The Late Qing Dynasty Diplomatic Transformation: Analysis from an Ideational Perspective
* Corresponding author. Email: zhangxm95{at}126.com
During the 19th century, the Imperial Qing Dynasty gradually waned, as the power of Western capitalist states surged and consolidated.1 The formidable military force commanded by the Western powers gained them entry into China's vast territory, wherein to extend their power parameters. Yet, the constant pressure exerted by Western gunboats, and this eminently advanced civilization as a whole, did little to sway the Qing government from its traditional mode of Chinese Dynastic diplomacy. This raises the questions, why should the Qing government seriously imperil state security throughout its two-decade, persistent adherence to outmoded statecraft? And why did the transformation in foreign policy that lead to the Qing government's diplomatic modernization occur so rapidly after the signing of the Treaty of Peking?
A rationalist approach within the academic field of international relations (IR) generally cites power and interests as the primary causes or determinants of a state's external behaviour, ideas being perceived as pre-determined factors that have little, or at most, epiphenomenal, impact.2 The authors of this essay believe that ideas are an important variable, equal in significance to power and interests, when interpreting state behaviour. The late Qing Dynasty had fundamental reasons for transforming its diplomacy; one was the direct military challenge of the Western powers, but the revolution in politics that was occurring both at home and abroad undoubtedly also spurred the change in Qing Dynasty diplomatic behaviour. It was the Qing government's acknowledgement of the quandary that China was in, and its causes, that added impetus to the momentous perceptional and ideational change that resulted in China's proactive implementation of international diplomatic practices.
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Explanatory Models of the Late Qing Diplomatic Transformation |
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Any contemporary historical research into late Qing diplomatic relations is likely to encounter John Fairbank and Joseph Levenson's ‘Impact-Response’ model.3 The basic assumptions behind this explanatory model are: China is an ossified society frozen in tradition and locked in cyclical motion. Lacking as it does the internal strength to break out of its traditional framework, it can catch up with the times only in response to the challenges imposed by Western domination. In other words, all the changes that have occurred in modern Chinese society are in response to Western challenges. Fairbank and Ssu-Yu Teng elaborate: ‘As China is the largest unitary mass of humanity with the oldest continuous history, its being trampled upon by the West during the past century was bound to create a continuing and violent intellectual revolution, the end of which we have not yet seen ... a century plagued with unequal treaties brought the ancient society of China into ever closer contact with the dominant and expanding societies of Western Europe and America. This Western contact, lent impetus by the industrial revolution, had a disastrous effect upon the old Chinese society. China's old order was challenged, attacked, undermined and overwhelmed within every social sphere by a complex series of processes – political, economic, social, ideological, cultural – that had been activated by encroachment of an alien, more powerful society’.4 This model has been of great influence on many Chinese scholars and is regarded as a main point of reference within historical research on late Qing diplomacy.
James Peck's ‘Imperialism’ is another broad explanatory approach that commonly crops up in Sino-related research.5 This model cites imperialism as being the root of all of China's problems during the century between the Opium Wars and the triumph of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This approach makes imperialism a key factor, as well as an historical reality, in an explanation that covers a hundred years of Chinese history (1842–1949 AD). During this period, Western economic power and domination caused China immense harm. But it was only the West, according to Peck, that could create the conditions necessary for fundamental change in China. It was Western might and industrialization that ‘undermined the foundations of China's self-sufficient agricultural economy and its traditional culture and values’.6
By the 1970s, these explanatory models were being challenged by scholars that placed more emphasis on the impact of domestic Chinese historical developments and changes. In 1974, Paul Cohen argued that the focus of the ‘Impact–Response’ model was too narrow. Its assumption that Chinese actions were purely the result of Western challenges overrode any possibility of their having been prompted by internal dynamics. The structure of the ‘Impact–Response’ model and the modernization paradigm inevitably lead historians to focus on phases of the historical process that either promote or retard ‘progress’, ‘development’, and ‘modernity’. Cohen recommends using China itself and its social structures, as well as their internal dynamics and changes, as the starting points for any thorough, methodical study of modern Chinese history. This he defines as a ‘China-centered approach to Chinese history’.7 This new analytic approach to modern Chinese history was strongly supported by Chinese academics, many of whom emulated it in their own research. The phrase ‘discovering history in China’ actually became a catchphrase within the field.8
In recent years, scholars have begun analysing the external challenge versus internal dynamic debate on a dialectic framework. Liang Bohua points out that although Western aggression may have been a major cause and catalyst of change in Chinese diplomatic policy, it was not outside pressure that causes the transformation in it in the late Qing Dynasty. ‘Imperialism as an exogenous factor cannot be used to explain the major transformation of Chinese international relations in the past hundred years. In searching for an explanation, if we relied exclusively on analyzing external challenges, then we would never see the whole picture. Modern Chinese international relations history is not just one foreign disaster after another. Chinese diplomatic transformation was not caused entirely by external factors, since China did resist imperialism in its own way and was not always passive. Instead, China attempted to find its own path and strengthen itself in the international community’.9 Liang Bohua believes that the late Qing government was reacting to Western challenges but that in adjusting its external outlook and behaviour it was also adapting to the new international environment and advancing along the self-strengthening path.10
In response to the ‘Impact–Response’ model, Cheng Shenglin suggested one ‘similar in wording, but different in meaning’ which he called the ‘Challenge–Reaction’ model. He argues that during the time of the Opium Wars, China faced the dual challenge of an ‘an invading West’ and a ‘technologically advanced West’. This led to three different policy reactions: a detrimental policy of isolationism; a submissive policy of traitorousness, and a patriotic policy of resistance and learning. The author analyses these three reactions in great detail, pointing out the symbolic significance of the third policy, which evokes the image of an awakened and rising modern Chinese nation. The ‘Challenge–Reaction’ model is used in analyses of Chinese reactions to the West in the wake of the Opium Wars but, in the words of Cheng Shenglin, ‘the three policy reactions that arose as a result of the Opium Wars traverse the entirety of modern Chinese history’.11 This type of analytical framework, therefore, is suitable for research on all aspects of modern Chinese history.
It later became clear, however, that none of the above mentioned models, including the external challenge model and the China-centred models, adequately addressed the questions: how did Western material aggression or Chinese–Western cultural exchange promote changes in the late Qing government's external outlook? And, how did these changes trigger the corresponding and speedy transformation of Qing diplomatic policy and behaviour?
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Ideas, Their Functions, and Paths |
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Scholars of IR differ over definitions of the concept of ideas. Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane argue that ideas are individually held beliefs covering an extremely broad array of issues, ranging from general moral principles to agreement on specific applications of scientific knowledge.12 Wendt, on the other hand, uses the term ‘shared ideas’, which means ‘the shared understandings and expectations of actors in a specific social environment’. This is the phenomenon whereby actors interact to create and reinforce a pool of shared knowledge.13
This article distinguishes between three types of idea.14 One is the idea or opinion that is created when certain objective factors stimulate the human sensory organs. It is this type of idea that develops direct causational relationships, similar in many respects to Goldstein and Keohane's ‘causal beliefs’.15 This type of idea is also extremely concrete, although it can change rapidly and frequently, and may have a direct effect on diplomatic policy. For example, after the Second Opium War, many Qing government officials began to distinguish between English and French intentions. This newfound understanding had significant impact on the ‘policy of engagement’ and ‘policy of hiring for suppression’ later adopted by the government.
Second, ideas also reflect the social consciousness that exists in every society. These ideas are characterized in different worldviews and value systems. Worldviews are the most basic guidelines to an actor's actions and behaviour. For much of the Qing dynasty, for example, the ‘Sino-centric worldview’ dominated diplomatic policy. Under its auspices, Qing rulers were in no doubt as to their world status. It was expressed in the principle: ‘I am a superior authority, therefore all lands are subject to me’. The emperor was the self-acclaimed Son of Heaven who, as long as he held the Mandate of Heaven, ruled supreme over all mankind. Value systems measure an actor's successes and failures; they are the yardstick that distinguishes right from wrong, as well as just from unjust. Value systems are also referred to as ‘principled beliefs’.16 That known as huayiguan (hua designates China and Chinese people; yi, namely, foreign barbarians, refers to all the other countries and peoples) existed during the Qing dynasty. It was based on the belief that ‘China and Chinese people are superior, all others are inferior’. In the Qing Rulers’ worldview, there was the civilized world (China) and the non-civilized world (everywhere else). The huayiguan value system was the keystone of the tributary system, which involved an extremely strict hierarchical structure of ceremonies that constituted Chinese diplomatic relations. Receiving tributes was perceived as a means of bolstering Dynastic dignity. It was consequently a crucial aspect of Qing government statecraft. This kind of worldview and value system provides a sense of stability and longevity in actors, although they vary as underlying conditions change. When they do occur, changes in worldviews and value systems cause a corresponding change in an actor's behaviour.
Third, interaction among different actors produces a sense of shared knowledge, which can be conceptualized as shared ideas or norms that ‘are not just subjective, but intersubjective’.17 Each actor's perception of the common relationship can be characterized as shared knowledge.
The evolution of IR theory has brought the material interests versus ideational norms debate to centre stage. The key question asked today is, how may diametrically opposed concepts affect state behaviour? The authors believe that ideational and material variables are equally significant when analysing a state's foreign policies, and that the two should work in combination. ‘Indeed, ideas often become politically efficacious only in conjunction with other changes, either in material interests or in power relationships’.18
Ideas have the following impact on foreign policy-making:19
First, ideas can serve as a road map for foreign policy-makers that perceive a causal relationship between policy goals and the strategies needed to achieve them.
Second, when the actors involved fail to achieve equilibrium in their strategic interactions, ideas can serve as points of reference. They can resolve issues arising from, say, a breach of contract, or offset other problems through collective action.
Third, ideas can become institutionalized, which raises long-term implications. Some ideas become institutionalized through long-term practice; others are embedded within the institution, wielding significant and lasting influence over its structural functions. Institutionalized ideas are instrumental in popularizing certain rules and linking various domains.20 An idea that is institutionalized in international society is one that a country's foreign policy is likely to emulate, in order to secure protection on the global stage. Institutionalized ideas are at the root of the Qing government's cognition, acceptance and use of international law, of its concept of sovereignty and of its establishment of diplomatic missions abroad.
Fourth, interaction among various actors in the international arena can engender the formation of shared ideas. This triggers reconstruction of the actor's identity and interests, which influences its ideas on foreign policy. Under similar or comparable material conditions, there are diverse cognitions and definitions of state interest that produce correspondingly eclectic results. In defining state interests, a state's view of itself in relation to another is extremely important, as regards its impact on interactive patterns within the international arena. International systems and standards belong in the domain of shared ideas, because they are ‘what actors commonly view and share as appropriate forms of behaviour and action’.21 International actors also internalise standards and norms, to the point they acquire a ‘taken-as-read’ quality.22
An idea, of course, can perform many functions that do not necessarily follow a single model or framework. An idea could potentially operate in a manner simultaneously consistent with some or all of the above functions.
Ideas do not change organically; this is a process of stimulation and impetus wrought by shifting exogenous conditions. Changes in an actor's material strength and position lead it to certain ideational variations. The Western challenge actually had significant impact on the late Qing diplomatic outlook and ideas. Ideational change and re-formation, however, is a complex process that involves synthesis of various factors and variables. Viewing ideational change in the late Qing Dynasty as solely attributable to Western challenges would be an oversimplification. After all, ‘the impact of Western challenges can only be understood in the context of internal Chinese historical development’.23
Alker argues that ‘there is no real point in debating the relative importance of ideas versus material forces or capabilities in international politics’.24 In the field of IR, ontological questions such as whether ideational or material forces have the greater influence cannot be answered on a macro level. The more interesting questions are: under what conditions do ideas change and transform? In international politics, what are the causal mechanisms for the role that ideas play?25 The central aims of this essay are to analyse changes in the late Qing government's external outlook and ideas, pinpoint the various specific stages of change, and assess the influence of this ideational transformation on late Qing diplomacy.
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Qing Dynasty Traditional Ideas of Foreign Relations and their Impact on Diplomacy |
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China was the most powerful country in East Asia from the Han and Tang Dynasties through to the ‘Kang-Yong-Qian’ Golden Era.26 Over the millennia it nurtured in itself a sense of political superiority. Geographical barriers and primitive transportation isolated China from the rest of the world and other advanced civilizations. It consequently developed an isolationist civilization with a self-centred worldview. Many of China's surrounding states and nations became vassals, some seeking to share in Chinese civilization and culture, others with more material interests in mind. Certain remote Western countries also evinced willingness to participate in the Chinese tributary system, as it provided a channel through which to serve their interests. These were the foundations of Chinese Celestial Dynasty diplomacy: a core tributary system complemented, when dealing with foreign relations, with strict application of moral ethical standards.
Inheriting and Sustaining Traditional Ideas
The Qing Dynasty inherited the following traditional Chinese concepts of rule: geographical self-centredness, civilizational self-centredness, and the value system known as huayiguan.
A. Geographical Self-centredness
China's geographical environment, surrounded on all four sides by natural barriers, its original territory integrated into a single geographical unit, hindered contact and communication with much of the outside world. This had the accumulative effect on most Chinese of their seeing the entire world from within the narrow confines of China's topography. They perceived China as being surrounded by ‘four seas’ (the natural barriers), bordered by peripheral kingdoms with an interior composed of various feudal kingdoms. This was the considered worldview of most Chinese people. ‘Heaven above; Earth below; the Middle Kingdom at the center of the universe; siyi are the peripheral regions; siyi is external, the Middle Kingdom is internal’.27 China gained some understanding of the outside world through the famous voyages of Admiral Zheng He during the Ming Dynasty, when Chinese contact with the West actually achieved a level of development. As, however, ‘Chinese people continued to hold to their traditional outlook on the world: that of a natural barrier of four seas encompassing an internally diverse but unified people’.28 Despite China's interaction, through Zheng He's intermediary, with overseas nations, this made no perceptible change to the traditional Chinese geographical outlook.
The Qing Dynasty (actually an outside tribe, the Manchu) that unified central China, inherited the traditional worldview of geographical self-centredness. Qing Document and General Analysis notes ‘central land in the center of the earth; surrounded on four sides by seas; seacoast is yi, but overseas states are also yi; yi means outer boundaries’.29 The direct implication of such geographical self-centredness is its explicit disinclination to study and understand neighbouring countries and peoples. In the prevailing view, ‘The outer-world, the sages know, but need not understand’.30 A prime example of Qing geographical misapprehension is that at the start of the Opium War, when the Emperor Daoguang and many of his top advisors had no idea where Britain actually was.
B. Civilizational Self-centredness
The Yellow River and central China valley are the birthplace and cradle of Chinese civilization. China's abundance of territory and natural resources, along with a climate suited to agricultural production, created for it a material civilization unparalleled in the East Asia region. Confucianism travelled from central China to its borders and became the accepted code of ethics throughout East Asia. For many nations, China epitomized civilized society. It was geographical self-centredness that led the Chinese to believe that theirs was both the geographical and civilized heartland, on whose borders lived barbarians. China's belief, sustained for centuries, that it was the world's single advanced civilization epitomizes civilizational self-centredness.
China's development reached its historical pinnacle during the ‘Kang-Yong-Qian’ period, when its civilizational self-centredness became further entrenched. Between the years 1655 and 1793 CE, a total of 17 Western diplomatic missions arrived in China, for reasons of self-interest. All, with the exception of the English mission, performed the kowtow ceremony before the emperor, which affirmed the Qing's sense of superiority. The Emperor Qianlong once said to Lord McCartney, England's first envoy to China, ‘Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its own borders. There is therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce. But as the tea, silk, and porcelain which the Celestial Empire produces are absolute necessities to European nations and to yourselves, we have permitted, as a signal mark of favour, that foreign hongs (merchant guilds) should be established at Canton, so that your wants might be supplied and your country thus participate in our beneficence’.31 Civilizational self-centredness is plain to see in Qing Dynasty scholar Wang Zhichun's view of his motherland: ‘Our country is highly civilised and moral, as is well-known to the outside world. All countries, some uncharted, come to pay tribute to us. Many countries have respected and admired us for two hundred years; they pay small tributes but receive generous rewards’.32
C. Huayiguan
The Qing inherited, along with geographical and civilizational self-centredness, the value system known as huayiguan. It essentially means ‘Chinese superior, others inferior’. The term hua means China, and the Han nation in particular; yi refers to the various minority groups that inhabited regions on the four perimeters of the Middle Kingdom [hence, siyi, si meaning four]. The siyi concept, in which the Han people are perceived as the only non-barbarians on earth, existed as early as the Spring–Autumn Period (722–481 BC), according to historical documentation. At that time, the distinction between the Han and ‘other’ people had tribal as well as cultural and geographical connotations.
As China's central area was generally regarded as the seat of its civilization and the peripheral regions as habitat of barbarians, the minorities living on the periphery suffered scathing discrimination. ‘China has ceremony and propriety, so it is called xia; China has beautiful apparel and customs, so it is called hua. Hua [China] regards itself as knowing ceremony and propriety and therefore as civilized, but regards other nations not knowing ceremony or propriety as uncivilized or barbaric’.33 The Report on Rites—Kings, states: ‘China's peripheral people have a distinct and unchangeable character. People in the east, called yi, are long-haired, have tattoos on their body, and sometimes eat uncooked food; people in the south, called man, also have tattoos and are cloven toed; they are unable to cook; people in the west, called rong, dress in animal hide and eat their food without cutting it; people in the north, called di, wear feathers and live in caves, they bite off chunks of food from a whole piece instead of cutting it into pieces’.34 The Han History – Story of the Huns (Xiongnu), states: ‘All people on the periphery are greedy, long haired and only half clothed, with human faces and savage hearts; so the Sage-King [of China] treats them as animals, not entering into oaths with them or fighting or chastising them ... leaving them outside, not inviting them in, not governing or educating them, not recognizing their national status’.35
The Qing Dynasty, as mentioned earlier, was of the Manchu minority, and after coming to power understandably strove to eliminate the huayi distinction. Its efforts, however, simply resulted in the term huayi being used to differentiate between those of the ‘Celestial Empire’ and those not. The huayiguan value system that had originally denoted tribal distinctions evolved into a term of reference within state-to-state relations. Between the end of the reign of Emperor Daoguang and the beginning of that of Emperior Tongzhi, all matters relating to foreign relations, including documents, memoranda and imperial edicts, were stored in the government file named Chou-ban yi-wu shi-mo (The Complete Account of the Management of Barbarian Affairs). The file name expresses the Qing rulers’ estimation of foreign relations. Western countries were grouped under the same derogatory yi classification as the barbarian yi or ‘others’. In the same document, contempt for Western foreigners is expressed in modifications to characters used to write the names of Western people and countries.
These traditional ideas of geographical self-centredness, civilizational self-centredness and huayiguan constituted the core late Qing Dynasty worldview and general external outlook. Moreover, these ideas, ‘were held not only by certain ignorant individuals cleaving to a feudal worldview, but also permeated all levels of Chinese society based on a solid foundation of public support’.36
Diplomacy under the Influence of Traditional Ideas
The Qing government, prior to 1861, was strongly influenced by traditional ideas in every aspect of its foreign relations.
One traditional idea that was the basic tenet of Qing diplomacy was that whereby the Qing court did not perceive other countries as equal political entities. From the Chinese perspective, East Asia was the entire world. When China engaged with other nations, it was in the context of its ever-expanding world, at whose centre was the Chinese emperor. The Qing government broadly grouped the countries it dealt with into ‘tributary states’ and ‘mutual trading states’. A tributary state was a Chinese ‘vassal state’ or ‘subject state’, that paid tributes at regular intervals. Mutual trading states were actually foreign, from Western Europe and America. They were not expected to pay tributes, but the Qing government still treated them as vassal states, referring to them as a ‘group of subjects’ or siyi. Mutual trading states were also perceived as inferior to China. Their trading and commercial activities were limited to one port in Guangdong province. In the Qing view, ‘In the Eastern field of political economy, there are two types of state—those that give and those that receive tribute.’37 Distant countries that were interested in establishing relations with China would also be categorized as tributary states and seen as ‘subjects’.38 Ships from abroad were consequently viewed as ‘tributary vessels’, gifts as ‘tributary goods’, letters as ‘tributary lists’, and people as ‘tributary envoys’.39 In the Qing emperor's letters of response to tributes he always wrote ‘Zhen (the emperor's form of self-address, namely, I) have received er (the mode adopted by a superior addressing an inferior, namely, you or your, a term strongly imbued with contempt,) tributary goods’; whether receiving goods or unexpectedly rewarding an inferior, the emperor would always write ‘Zhen remembers the er tributes, and therefore bestows this reward upon you and your country.’
The Qing government had no specialized diplomatic agency that handled foreign affairs until 1861. From the perspective of the Qing ruler: ‘We are a sovereign and superior nation; all lands are subject to us; we have no diplomacy; only tributary affairs.’40 From this standpoint, there seemed no need for a specialized diplomatic agency. The Qing government delegated the office dealing with foreign ‘subject states’ to the Huitong siyiguan41 or Common Residence for Tributary Envoys, superintended by a Libu, or Board of Rites, senior secretary. There existed another organ, the Lifan yuan, or the Court of Colonial Affairs, in charge of Mongolian, Mohammedan, and Russian affairs. After the signing of the Sino–English Treaty of Nanking, however, it became clear that the two agencies were incapable of handling China's foreign relations. Emperor Daoguang, therefore, established the position of Minister of Commerce for the Five Ports in November 1844. It was a concurrent post held by the governor of the Two-Guang provinces (Guangdong and Guangxi). The Minister of Commerce for the Five Ports was stationed in Guangzhou (Canton) and in charge of commerce and trade for the five ports as well as ‘yi affairs.’ This post constituted one of the main official channels for China's foreign relations with the West, but was always performed by a specially appointed Imperial Commissioner answerable only to the Emperor, and concurrent. Although the new appointment indicated progress as regards China's mode of diplomacy, it was clear that the Qing Dynasty still held to its traditional view of foreign affairs being an inconsequential aspect of statecraft.
There was also no post of professional diplomatic official within the Qing government. This was the inevitable consequence of the localized manner of diplomacy as administered under Qing Dynasty traditional foreign policy. Non-tributary foreign affairs were handled locally, either by regional governors or Imperial Commissioners that had been especially appointed by the emperor, at the port of Guangzhou. Morse once said ‘[s]o far does provincial autonomy go that we shall find, in the course of this history, that before, and for many years after, 1834, the Imperial government struggled hard to keep clear of all contact with foreign affairs, and required that their discussion and the decision of them should be left absolutely to the officials in the provinces’.42 After the Opium War, the diplomatic task of negotiating and dealing with the Western powers fell largely on the shoulders of the Governor of the Two-Guang provinces, who at this time held the concurrent post of especially deputed Imperial Commissioner. Earlier Qing officials were obliged to deal with Western envoys under the auspices of the huayiguan value system. They did not deign to negotiate directly with Western diplomats, instead using merchants or lower ranking local officials as intermediaries.
The most direct influence of traditional ideas on Qing diplomatic practice is manifest in the government's rigorous attempts to maintain the hierarchical order and imperial ethics inherent in the tributary system. Within this structure, subject and vassal states paid tribute to China in acknowledgement of China's divine authority. China, in response, provided education in ethics and the emperor, on the principle of ‘reward more; demand less’ would implement the policy of tangible placation or reconciliation with the peripheral peoples. The tributary system was a means of celebrating China's state power and reaffirming its moral superiority over the rest of the world, as it knew it. In this way, the traditional tributary system constrained the late Qing rulers from making an objective analysis of China's political situation and considering effective counter-measures for an extended period. ‘During the period of the two Opium Wars, and for 20 years afterwards, China stubbornly maintained its tributary system as its primary means of conducting diplomacy with the outside world. Even relations between China and the West, one of China's three types of diplomatic relations at the time, continued to fall under the banner of the tributary system, being strictly limited to commerce in the five ports area and seacoast. Traditional Chinese ideas of foreign relations continued to play a dominant role in diplomatic affairs during this period.’43 The key strategy for maintaining the tributary system was ‘combining rewards and coercion’, although other traditional strategies such as ‘suppression’ and ‘comforting’ were also used. ‘Since ancient times, emperors have dealt with barbarians in the following ways: if they rebel, suppress; if they submit, comfort. There are just two options: compassion or intimidation.’44 During the two Opium Wars, the Qing government's strategy as regards the Britiish oscillated between ‘suppression’ and ‘comforting’.
While ideas precipitate certain actions and strategies, inherently conservative, stability-related ideas also promote continuity in behaviour. In that situation, policy-makers, despite drastic changes in the external environment, generally adhere to familiar concepts and known methods of resolving problems. In the instance where a ruler with no knowledge or understanding of international law and conventions faces a completely new, international environment, the only apparent recourse seems that of referring to past events and experience in order to understand and resolve a completely different set of problems. When facing the English invasion, therefore, ‘[the Qing sovereign] must protect Dynastic interests, as well as avoid provocative behaviour that could lead to further conflict, and since he does not understand how to use modern international law to protect his country's interests, there seems only one path available to him: rely on traditional ideas to negotiate with the British’.45
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Transformation of Traditional Ideas and the Impact on Diplomacy46 |
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The West succeeded in opening China's main gates through military force, and Western advanced technologies, as well as ideologies and culture, poured in. Upon being faced with modern Western civilization, certain of China's ruling elite and enlightened intellectuals gradually began to transform their external outlook and traditional ideas. This period was an important transitional stage in modern Chinese thought,47 when China's views of its relationship with the West moved from a Confucian idealist to a more pragmatic, practical perspective. This had great influence on Chinese external strategies and diplomatic policies, both of which underwent dramatic transformations.
Transformation of Traditional Ideas
The transformation of traditional ideas primarily involved recognition of the new political situation, and the need to change the Sino-centric worldview and huayiguan value system. These three acknowledgements laid the foundations for an overall transformation of Qing diplomatic behaviour.
A. Recognition of the New Situation
China's defeat in the Second Opium War, along with the signing of the Treaty of Tientsin and the Treaty of Peking, further alarmed certain Chinese intellectuals and government officials. These cataclysmic events forced many Chinese to take a more rational approach, grounded in reality, to analysing and examining the situation they currently faced.
‘A new situation unparalleled in the past thousand years’, was commonly acknowledged by China's government officials and scholars. They all offered advice and suggestions, analysing the situation and proposing counter strategies. Xue Fucheng was one of the earliest to evince alarm at the changing political situation. He stated as early as 1865, while discussing the matter of coastal defence: ‘Today's political situation is changing and is a great challenge’; ‘I believe that today, all countries of the world are connected, a strange realization compared to the beliefs of our thousand years of history.’48 He later explained his views more specifically: ‘In the past, national defense related to just one country. But today, a couple of dozen Western countries can come from far overseas, all demanding to trade with us. They have faster ships and better weaponry than China, which is unprecedented. They rely on their power to make many demands ... This is a natural fate, and a most dramatic change for our nation.’49 Wang Tao pointed out that Western countries ‘come [to China] by sea, converging on China, which is unprecedented in all of Chinese history’.50 Zeng Jize expressed his incredulity that, ‘Western naval forces have come to China; this is something unusual and challenging, unique in the five thousand years of Chinese history.’51 Li Hongzhang expressed the outlook of someone who had experienced the challenges of two Opium Wars: ‘In ancient times, defence concerns were mostly about the northwest. The relevant roles, strong-weak, defender-invader, were clear, and there were China-foreign borders. Today, many traders and missionaries travel back and forth in our southern coastal areas without restriction. Some are concentrated in Beijing or provincial capitals where, under the pretence of promoting better relations, they actually plan to conquer China.’52 Li Hongzhang was also cognisant of the vast gulf in levels of power between China and the West. He believed that China was in no position to contend with Western states: ‘Without financial power and strength, we cannot compete with foreign powers, only yield to them for the time being and bide our time.’53 Therefore, ‘when dealing with foreigners, follow my mentor's instructions: loyalty, faithfulness, sincerity and respect ... if necessary, make compromises to maintain better relationships, but continue to self-strengthen’.54
These individuals were cognisant of the unprecedented political situation that China faced. They knew that once the gates to the empire had been forced open, they could never be completely closed, as contact with the West was unavoidable. XueFucheng believed that isolation and cutting off contacts was not possible under the current conditions, ‘China has vast borders that cannot be adequately defended, and Western powers have come to China across the sea; this is a situation unparalleled in a thousand years of Chinese history. We cannot close our doors in order to avoid their vast influence. Trade between two Western nations goes on even when they are at war with one another ... Under the current circumstance, a closed door policy is not feasible, and we must do the best we can’.55 Feng Guifen also believed that ‘in today's world, sea transportation and railways have created a network, so it is impossible to isolate ourselves and refuse communication with others’.56 Throughout this changing view of the East and West, Qing government officials generally accepted the trend of opening up further and greater commerce. ‘Western commerce with China will continue as long as the earth moves. Closing our doors and refusing communication with the west would be a foolish move.’57
B. Transformation of the Sino-centric Worldview
Traditional ideas connected with geographical self-centredness were the first to change. Lin Zexu was the first Chinese scholar truly to see the world as it was. During the Opium War, he compiled Si-zhou zhi, or the Story of Four Continents, in which he spoke of the world's five great continents and over thirty major countries and their historical and geographical situations. Building upon this foundation, Wei Yuan compiled Hai-guo tu-zhi, or the Illustrative Report on Overseas Countries, which was an extensive report on the world major powers. His main aim was to make clear that China was in one of the world's five continents and not the world's central empire; neither was China a Celestial Empire; it had, on the contrary, fallen behind other countries in many respects. At the time, this was an extremely daring and innovative statement of fact. Jishe's Ying-huan zhi-lue, or Global Strategies was more detailed than Wei Yuan's Illustrative Report on Overseas Countries as it examined Western science and technology as well as Western democratic governance. There also appeared Li Zhaoji's Hai-guo tu-ji, or the Illustrative Record on Overseas Countries, Yao Ying's Kang-you ji-xing, or the Travel Diary, Liang Tingnan's Hai-guo si-shuo, or the Discussions on Overseas Countries and many others. By 1861, more than 22 scholarly works on this theme had been written.58 Through their writings, these scholars spoke to their compatriots of the geography, history, customs, and belief systems of various Western countries. These works opened a window to the outside world for many Chinese people. It showed them that, China's doors having been blown open, it was revealed as much weaker than the West, as regards military force, politics, economics, and culture. Certain late Qing period intellectuals and government officials decided it was time for China to drop its conceited and arrogant stance and make a change in traditional ideas of foreign relations. It was with this attitude that they kept track of global events and perceived that China was only one aspect of the world, not its dominant power or Celestial Empire. As, however, mainstream views at the time remained unshaken, such theories and ideas received scant attention from the Qing sovereign.
The defeat in the Second Opium War, however, completely destroyed the late Qing Emperor's inflated ego and arrogant worldview. This ruler, who had naively seen himself as leader of a Celestial Empire, was forced, along with his officials, to face cruel reality. As they came to understand more about the world, they realized that China did not have ‘more resources than the world’, rather that it was a weak state in a very vulnerable situation. It was also plain that Western states were not barbarians, but powerful states stronger than China in many respects. In the early 1860s, ever more Chinese people began to see that there existed many mighty countries in the world in addition to China. In 1864, the Minister of the Zongli Yamen, commonly known as the Foreign Office, Dong Xun wrote in the preamble to Wan-guo gong-fa, or Laws and Regulations of All Nations (namely, the International Law), ‘Today, there are many countries outside China.’59 In a second preamble, official Zhang Sigui compared the current situation with the Spring–Autumn period in Chinese history, when many kings competed for power, ‘In today's general world situation, China is the world capital, but many countries have come to the four seas surrounding it, and the situation is grave. These foreign countries are similar to the many kingdoms of the Spring–Autumn period.’60 The forewords written by the two officials in Laws and Regulations of All Nations constituted public acceptance of the existence of strong states outside China, also acknowledgement that China was only one member of the international community. This ‘amounted to a revolutionary departure from the conventional Chinese claim of universal supremacy’.61 Most Qing government officials silently acquiesced to the central arguments advanced in Dong and Zhang's preambles. In 1865, thanks to the strong advocacy of Shen Guifen, Dong Xun agreed to engrave Xu Jishe's book Global Strategies. More and more scholars in the latter part of the 1860s began to compare the current international situation with that of the Spring–Autumn period of Chinese history. This phenomenon demonstrates the collapse of the traditional Chinese idea of geographical self-centredness and the ongoing formation of new ideas.
The traditional idea of civilizational self-centredness was also changing. The two Opium Wars made clear to many government officials and intellectuals that China faced both internal disorder and foreign threats, and that the Chinese state had become impoverished and weak. The Western powers, on the other hand, were economically and militarily strong and technologically and culturally advanced. The two sides could no longer compete on the same terms. Many officials acknowledged this reality. They abandoned their traditional civilizationally self-centred views, accepting that China no longer represented the highest civilization in the world, by inference indicating their acceptance of the advanced degree of Western civilization. After examining China's changing situation, Li Hongzhang, stated that the Western countries’ ‘ships and telegrams of high speed can travel the world in seconds; their military machine is powerful, commanding gun power that destroys the most difficult targets, not even water and land barriers can stop them’.62 Wang Tao, on the other hand, stated, ‘China and the West have ships but the West has stream ships; China and the West have vehicles, but the West has trains; China and the West have communication networks, but the West conveys news through telegrams; China and the West have firearms, but the West's guns are the better; China and the West have fortifications, but the West's gun forts and minefields are better for defence; China and the West have forces, but the West's are more strategically and tactically proficient.’63 Xue Fucheng pointed out, ‘Western firearms have become more and more technically advanced, and firearms produced in our factories cannot compete ... nevertheless, China has a huge population, abundant resources, and the world's most intelligent people; China should have done well. But Westerners have clear and simple laws which are easy to implement; we have inflexible attitudes toward laws and regulations; Westerners cooperate and ally with one another but we are isolated and almost too weak to sustain ourselves.’64 Feng Guifen, after comparing China and the West, also pointed out, ‘In terms of achieving all of our people's potential, we are not as good as the West; in terms of maximally using land, we are not as good as the West; in terms of communications between the state and the people, we are not as good as the West; in terms of implementing laws and policies, we are not as good as the West; in terms of navy ships and firearms, we are not as good as the West; in terms of moving forward but being unable to reverse, we are not as good as the West.’65 Guo Songtao stated ‘The West has been established for two thousand years, its political education is well developed and with good foundations; its customs, geography, and people are in some aspects actually far better than China's.’66 Wang Tao also stated ‘Western scholarship is actually better than China's scholarship; Western navy and army strategies and tactics and their military academies, which provide officers, are well-designed and coherent, this is something China cannot compete with.’67
Changing ideas regarding the Sino-centric worldview indicated that, under new domestic and foreign circumstances, ideas about the world held by the Chinese for centuries had begun to transform. This change in worldview not only influenced ideas and thoughts, but also promoted changes to the Qing government's foreign policies.
C. Transformation of China's Huayiguan Value System
Changing perceptions of current events and worldview promoted the transformation of China's traditional huayiguan value system.
It was at the time of the first Opium War that Wei Yuan expressed his belief that the Chinese and Western people were of the same human nature. Westerners were knowledgeable, polite, and honest; they should not be called yi di (inferior foreigners); Western countries were actually far more powerful and civilized countries than China. Wei Yuan, therefore, proposed studying and learning from the West. Huang Entong named Western countries yuan (far away countries). Ding Richang called them waiguo (foreign countries); Xue Fucheng referred to xiyang (Western countries).68 The Treaty of Tientsin of 1858 ruled that foreign related affairs no longer be referred to as yi. The term, yi ren changed to yang ren (foreigner, a more neutral term) and yi wu changed to yang wu (foreign affairs). These changes may have been compelled by the Western powers’ overwhelming military might, but nevertheless indicate in the late Qing Dynasty a shift of ideas and perception. China's foreign relations no longer comprised Celestial Empire versus yi di (inferior foreigners) but China versus Western powers.69
Yi Xin (popularly known as Prince Gong, favoured minister of Emperor Qianlong) was the first within the top inner circle of the Qing government to change his attitude towards the Western powers. He personally exchanged international treaties with British and French representatives, and also expressed in a memorial to the emperor his view that ‘[foreigners] do not covet our territory and people’; he proposed compiling a Zongli Yamen whose focus was business relations with foreign countries.70 Zeng Guofan also changed his ideas about the West in the process of dealing with Western traders. He found, ‘Although they (Western countries) are merchant traders, their behaviour is very gentlemanly.’71 When dealing with them, therefore, ‘We should treat them with human courtesy, not evil courtesy.’72 His son, Zeng Jize thought Western countries were not to be compared with the old yi di, and that China should not look down upon them. ‘Those foreign countries regard themselves as civilized and courteous countries. Frankly speaking, they are different from island aboriginals and southeast indigenous peoples. Should we, in the spirit of the old idea of China's superiority over all yi, insult them because they have different customs and civil traditions from us?’73 Wang Tao thought that distinguishing hua (China) and yi should be based on more than just geographical factors. ‘In the past, there was a theory about internal hua and external yi, China is hua and everything outside China is yi. This is mistaken ... the difference between hua and yi is not that of being inside or outside China's geographical boundaries but of being civilized. If civilized, yi could become hua; uncivilized, hua could become yi; how can we so blindly and self-boastingly look down on others?’74
The Western powers’ established policies in China of protecting and supporting the Qing regime generated a tremendous amount of aid to the Chinese government during the tumultuous Taiping Rebellion. As this critical support enabled the Qing Dynasty to overcome a serious crisis, the government began to change its hostile attitude towards the West. As from the 1860s, westerners were no longer called yi but yang ren (foreigners); all affairs pertinent to foreign countries were yang wu (foreign affairs); Western science and civilization were xi xue (science and knowledge from the West). This changing concept of the West indicated disintegration of the Qing government's traditional view of it as a land of barbarians, also that Qing officials no longer regarded the West as an enemy intent upon sabotaging the regime.75 At this time most Qing officials believed that the Western powers had not come with the intent to harm China but to trade with China. Yi Xin (Prince Gong) stated: ‘These foreign countries want China to treat them as neighbours, not tributary subject nations; they want to open trade inside and be treated with respect outside.’76 In 1861, Yi Xin, together with two other high-ranking Qing officials, Wen Xiang and Gui Liang, submitted a memorial to the Imperial Court which stated: ‘They do not covet our territory and people. Hence we can still tame and control them through faithfulness and justice.’77 China's first ambassador Guo Songtao expressed many times the opinion that ‘foreigners’ intentions are to do business and trade, not to occupy our land,’ ‘They come to China to trade’,78 and ‘The foreign challenge is before us, we have no way of stopping it; their purpose is to open trade; they want to see China prosper because it will he to their benefit. They have no intention of harming China.’79 In his analysis of China's external situation, he noted, ‘In recent years, Britain, France, Russia, America and Germany have been vying for power and establishing international law; one that foremost upholds faithfulness and justice, emphasizing neighbourliness by means of courteous exchange and good intentions; this is a better set up than our Spring-Autumn epoch. (The two powers of Britain and Russia) that surround China have been closely observing us; they have long-term ambitions and overwhelming power, but no intention of using force for the sake of short-term plunder. They station troops in China, but will also use other, non-military strategies to subdue us, such as withholding power and waiting for a response.’ According to him, therefore, ‘Dealing with Westerners requires the appropriate attitude, one non-acquiescent to coercion but expressing no overt hostility.’80 His intention was to make clear the necessity of establishing harmonious relations with Western powers in order to negotiate compromises.
Various capitalist states gained great privilege through a series of treaties with China, support for the Qing regime in order to maintain and expand their interests being the fundamental principle of the encroachments after the two Opium wars. Western powers then turned from coercion to a ‘cooperation’ policy.81 This meant helping the Qing Dynasty avoid a Western military invasion that would undoubtedly destroy it, and helping to strengthen the Qing government's power base. This policy was warmly received by high ranking Qing officials. The Qing rulers were undoubtedly suspicious of the cooperation policy, but their acceptance indicates a positive change in attitude towards the West. The China–West relationship edged towards reconciliation. Foreign representatives of Western states and Western missionaries in China established good personal relationships with Zongli Yamen officials. Until 1864, the term ‘cooperation policy’ had ‘the single consensus that, in order to make peaceful resolution of disputes and help China modernize, Britain, America, France, and Russia on one side and China on the other side should develop a cooperative relationship’.82 In their commentary on China–West relations in 1862, the Beijing jiebao (Beijing Express News) proclaimed that ‘every nation's embassies in Beijing and their relationship with the new Qing government are being established based on foundations of friendship’.83 ‘Prince Gong and other officials not only displayed a friendly attitude towards Western ambassadors and emissaries, but also consulted with Westerners on many of the Imperial Court's most pressing internal political issues, such as suppressing the Taiping Rebellion.’84
Western envoys and diplomats actually acted as reliable consultants for the Qing government in its management of foreign relations. It ‘received a lot of help from diplomatic representatives stationed in Beijing’. Elgin claimed, ‘I am already China's friend on all of these issues.’85 The Zongli Yamen called Englishman Robert Hart ‘our friend’; the British envoy Thomas Wade was not only ‘honest and straightforward’, but ‘possibly one of the most helpful and interesting partners’. The seal that Yi Xin (Prince Gong) presented as a gift to Wade was inscribed, ‘invaluable friend in one's lifetime’;86 American envoy Anson Burlingame described Seward's instructions to provide ‘consultation and cooperation’ as ‘seemingly to provide Chinese officials with a friendly consultation office’, and believed that ‘this office frequently provided them with advice and help’.87 His active promotion of the cooperation policy and the help he gave William A. P. Martin in translating Laws and Regulations of All Nations, won Burlingame the trust of the Zongli Yamen. Burlingame also received the accolade of being appointed Qing Dynasty special Imperial Envoy to Europe and America.
Although the huayiguan value system was undergoing change, Western invasions and encroachments also played a role in the late Qing officials’ and intellectuals’ reassessment of China's self-identity and new understanding of the West. The huayiguan issue's re-examination and self-criticism was indicative of a change in the Qing Dynasty's traditional ideas and values, and gave greatest impetus to revisions in the blindly xenophobic dynastic policy. Changes in the huayiguan value system also encouraged the late Qing Dynasty gentry to alter its hostile attitude towards the West. This reduced antagonism between China and the West and created a better foundation for future cooperation.
Ideas often being the determining factor in a government's decision-making process, it was the principled and causal beliefs originating in its ideas that provided the Qing government with a ‘road map’, enabling them clearly to identify and understand the relationship between process and objective.88 Around the 1860s, a new understanding of current events, a new understanding of China–West relations, and changing worldviews and value systems, all combined to transform the traditional mode of thought. If the late Qing government were to sustain its regime while facing internal and external difficulties, it needed, from a logical point of view, to change its foreign policies.
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Late Qing Faithfulness and Justice Diplomacy and Efforts to Reconcile with the West |
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The late Qing government's ideational transformation resulted in its implementation of the Faithfulness and Honesty policy in 1861.89
After the signing of the Treaty of Peking, British-French troops accordingly withdrew from Beijing and moved back to Tianjin. On January 13, 1861, certain Qing officials, among them Yi Xin, Wen Xiang, and Gui Liang, spoke of the change that their concepts of yi had undergone. They said, in memorials to the emperor: ‘Since our exchange of treaties with the barbarians, they have returned to Tianjin and to the south in groups. Moreover, the demands they make are based on the treaty conditions. This indicates that they do not covet our territory and people.’ These scholars proposed changing the old policy of ‘concurrent favor and coercion’ to an ‘appeasement policy of faithfulness and justice’, ‘we can hence win them over and bend them to our will through faithfulness and justice while striving towards our own recovery’.90 Emperor Xianfeng approved Yi Xin's proposal on 20 January 1861 and agreed to establish the Zongli Yamen. Yi Xin's memorial on China–West relations was representative of the prevailing opinion within the Qing Dynasty's highest ruling clique. After the palace coup in November 1861, Yi Xin, in his capacity as most powerful politician in the Qing Court, became the main decision-maker and manager of the government's external and internal affairs. This facilitated the Qing central government's smooth application of its faithfulness and justice diplomacy approach to the Western powers.
Changing ideas predisposed many high-ranking officials to embrace more friendly and harmonious foreign policies. Zeng Guofan regarded the change in approach to foreign affairs as, ‘difficult to handle, but no different in intent from the Confucian concepts of loyalty, faithfulness, sincerity, and respect. Sincerity means uprightness, respect means caution. Faithfulness means truthfulness, but is difficult to put into practice. We should start from the concept of faithfulness in adhering to the truth and not being tempted to do otherwise for the sake of trivial benefits’.91 Li Hongzhang was another strong supporter of faithfulness and justice diplomacy, having stated: ‘When dealing with foreigners, focus on loyalty, faithfulness, sincerity and respect.’92 Guo Songtao pointed out, ‘One needs special attributes in order to manage foreign affairs; they are fundamentally loyalty and faithfulness of verbal expression, and sincere and respectful actions.’93 ‘Under today's conditions, faithfulness and justice are the only course when dealing with foreign countries; we will otherwise never be independent and self-strengthening.’94
The faithfulness and justice diplomacy practiced was actually based on implementation of the conditions specified in the treaties signed with the Western powers, and ensuring that they were respected. ‘Our current plan is to act in exact accordance with the treaties in making sure the foreigners do not infringe them. We should be outwardly sincere and amicable as a means to keeping them in line.’ Implementation of treaties thus acted as the guideline for the late Qing government's faithfulness diplomacy.95 Other officials involved in foreign affairs also decided to be guided by the treaties. As remarked, ‘China's dealings with foreigners are in accordance with the treaties.’96 Li Hongzhang was responsible for late Qing Dynasty foreign relations for thirty years. His guiding principle was, ‘All treaties with foreign countries are in place and impossible to change.’97 Xue Fucheng also advocated, ‘When managing foreign affairs, insist upon abidance by treaty principles and behave reasonably; there are no other shortcuts.’98 Guo Songtao insisted, ‘Whenever a foreign affairs issue arises, we must first check the treaties to see how the issue in question relates to them; we will agree to it if the treaty allows and reject it if the treaty does not.’
Faithfulness and justice diplomacy ushered in an era of peaceful stability for the Qing Dynasty during the Tongzhi period, which also provided a good environment for the late Qing ‘self-strengthening’ movement. Zeng Guofan, in his memorial to Emperor Tongzhi, compared the Qing diplomatic circumstances of the respective Daoguang, Xianfeng and Tongzhi periods, pointing out the positive results of faithfulness and justice diplomacy: ‘The weaknesses and mistakes of foreign policy have been as volatile swings between war and peace since the Daoguang period; nothing being certain and there being no set guidelines has made the situation worse to the point of being almost impossible to manage. Since Emperor Tongzhi ascended the Celestial Throne, foreign countries’ immense power has remained constant, yet due to our insistence on abiding by treaties and being bound by agreements, we have maintained peace for ten years. This indicates the success of faithfulness and justice diplomacy.’99
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The Emergence of Modernity and the Modernization of Late Qing Diplomacy |
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The erosion of traditional ideas lead to emergence and acceptance of the more modern Western concept of foreign affairs and diplomacy, and eventual establishment of the Qing government's updated diplomatic system. Ideational change played a key role in the modernization of late Qing Dynasty foreign policy and diplomacy.
The Introduction of International Law to China, the Rise of the Concept of Sovereignty and their Influence on Late Qing Diplomacy
The international law observed by various nations was a bounded collection of principles, regulations and rules intended to manage nation-to-nation relations.100 International law, insofar as being a set of international norms, is within the realm of ideas. International law was introduced to China in 1864, and became regarded as the template for diplomacy. After the Zongli Yamen, or Foreign Office, had been established, its acceptance of international law was a main indicator of the government's diplomatic modernization process.101
A. International Law Introduced to China
After the 1860 signing of the Treaty of Peking, Western countries began to implement their ‘cooperation’ policy, so reducing tensions between China and the West. Within this new environment, the Qing government needed to adopt a fresh approach to its relations with Western powers, and the temporary template provided by the unequal treaty system was insufficient to establish a stable, dependable relations. As Qing officials had no reliable norms or guidelines for dealing with foreign affairs, they were often confused and unsure as to how to act, which adversely affected national interests. The Qing government was cognisant of its quandary and of its being the result of ignorance of Western laws and legal systems. It was consequently aware that acquiring knowledge in the uncharted area of diplomacy was an urgent matter.
This urgency was accentuated by the conflict between China and France that occurred between 1862 and 1863, owing to French missionary activities in Guizhou, Jiangxi, and Hunan. Long, drawn out negotiations hit crisis point when the French envoy threatened to lower his legation's flag and leave Beijing. Sino–French relations were very tense at this time. In an attempt to resolve this potentially volatile situation, Wen Xiang, a high ranking Zongli Yamen official asked the American envoy Anson Burlingame to recommend an authoritative legal document, recognized and accepted in the West, to guide them through negotiations. Burlingame recommended Wheaton's Guojifa yuanli (Elements of International Law). William Martin brought the translation he had made of Elements of International Law to Beijing in June 1863, when he met Chong Hou, minister-superintendent of trade for the Three Northern Ports. Chong Hou was most impressed with the work, particularly its ‘adaptation to the needs of China in her new relations’. He promised to write and recommend the translation to Wen Xiang.102 Martin met with Zongli Yamen officials in Sept 1863. They also showed great interest in his translation. Prince Gong appointed officials to help Martin polish the final translated text, and in April 1864, the translation of Elements of International Law was complete. Yi Xin submitted a memorial to the emperor on 30 August 1864, stating that the Qing Court needed such a book on international law, and pointed out its benefits, saying:
One can refer to this book when dealing with foreign relations ... . Upon examining the book, I find that it covers alliances, laws of war, and much other pertinent information. Most notably, it contains laws regarding the outbreak of war and the checking and balancing that occurs between states ... . I found it not to be fully compatible with Chinese laws and regulations. There are, however, aspects of it that could be of great advantage to us. There was for example, a dispute this year in the Tianjin port over Prussia's detaining of a ship from Denmark. We negotiated with Prussia using the argument presented in the book. The Prussian minister immediately acknowledged the mistake without attempting further defence. This case is a good example.103
Yi Xin also asked the emperor's permission to print Laws and Regulations of All Nations. ‘We [humble officials] discussed and decided to allocate 500 silver taels to this task. After the book has been printed, three hundred copies should be sent to my office. Later, all other ports involved in foreign trade should be given a copy. The book includes relevant laws and customs regarding foreign affairs that should be helpful.’104 The emperor approved this request from the Zongli Yamen. The early attempt at translating international law documents that was an individual effort by William Martin, became, subsequent to the involvement of the Zongli Yamen, official Qing government sanctioned policy.
B. Emergence of the Concept of Sovereignty
Introduction of international law to China helped to promote the modern concept of national sovereignty. The Laws and Regulations of All Nations gave detailed definitions of sovereignty and sovereign equality: ‘Sovereignty is the supreme power of governance. Sovereignty applies to a country's internal authority as well as external status.’105 ‘Internal sovereignty need not be recognized by others, but external sovereignty must be recognized by other countries.’106 ‘From a public law perspective, independent states, no matter big or small, are all equal.’107 The concept of sovereignty and its implications provided late Qing Dynasty officials with a new point of reference as regards understanding the state's sovereign interests. The concept of sovereignty was thus sown in China.
During negotiations in 1864 between China and Prussia over Prussia's detention of a foreign ship in one of China's ports, Yi Xin pointed out that, ‘one foreign country's detaining another foreign country's ship within China's territorial waters is a violation of China's sovereignty’, according to the relevant international law regarding sovereignty of territorial waters. Yi Xin, therefore, perceived negotiations with the Prussian diplomat von Rehfues as being in the interests of protecting China's sovereignty.108 Zheng Guanying went further in his accentuation of sovereign equality among different nations, ‘To many countries, public international law is expressed in treaties. Public international law makes every nation a member of the many nations; all members, therefore, are related but not commonly ruled. Each nation, whether it is a monarchy, democracy, or monarchy combined with democracy, has the unviolable right to autonomy.’109
The introduction of international law and its practice to the Chinese caused them to focus on the sovereignty-related issues of autonomous rights as regards taxes and tariffs, extra-territoriality, and unilateral most-favoured nation status.
In Treaty of Humen, signed by China and Britain in 1843, the British levied a 5% customs duty on all Chinese goods, effectively and substantially limiting customs duty to suit their own business interests.110 China signed the Treaty of Wangxia with the USA in 1844, and the same year signed the Treaty of Huangpu with France. Both treaties disallowed China from amending any articles regarding its taxes and tariffs without foreign approval. Signing this ‘consensus tax and tariffs principle’, as it became known, amounted to China's forfeiting of its autonomous right to regulate its own taxes and tariffs. The Treaty of Humen, therefore, constituted a serious violation of China's state sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty in relation to tax and tariffs became a frequently discussed topic within the Qing government and by scholars and intellectuals. All concerned were eloquent and unanimous in their assertion that taxes and tariffs are matters of state sovereignty to be administered autonomously and by no other state, no matter how powerful. ‘Our country has the freedom and right to increase its taxes; whether we do or not is not a matter for dispute with the British Ambassador.’111 ‘A nation's taxes are an aspect of its autonomous rights in which other countries should not interfere as it is not their business.’112 ‘The right to levy taxes is in the hands of the state; public international law states that no country, no matter how large, can control another, however small, and that all countries may sanction this right without interference from any other country.’113 During ongoing negotiations between China and Britain in 1879 regarding proposed increases of customs duty on imported western medicine, Zeng Jize pointed out that the right to increase or decrease taxes and tariffs was a matter decided by the state in question, according to its sovereign authority, and that any attempt at foreign intervention actually contravened the relevant western principles. ‘Decisions regarding taxes and tariffs are made independently in all Western countries, no matter big or small, powerful or weak; having made its decision, the country in question accordingly instructs its department of Customs and Excise to implement the increases or decreases; no matter how strong foreign countries may be, they may not deprive us of our autonomous right ... the power to make decisions about taxes and tariffs, therefore, is our own, and we have no need to confer with foreign diplomats or with the foreign affairs office.’114
Two other main issues, that actually resonated as one, were raised by Chinese officials and intellectuals who had familiarized themselves with Public International Law; they were those of consular jurisdiction and extra-territoriality. In addition to imposing an artificially low rate of customs duty on Chinese goods, the 1843 China–Britain Treaty of Humen also gave Britain consular jurisdiction. The 1844 China–America Treaty of Wangxia expanded consular jurisdiction from the five ports originally designated by the China–Britain Treaty of Nanking to all Chinese ports; and the 1858 Treaty of Tientsin further consolidated the Western countries’ rights of consular jurisdiction. These treaties deprived China of its right to independent jurisdiction. Certain Western individuals, protected by their rights of consular jurisdiction, moreover, acted unlawfully in China. Qing officials and intellectuals that had understanding of international law through frequent interactions with Western countries were fully cognisant of the humiliating significance of losing this right. Li Hongzhang, for example, pointed out ‘Foreigners living in China under foreign consular jurisdiction and not that of our government is entirely inconsistent with public international law.’115 Xue Fucheng also expressed deep concern about losing consular jurisdiction: ‘Foreigners living in China are not under Chinese jurisdiction ... this constrains everything [our pertinent governing measures].’ Xue Fucheng, therefore, suggested resolving the problem through international law, saying ‘We may not be able to force foreigners to comply with Chinese law, but we can use Western law to govern westerners.’116
As regards the matter of unilateral most-favoured nation status, the 1843 China–Britain Treaty of Humen stated; ‘If, in the future, China's emperor should grant any foreign countries more favorable conditions, in order to be fair, the British should also enjoy such benefits.’117 Britain's being accorded the same privileges as the most favoured nation, however, did not work in reverse; China was not granted the same privileges as Britain's most favoured nation. This condition in the Treaty of Humen unilaterally deprived China of its rights, and was consequently a serious violation of the principle of sovereign equality. It was the emergence of international law in China that made Qing officials realize the full extent of damage rendered by this unequal treatment. Xue Fucheng pointed out; ‘One country's compromise that brings benefits to foreign countries but not to itself’ does ‘endless damage’ because it ‘enables all the Western powers to defraud us, and is a most serious mistake’.118 When Zeng Guofan negotiated with Japan over the signing of new treaties in 1871, he proposed to the Qing court that this particular article be eliminated from future treaties. Zeng Jize also suggested that, ‘When the time comes to renew our treaties with Western countries, we should specify to those concerned our wish to amend this article.’119
The entry of international law documents into China and its greater engagement in international affairs enabled late Qing officials to develop a deeper and broader understanding of the international law arena. Their knowledge and ideas about state sovereignty also expanded to include territorial waters, inner rivers, telecommunications, railway rights, and mining rights. Liu Xihong once strongly criticized the Western powers for competing for railway construction rights because, again, it violated China's state sovereignty. ‘As an independent state, building railways is an aspect of our internal affairs and one in which others should not intervene, according to public international law. Why does the West interfere today?’120 In 1897, Germany used the Caozhou church issue as a pretext for demanding mining rights in Shandong. Zhang Zhongxi, an official from the Department of Industry reported to the Qing Imperial Court, ‘The central department should stop Germany from intervening in China's autonomous rights.’121 In 1905, when Germany demanded the rights for a further five mines in Shandong, Xu Huifeng, Minister of War, and 18 other officials submitted a memorial to the Imperial Court, stating ‘Losing interests is undesirable, but losing sovereignty is intolerable.’ They asked that ‘the government unequivocally refuse Germany's demands on the basis of the existing treaty and mining regulations. If we insist, German has neither reason nor legal basis to intervene. We wish Shandong's mining explorations to be financially and autonomously managed by local business people, in order to regain our sovereignty and avoid losing our rights’.122
Use of International Law to Protect the State's Sovereign Interests
Qing officials and intellectuals used international law as a guide and also took measures to implement it as a legal foundation on which to defend national interests in its diplomatic interactions with Western countries.
Prior to the full translation of international law into Chinese, the Qing government had already successfully resolved the ‘commercial ship’ dispute between Prussia and Denmark that occurred in China's Bohai territorial waters. Its correct application of international law obliged Prussia to release two Danish ships