We worry most about a strong China. If China's current pace of economic development continues for another ten years, then ... the greatest strategic concern at the end of the 20th century ... is the rise of China’.55 The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review released by the Department of Defense in 1997 declared that China was potentially one of America's global competitors of the 21st century.56 The Report of 2001 clearly proclaimed that, other than the Balkans, Europe was basically peaceful and Russia no longer posed a nuclear threat to NATO. However, the maintenance of stability in East Asia was complicated because the region potentially had an emerging ‘military competitor with a formidable resource base’.57 The report's ‘military competitor’ is China.
At the same time, the United States was continuously taking actions to contain China and prevent China from acquiring the accompanying economic and political benefits. China–US cooperation on military technology was halted on 6 June 1989. Overall China–US relations have since experienced several improvements and military contacts generally recovered, but the United States has never again sold advanced military technology, even blocking some sales that lacked any military implications.58 After 1992, the revamping of the US policy towards Taiwan, particularly improvements in the quantity and quality of weapon sales, enhanced US–Taiwan relations. This enhancement created a fairly tense situation in the Taiwan Strait, as well as postponing China's progress toward unification and slowing the pace of China's rise.59 After the 1990s, as the United States began reducing both the US and Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles, it actually took aim at China's nuclear weapons capacity, the goal being to prevent China from accruing any relative advantage from the US–Russia bilateral disarmament.60
Diminishing need for China
The gradual elimination of the Soviet threat gradually lowered the US's strategic reliance on China. After the mid-1990s, it became increasingly obvious that the preponderance of the US power allowed the United States to rely on itself for the protection of its core security interests. Shrinking US dependence on the UN or other countries gradually weakened China's policies of strategic conciliation by weakening China's vote in the UN, as well as diminishing China's ability to apply its security assets towards mutually beneficial exchanges or achieving its security objectives. In 1995, the US National Security Strategy clearly stated that the United States has to be ‘willing to act unilaterally when our direct national interests are most at stake’.61 Before the invasions of Kosovo and Iraq in 1999 and 2003, respectively, the United States tried desperately to gain UN support, but when unable to get it, bypassed the UN and took military action with other multilateral organizations or by uniting select countries, which consolidated its dominant status. In 2002, the United States announced its unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, clearing the way for a national missile defence system and further expanding its military superiority.
Before the dissolution of the Soviet Union and even shortly afterwards, the chief security concerns for the United States were the direction of the USSR and Eastern Europe, as well as managing relations between them and US allies. China was more a political problem than a security problem. After political crises in Beijing and abrupt change in the Soviet Union during 1989, smooth power transitions and continued ‘reform and opening up’ were uncertainties in China.62 The implementation of strategic conciliation policies in an attempt to cooperate with the United States, especially politically, nonetheless showed some effectiveness. At the end of 1989, the US Assistant Secretary of State testified to Congress that the United States must maintain contact with China because, from a global perspective, the strategic value of the China–US relationship was not weakened by US–USSR detente.63 This showed that when the future of the Soviet Union was ambiguous, the United States took China's strategic importance fairly seriously and, to a certain extent, hoped to maintain previous levels of strategic cooperation. Even after the fall of the USSR, there was still a real Soviet threat, so the United States maintained contact with China to counter the threat that still had not fully disappeared.64 From 1989 to 1992, strategic conciliation policies were still effective, particularly politically.
Changes in Chinese and US power levels resulted in a greater focus on China's relative gains in the security realm. This occurred as China's strategic use was declining, which made it difficult for China's strategic conciliation policies to mitigate security pressures. The policies were unable to effectively curb the US support for Taiwanese independence, for instance, because the United States considered cooperation in the security realm as granting China obvious benefits and detrimental to the maintenance of US dominance. Consequently, China's use of strategic conciliation policies to achieve its security objectives has increasingly encountered difficulty. Even after 9/11, these circumstances have not changed a great deal. In September 2001, reporters asked US Secretary of State Colin Powell whether the US would offer the Chinese government ‘support and understanding for China's fight against terrorism and separatism’, which would demonstrate goodwill and reduce US support for Taiwan. Powell responded that there was absolutely no possibility of bilateral exchanges regarding the terrorism issue, suggesting that the United States would not link its war against terrorism to its Taiwan policy. At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum later that year, Presidents Jiang Zemin and Bush held a joint press conference in which they agreed that the fight against terrorism ‘absolutely cannot become an excuse for the persecution of ethnic minorities’.65
Strategic coercion
The United States wish to avoid nuclear confrontation and the gap between the US and the Chinese military strength guaranteed that policies of strategic coercion were partially successful.
In order to consolidate and extend the US hegemony, the US has encouraged every effort to maintain stability in the international system, largely by avoiding direct military confrontation with nuclear powers that could trigger a great power war. On issues involving the core of China's security, such as restraining the growth of Taiwanese independence, China has therefore adopted a moderate level of strategic coercion. By demonstrating the determination and capacity to defend its national unification, as well as revealing the limited nature of its strategic objectives, China was able to force the United States to adopt cooperative action. The constructive results of this policy were more effective than strategic conciliation because conciliation would have given the US the impression that China would tolerate the US position on Taiwan. Policies implemented against the threats to China's survival therefore show a firmer resolve. China's experience in 1995–96 provides a quintessential example of this policy in practice.
The 1996 confrontation in the Taiwan Strait made the United States realize that military support for Taiwanese independence was dangerous, and avoiding a nuclear conflict with China meant that US military support for Taiwan must have limits. Clinton subsequently declared his opposition to Taiwanese independence, took international action and, in so doing, improved China–US relations. In the year following Li Denghui's visit to the United States in May 1995, China exercised restraint in the face of US weapons sales to Taiwan and a restructured US policy towards Taiwan. Over the course of discussing whether Li Denghui should visit the United States, the State Department believed that China would have three possible reactions: (1) adopt potentially crisis-level measures, including recalling the ambassador or other pointed actions; (2) retaliate against the United States in other spheres and (3) give an incensed public reaction, but not take rash action. The final verdict from the State Department was that the likelihood of the first or second reactions was minimal, but that the possibility of the third reaction was high. If the United States invited Li to visit, then it had to accept the danger involved and had better be able to endure the potential outcomes. Ultimately, the result was the presidential approval of Li's visit.66
The gap between Chinese and US conventional military strength meant that China's coercive policies would not be completely successful. Although the Chinese military has more troops and expenditures are rising, the overall quality of the military is at least 15–20 years behind that of the United States. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, Jr believes that the Chinese military almost never receives training in the tactics of modern warfare. The military's information technology is particularly rudimentary, and in the 21st century, the most important military capabilities happen to rest in information technology. Perhaps, in another 20 years China will reach the current levels of US military strength. But the United States will definitely continue to advance in the interim. An objective assessment of the gap in military power suggests that tactics of strategic coercion can be employed only on issues concerning China's survival, and that their value will be tempered and only partially effective.
Economic inducement and economic sanctions
The strengthening of China's economic power means that economic inducement can be effective at alleviating the US economic pressure; the difference in relative economic capability means that China is powerless to enact economic sanctions.
China's improving economic power—gradual expansion of economic capacity, daily increases in investment opportunities and growing market size—strengthens its ability to reach political objectives through economic assets. The result is that economic inducement policies can effectively resolve China–US economic disagreements because the United States is unwilling to forgo China's market opportunities and allow other developed nations to benefit while the United States undermines its economic well-being. Two telling examples are the US abandonment of the linkage of human rights circumstances to the MFN status in 1994 and the November 1999 bilateral agreement on China's entrance into the WTO.67
In addition, the post-Cold War structure of the Chinese and US economies made them natural economic partners, but the relative economic gains have not been nearly as palpable as gains in the security sphere. A research paper by the US Institute for International Economics reported that the expansion of US–China trade had a positive overall impact on the US economy. Of the total US imports from China, 90% originated in other countries and only 10% were substitutes for US products. At the same time, US companies and workers gain many benefits from their exports to China. Nicholas Lardy believes that, as a developing country and developing market, China will continue to purchase large quantities of US goods for various spheres of its economy, including airplanes, electronics, steel and construction materials. Moreover, China can still become a major consumer of US agricultural products.68
The gap in economic strength between the two countries, particularly considering the skewed configuration of bilateral trade, determines that China has virtually no possibility of adopting sanctions. Statistics show that China is heavily trade-dependent on the United States. From 1989 to 1998, the percentage of Chinese exports bound for the United States increased from 24.4 to 38.7% of China's total exports. (Chinese statistics say the numbers are 8.3 and 10.7%, respectively.) Comparatively speaking, the US reliance on Chinese trade is far lower. From 1989 to 1998, the percentage of US exports to China hovered between 1.2 and 2.1% of the US total.69 Although China–US trade has since become a gradually larger portion of total US trade, the figure was still only about 7% in 2003.70 Thus, China has little potential to enact economic sanctions to protect its economic interests, especially in pursuit of political and security objectives. Even if they were used, they would not achieve their desired result.
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When the basis for China–US strategic cooperation against the USSR ceased to exist after 1989, the nature of the relationship changed. Disagreements in China–US relations gradually became more apparent, as did structural problems. In response to these changes and the need to alleviate heightening US foreign policy pressures, China implemented a number of policies towards the United States. From an effectiveness perspective, strategic conciliation was ineffective at mitigating security concerns, which became more obvious after the mid-1990s; conciliation, however, did prove more effective at alleviating political pressure, especially during the early 1990s before the USSR was completely dismantled. Strategic coercion was partially effective in response to changes in China–US relations during 1995–96. It revealed that, moderately coercive policies were more successful than conciliation in response to security problems involving China's existence. Economic inducement successfully made the US abandon its policy of linking MFN status to China's human rights situation, showing that this policy was successful at softening economic pressures and their accompanying political problems. China never adopted economic sanctions to ease the US pressure on political or security issues.
The main reasons behind the differing results of China's policies stem from post-Cold War changes in relative Chinese and US power levels: the United States became the world's sole superpower and its systemic dominance was gradually established; China's relative capability has steadily increased as it rises the fastest of the great powers. The major influences of these two factors are as follows:
- The US wariness of China and its diminishing need for cooperation with China made it difficult for conciliation strategies to reduce security pressures. In a US-led international system, the obvious rise in China's relative capability made it the main target of US overtures. The United States increasingly worries about Chinese gains in the security realm that advances China towards threatening US dominance. Rather than adopt substantive measures to satisfy Chinese security concerns, the United States has instead exploited opportunities to contain China. Additionally, overwhelming post-Cold War power superiority has strengthened the US capacity and resolve to act unilaterally, reducing its need to solicit Chinese cooperation on security issues. China's strategic conciliation tactics were ineffective in slowing US security pressures.
- The US wish to avoid conflict with nuclear powers and the preponderance of US conventional power guaranteed that moderate policies of strategic coercion were only partially effective on problems regarding China's survival, but more effective than strategic conciliation. The US dominance of the international system means that its primary interest is to preserve stability by avoiding direct military confrontation with nuclear powers, especially when involving a great power's survival or other core security concerns. In terms of the Taiwan problem, then, moderate displays of strategic coercion can advance the notion that China will resolutely defend its key interests. By revealing that China's objectives have policy limits, the United States is challenged to take some sort of cooperation action. Strategic conciliation, on the other hand, will give the United States and her allies a mistaken view of China's policy position and encourage the implementation of policies even more harmful to China. Because of the obvious gap between Chinese and US military strength, however, strategic coercion can be sustained only at low levels and adopted only in extreme circumstances, otherwise the effect may be opposite to the desired outcome.
- The enhanced appeal of China's market and its less relative gain in the economic cooperation with the United States result in the policies of economic inducement effectively mitigating economic problems and their accompanying political pressure. But because China's dependence on US trade is far higher than the United States dependence on China's trade, China has no capacity to achieve its political objectives through economic sanctions.
This analysis offers the following guidance for future policy formulation towards the United States: first, policy makers must fully recognize fundamental clashes arising out of changes in relative China–US power levels during the post-Cold War era, most notably that strategic conciliation policies will not attain US cooperation on Taiwan. Regarding the interests of national survival in the Taiwan problem, China should adopt strategic coercion policies uniquely adapted to its strengths. This will demonstrate Chinese resolve, enhance the credibility of China's military deterrent and head off the fast-growing momentum behind Taiwanese independence; second, with regard to other political concerns, policy makers must steadfastly promote China–US cooperation, employ strategic conciliation and strive to preserve smooth development of China–US relations in ways that best limit US capacity to hinder China's relative economic or political gains and third, we must preserve the movement towards strong economic cooperation and guarantee normal China–US exchanges and contacts, for these forms of integration are vital to settling political and security concerns.
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1 During the mid-1990s, some scholars, especially the US scholars, paid particular attention to China's future posture and proposed the US response. This article will not discuss this topic because it is only weakly related to this article, and the summaries already available on the subject suffice. Interested readers can see Fu Menzi, ‘Zhongguo jueqi: Meiguo de jiben pinggu ji dui hua zhengce lunzheng’ (‘China's Rise: US Base Assessments and Policy Debates’) Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics), No.2 (2002), pp. 20–5; Thomas Christensen, ‘Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and the Challenges for US Security Policy’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2001), pp. 5–10.
2 See Wang Weiguang, ‘Kunjing yu xuanze: lengzhan hou Zhongguo dui Mei waijiao’ (‘Dilemmas and Choices: China's Post-Cold War Diplomacy toward the United States’), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), No. 3 (2000), pp. 78–87; Zheng Yongnian ‘Shijie tixi, ZhongMei guanxi he Zhongguo de zhanlue kaoliang’ (‘Global Systems, China–US relations and Chinese Strategy Considerations’), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), No. 5 (2001), pp. 65–77.
3 See Michael Swaine and Ashley Tellis, Zhongguo da zhanlue, (Interpreting China's Grand Strategy), trans. Hong Yunxi and Cai Yan (Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe, 2001), pp. 103–11, 142–72. For English, see http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1121/; Shi Yinhong, ‘ZhongMei waijiao he zhanlue 15 nian: yanhua guocheng, jiben jingyan he shangcun wenti’ (‘Fifteen Years of China–US Diplomacy and Strategy: Evolutionary Processes, Essential Experiences and Remaining Problems’), Guoji guangcha (International Review), No. 2 (2004), pp. 1–6; Tang Shiping and Zhang Yunling, ‘Zhongguo de diqu zhanlue’ (‘China's Regional Strategy’), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics), No. 6 (2004), pp. 8–13; Yang Jiemian, Hou lengzhan shiqi ZhongMei guanxi: waijiao zhengce bijiao yanjiu (Post-Cold War China–US Relations: Comparative Foreign Policy Research), (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2000), pp. 68–104; Chu Shulong, Lengzhan hou ZhongMei guanxi de zouxiang (Post-Cold War Trends in China–US Relations), (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2001), pp. 132–79.
4 See Robert Ross, ‘The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility and the Use of Force’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2000), pp. 87–123; Zhao Suisheng, ‘Cong heping gongshi dao qiangzhi zhanlue: you Beijing de renzhi bianhua kan 1995–96 nian Taiwan weiji’ (‘From Peace Offensive to Strategic Coercion: the 1995–96 Taiwan Crisis as seen from Beijing’), Yazhou pinglun (Asia Review) (Fall-Winter 1998), pp. 8–29.
5 See David Lampton, Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing US–China Relations, 1989–2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Wang Jisi and Wang Yong, ‘A Chinese Account: The Interaction of Policies’, in Ramon Hawley Myers et al., eds, Making China Policy: Lessons From The Bush and Clinton Administrations, (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), pp. 269–95; Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, Changcheng yu kong chengji: Zhongguo dui anquan de xuqiu (The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security), trans. Ke Xiong (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1997); Jia Qingguo and Tang Wei, eds, Jishou de hezuo: ZhongMei guanxi de xianzhuang yu qianzhan (Thorny Cooperation: Current and Future China–US Relations) (Beijing: Wenhua yishu chubanshe, 1998).
6 Bruce Russet and Harvey Starr, Shijie zhengzhi (World Politics), trans. Wang Yuzhen et al. (Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 2001), pp. 158–9.
7 Bruce Russet and Harvey Starr, World Politics, p.115.
8 Robert Keohane, ed., Xin xianshi zhuyi ji qi pipan (Neorealism and Its Critics), trans. Guo Shuyong (Beijing: Beijing Daxue Chubanshe, 2002), p.105.
9 Another example of economic inducement policy came in November 1999, when China and the United States reached an agreement on China's entrance into the WTO. This article does not allow for its detailed consideration. See David Lampton, Same Bed Different Dreams, pp. 183–8. Post-Cold War China has never used economic sanctions against the United States to achieve its political or security objectives, so it will not be considered here.
10 Su Ge, Meiguo dui Hua zhengce yu Taiwan wenti (US Policy toward China and the Taiwan Problem) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1998), pp. 592, 594 and 597.
11 Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, (Deng Xiaoping Selected Works) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), Vol. 3, p.321.
12 Jia Qingguo and Tang Wei, eds, Thorny Cooperation, p.60.
13 Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo dangdai waijiao shi: 1949–95 (China's Contemporary Diplomatic History: 1949–95) (Beijing: Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 1997), p.474.
14 Su Ge, US Policy toward China and the Taiwan Problem, p.620.
15 Jia Qingguo and Tang Wei, eds, Thorny Cooperation, pp. 70–71.
16 Xie Yixian, ed., China's Contemporary Diplomatic History: 1949–95, p.410.
17 Jia Qingguo and Tang Wei, eds, Thorny Cooperation, p.71.
18 Xie Yixian, ed., China's Contemporary Diplomatic History: 1949–95, pp. 460–1.
19 Su Ge, US Policy toward China and the Taiwan Problem, pp. 613–4.
22 Jia Qingguo and Tang Wei, eds, Thorny Cooperation, pp. 93–4.
23 Xie Yixian, ed., China's Contemporary Diplomatic History: 1949–95, p.462.
24 Yan Xuetong, Meiguo baquan yu zhongguo anquan (American Hegemony and Chinese Security) (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 2000), p.230.
25 ‘Chen Shuibian shouci gongkai jiaoxiao: gongmin toupiao gaibian taiwan xianzhuang’(‘Chen Shuibian's first Public Commotion: Referendum can Change Taiwan status-quo’), http://www.cctv.com/special/670/1/40284.html.
26 Tao Wenzhao, (‘Bushen dangzheng yilai de zhongmei guanxi’) (‘China–US Relations with Bush in Power’) http://www.cass.cn/meiguosuo/show/show_project_ls.asp?id=552.
27 Wang Jisi, ‘China's Reaction to G. W. Bush: Tactical Moves, or A Strategic Reorientation?’ in Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, ed., US–China Relations and the Bush Administration: A New Paradigm or Continuing Modalities (Claremont, CA: Keck Center of International and Strategic Studies, 2002), pp. 143–4.
28 See Resolutions 1441, 1472, 1483, 1500 and 1511.
29 Three examples are the ‘Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies’, the ‘Export Control of Dual-use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies’, the ‘Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies’, and their accompanying surveillance mechanisms. Further, China revised its ‘Export Control of Military Items’ and its surveillance mechanisms. See also Tao Wenzhao, ‘China–US Relations with Bush in Power’.
30 Notable examples of this include the 30 September 2002, National Security Strategy, which emphasized cooperation with China and other great powers through mutual responses to non-traditional security threats. The US government also expressed appreciation for China's constructive role in the North Korea nuclear problem. See also Tao Wenzhao, ‘China–US Relations with Bush in Power’; Michale Swaine, ‘Reverse Course? The Fragile Turnaround in US–China Relations’, http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Policybrief22.pdf.
31 Wang Jisi, ‘China's Reaction to G. W. Bush’, p.148.
32 Liu Hong, ‘The Restructuring of US Post-Cold War Policy toward Taiwan and the Impact on Cross-Strait Relations’, http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/179294.htm
33 ‘Meiguo xuanbu duitai junshou xin jihua: Zhongguo qianglie buman, zhi xiang taidu shili fachu cuowu xinhao’, (‘The US Announces New Plans for the Taiwanese Military: China Extremely Dissatisfied, Says is Mistake’) http://www.zaobao.com/special/china/taiwan/pages6/taiwan020404.html
34 ‘Meiguo zhichi taidu de gongkaihua’ (‘The Publicizing of US Support for Taiwanese Independence’), http://www.zaobao.com/special/china/taiwan/pages6/taiwan290404f.html.
35 Su Ge, US Policy toward China and the Taiwan Problem, p.640.
36 The primary regulations were that the United States would initiate higher-level contacts and allow Taiwanese officials to come to US territory; hold fixed-level cabinet meetings at the Assistant Secretary level to negotiate trade and investment agreements; support Taiwan's entrance into international organizations as a normal member, in some organizations looking for Taiwan to have a ‘legal function and voice’; allow the chief, deputy chief, and any level worker at the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) to enter Taiwan's ‘foreign ministry’ to discuss official matters; allow US economic and technology cabinet workers to arrange meetings at the AIT with Taiwanese representatives; the Taiwanese mission in the United States would change its name from ‘North American Affairs Coordination Committee’ to the ‘Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office’, etc. See also Su Ge, US Policy toward China and the Taiwan Problem, pp. 729–30.
37 Zhao Suisheng, ‘From Peace Offensive to Strategic Coercion’, p.20.
38 Su Ge, US Policy toward China and the Taiwan Problem, p.739.
39 Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress, p.80.
40 Su Ge, US Policy toward China and the Taiwan Problem, pp. 740–48.
41 Zhao Suisheng, ‘From Peace Offensive to Strategic Coercion’, p.24.
42 Su Ge, US Policy toward China and the Taiwan Problem, p.751.
43 Chen Jian, ‘Lengzhan hou shiqi Beijing de duitai zhengce yu jiejue Taiwan wenti de yixie jiben silu’(‘Beijing's Post-Cold War Policies on Taiwan and Base Modes of Thinking in Resolving the Taiwan Problem’), Yazhou pinglun (Asian Review), Fall-Winter 1998, p.41.
44 Su Ge, US Policy toward China and the Taiwan Problem, p.752.
45 Yang Jiemian, ‘Kelindun zhengfu duitai zhengce tiaozheng’ (‘The Restructuring of the Clinton Administration's Taiwan Policy’), Meiguo Yanjiu (American Studies), No. 4 (1999); Data Center of Renmin University of China, Zhongguo waijiao (China's Foreign Affairs), No. 5 (2000), p.6.
46 Su Ge, US Policy toward China and the Taiwan Problem, pp. 672–3.
48 David Lampton, Same Bed Different Dreams, p.40.
49 Su Ge, US Policy toward China and the Taiwan Problem, p.692.
51 David Lampton, Same Bed Different Dreams, p.40.
52 Su Ge, US Policy toward China and the Taiwan Problem, p.695.
53 Niu Jun, ‘Zhuanxingzhong de ZhongMei guanxi’ (‘Turning Points in China–US Relations’), Guoji Jingji Pinglun (International Economics Review), No. 1 (2000); Data Center of Renmin University of China, ‘Zhongguo waijiao’ (‘China's Foreign Affairs’), No. 3 (2000), p.3.
54 Relative capability includes two indicators, relative military capability and relative economic capability. The above method of calculation: relative military capability = (national military expenditures/the sum of the world's top seven military spenders)*100%; relative economic capability = national GNP/the sum of the world's top seven GNPs)*100%. The seven major powers are: China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia (from 1989 to 1991, the USSR) Great Britain and the United States. Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). All data of the article's statistics regarding relative capability levels were obtained from SIPRI database. See http://web.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_database1.html (requires registration). GNP figures were calculated from the military expenditures over GNP, with the exception of the Soviet Union's 1991 military expenditures, which are not provided.
This article does not use figures from the US Department of State; see US Department of State, World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers (WMEAT), 1999–2000, http://www.state.gov/t/vc/rls/rpt/wmeat/1999-2000/. There are two reasons for this. First, the statistics are not complete. (WMEAT, 1999–2000 does not have figures for 2000–2002). Second, statistics on China's relative capability are exaggerated. For these reasons, SIPRI's numbers have stronger persuasive power and are used here.
55 Chu Shulong, Post-Cold War Trends in China–US Relations, p.44.
56 Report of The Quadrennial Defense Review (Department of Defense, May, 1997), p.5.
57 Report of The Quadrennial Defense Review (Department of Defense, September, 2001), pp. 3–4.
58 Li Bin, ‘Juedui huoyi, xiangdui huoyi yu Meiguo dui Hua anquan zhengce’ (‘Absolute Gains, Relative Gains and American Security Policy toward China’), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics), No. 11 (2002), p.20.
59 Yan Xuetong, American Hegemony and Chinese Security, p.144.
60 Li Bin, ‘Absolute Gains, Relative Gains and American Security Policy toward China’, p.20.
61 Yan Xuetong ed. Zhongguo yu yatai anquan (China and Asian-Pacific Security), (Beijing, Shishi Chubanshe, 1999), p.82.
62 US Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century, April, 1990, p.4. Cited in Wu Xinbo, ‘Lengzhan jieshu zhichu Meiguo yatai anquan zhanlue de zhuanbian’(‘US Security Strategy Transformations in East Asia and the Pacific at the Conclusion of the Cold War’), http://www.irchina.org/xueren/china/view.asp?id=262.
63 Su Ge, US Policy toward China and the Taiwan Problem, p.609.
64 Chu Shulong, Post-Cold War Trends in China–US Relations, pp. 57–8.
65 Zhang Ruizhuang, ‘Bushi duihua zhengce zhong de "lanjun" yinying’ (‘The Shadow "Blue Army" in Bush's China Policy’), Meiguo yanjiu (American Studies), No. 1 (2002), p.41.
66 Su Ge, US Policy toward China and the Taiwan Problem, pp. 737–8.
67 For a description of the process behind the bilateral agreement on China's entrance into the WTO, see David Lampton, Same Bed Different Dreams, pp. 183–8.
68 Chu Shulong, Post-Cold War Trends in China–US Relations, pp. 478–9.
69 David Lampton, Same Bed Different Dreams, p.380.
70 ‘ZhongMei maoyi ji touzi zuixin tongji’ (‘The Most Recent Statistics on China–US Trade and Investment’), http://us.mofcom.gov.cn/article/200203/20020300003584_1.xml.