Xun Zi's Thoughts on International Politics and Their Implications*
Corresponding author. Email: yanxt{at}mail.tsinghua.edu.cn
There is considerable depth and breadth of research on the ancient Chinese philosophy of Xun Zi. These studies, however, usually explain his ideas from the perspective of domestic politics and governance. This article explores Xun Zi's thoughts on international politics from an international politics perspective.1 Xun Zi's expositions on international politics were few, and diffused over different books. His most pertinent views are expounded in Book 11, Of Kings and Lords-Protector; Book 9, On the Regulations of a King; and Book 18, Rectifying Theses. Although they contain no systemic ideas or formal theories on international politics, Xun Zi's thoughts from 2,000 years ago are nonetheless relevant to current explanations of international political phenomena; certain of his ideas in this context offer plausible and sensible rationales. This article discusses Xun Zi's analytical methodology and ideas on international politics and how it may have provided inspiration for contemporary China's ‘rising strategy’.
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Methodology for Analysing International Politics |
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 Top Methodology for Analysing... Understanding the Power of...Understanding International...Understanding International...Inspirations Offered by Xun... |
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System Level and Unit Level Analysis
The two key analytical variables in modern international political theory used to explain international political phenomena are those of the unit actor and the international system. Unitary analysis focuses on change in the unit actor; systemic analysis on change in the international system. Xun Zi discusses the function of international norms and the Five Ordinance System, and their role in preventing international conflict, according to the Universal Unification Idea. His analyses on achieving stability in the international order are primarily from the point of view of great powers. It was Xun Zi's belief that it is the inner nature of great powers that determines the stability of the international system, and not the system that modifies the behaviour of great countries. His first analysis is of the three changes of situation that states undergo: rise, decline and destruction. His conclusions reflect the causes of transformation in the international order. The dependent variable in this case has two key values: anning or zhi (peace, order and stability) and hunluan or luan (disorder and chaos); the independent variable has three values: wang (true kingship), ba (hegemony or, according to actual Xun Zi text, lord-protector) and qiang (might or power). Xunzi uses these terms in both the verbal and nominal senses. The verb wang means to lead the world; ba to wield hegemony in certain areas of the world; and qiang to exert greater power than other states. The nouns wang, ba and qiang also reflect these different behaviours by states and leaders.2 Xun Zi, therefore, treats state nature, type of leader and nature of policy as three systemically consistent, compatible manifestations of one thing. In other words, stability in the international system depends on the nature of great states. States of true kingship bring stability to the international order; mighty states bring chaos; hegemon relations are stable with hegemon allies and chaotic with non-allied states. See Table 1.
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The system, state and individual are the three general levels of analyses in international politics theory. Xun Zi's analysis could be interpreted at the individual level, because to him the ruler is the fundamental independent variable and the nature of state is the intermediate variable. Xunzi regards the state as the instrument with which the ruler governs and manages society. When the mores and beliefs of rulers differ so too do the principles and tactics involved in use of the state as an instrument, and hence its nature. The differences in the mores and ethics of leaders of great world powers, moreover, determine the nature of states and of the international order as either peace-stability or disorder-chaos. Xun Zi says: ‘The state is the most powerful instrument for benefit in the world. The ruler of men is the most influential position of authority for benefit in the world. If a ruler employs the Way to maintain these two – the state and his position – then there will be the greatest peace and security, the greater honour and prosperity, and the wellspring for accumulating what is beautiful and fine. If a ruler does not employ the Way to maintain them, then there will be the greatest danger and peril and the greatest humiliation and adversity. It would be better not to have these two than to have them.’3
But Xun Zi's individual-level analysis is not restricted to the ruler; it emphasizes ministers as an intermediate variable of importance equal to the nature of the state, because it is that between state and ruler (see Figure 1). The core function of the ruler, therefore, is not solely that of governance but also of selecting ministers best suited to administrating the country. He says: ‘Those who are to maintain the state certainly cannot be so alone. Since this is the case, the strength, defensive security, and glory of country lie in the selection of its prime minister. Where a ruler is himself able and his prime minister is able, he will become a True King. Where the ruler is personally incapable, but knows it, becomes apprehensive, and seeks those who are able, then he will become powerful. When the ruler is personally incapable, but neither realize[s] it, nor becomes apprehensive, nor seeks those who are able, but merely makes use of those who fawn over him and flatter him, those [who] form his entourage of assistants, or those who are related to him, then he will be endangered and encroached upon, and, in the extreme case, annihilated.’4
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When comparing rulers and ministers, Xun Zi sees the function of the ruler as deterministic, because the type of minister, as an intermediate variable, depends upon the changing variable of the nature of the ruler. In Xun Zi's belief there is no scarcity of decent ministers; whether or not they are selected and used by rulers is the main matter. There are various types of minister; the key to able governance is the type of minister the ruler seeks. As Xun Zi says, ‘Thus, the relation between King Cheng and the Duke of Zhou was that he heeded the duke's advice on everything that transpired, for he realized what was valuable. The relations of Duke Huan to Guan Zhong were that in the business of state he used Guan for everything that developed, for he knew what was beneficial. The kingdom of Wu had Wu Zixu but was incapable of using him, so ultimately the country was destroyed, for it turned against the Way and lost this worthy man. Thus, those who honoured sages became king; those who valued the worthy became lords-protector; those who respected the worthy survived; and those that scorned them were destroyed.’5
Ideational and Internal Determination of Cause
International politics theory can be divided into three determination theories: material determination; idea determination; and idea-material concurrent determination. Realist theory, which sees a state's hard power as the determining factor, is normally a material determination theory; constructivism, which sees human ideas as the determining factor, is normally an idea determination theory; and institutionalism takes a compromise position, according equal importance to material power and institutional norms. Xun Zi does not deny the importance of material power, but his analysis, in viewing ideas as the original driving force behind human behaviour, concurs with constructivism. In his discussion of behavioural norms, Xun Zi's concepts of ‘True King, Hegemon, and the Mighty’ compare with Alexander Wendt's concepts of Kantian Culture, Lockean Culture and Hobbesian Culture. Xun Zi argues: ‘The True King tries to win men; the lord-protector to acquire allies; the powerful to capture land.’6 In his view, winning talented people depends on ethics and mores, winning the support of allies depends on trust and honesty, and capturing land depends on hard power. Wendt, on the other hand, believes that the three cultures have different structures and reflect ‘three different degrees to which a norm can be internalized, and thus as generating three different pathways by which the same structure can be produced – force, price and legitimacy’.7 When comparing the conceptualizations of Xun Zi and Wendt, the True King and Mighty concepts are respectively similar to the Kantian and Hobbesian cultures, but the Hegemon concept differs from Lockean culture.
Xun Zi believed that it is rulers’ and ministers’ ideas, rather than capabilities, that cause change in a state's change of power-status. In his view, the different ideas that rulers have cause them to select ministers with different political principles, whose different policies on administrating the country have different results. In his words: ‘If the ruler is guided by the model of a True King and associates with men who are proper companions for a True King, then the ruler himself will also be a True King. If he is guided by the model of a lord-protector and associates with men who are proper companions for a lord-protector, then himself will also be a lord-protector. If the model by which he is guided is that proper to a doomed country and he associates with men who are proper for a doomed country, then the ruler himself will be doomed as well.’8
Xun Zi's idea of ruler and ministers as constituting the original state behaviour dynamic correlates with internal factor determination theory. He argues: ‘With these instruments (of government) he can be king, or with them he can be mere lord-protector. With these instruments he can survive, or with them he can perish. In a country of ten thousand chariots, it is the ruler who establishes its majesty and strength, who makes finer its fame and reputation, and who bends its enemies to submission. What makes a country secure or endangered, good or bad, is determined exclusively by its ruler and not by others. Whether he is a king or a mere lord-protector, whether he is secure and viably existing or in imminent peril and faced with utter destruction – these are determined by the ruler himself and not by others.’9 In other words, world leadership, hegemony and protecting the state's security depend on no other than the ruler.
Strict and Comparative Analysis
International politics phenomena are the result of multiple factors. Analytical methodology can therefore be divided into the two categories of strict and comprehensive analysis, according to how many independent variables an analysis takes into account. Comprehensive analysis places multiple variables in parallel and explains the value change in causal variables without discussing the relationship between them. Strict analysis, in contrast, uses a single variable to explain changes in causality through logic chains, which requires analysing the relationship between each independent variable. Kenneth N. Waltz’ use of the structure of great powers as an independent variable to explain whether or not war occurs in the international system is an example of strict analysis. Hans J. Morgenthau, on the other hand, uses many independent variables, such as power, interest, culture, law, mores and diplomatic tactics, to explain changes in the international system. This is comprehensive analysis.
Xun Zi's work comes under the strict analysis category. He uses the ideas of rulers as the fundamental independent variable through which to explain the nature of ministers responsible for making a state's policies. He therefore uses the nature of ministers to explain the nature of the state, and the nature of the state to explain order or disorder in the international system (see Figure 1). Figure 2 shows the structure of this analytical logic, whereby the strategic orientation between ministers and the nature of the country is the intermediate factor, and the extent of power and foreign relations are the two intermediate variables between the nature of the country and international order. Variables at different levels in Xun Zi's thought thus have clear logical connections in consistent relationship.
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Comparative analysis is the opposite approach to that of single case analysis. Single case analysis uses a case study to argue from a positive viewpoint, whereas comparative analysis uses both positive and negative viewpoints to prove or disprove the argument. As Xun Zi uses both positive and negative examples to make his point, his analysis is comparative. The positive examples Xun Zi uses include Shang Tang, Duke of Zhou and King Wen; Jie and Zhou are usually his negative examples. In his argument that true kingship authority is not arbitrarily seized but naturally formulated, for instance, Xun Zi says: ‘Tang and Wu did not seize the whole world. Rather, they cultivated the Way, carried out their moral duty, caused whatever benefited the empire in common to flourish, and removed whatever did harm to the whole world, so that the empire offered allegiance to them. Jie and Zhou Xin did not abandon the world. Rather, they turned against inner power of (their forebears) Yu and Tang, brought chaos to the divisions of social functions inherent in ritual and moral principles, behaved like wild beasts, gathered up their own ultimate catastrophe, completed their own evil, so that the world abandoned them. The empire offering allegiance to you is what is meant by King. The whole world abandoning you is what is meant by ruination.’10
Xun Zi's understanding of international politics has strong logical basis, but his analytical method is not scientific, according to modern scientific standards. Neither do the examples he uses to make his point strictly accord with the positivist model. As most of his analytical examples are historical legend, the backgrounds to and general processes of events that he cites are absent. Finally, not all the sources of his pertinent knowledge can be given and therefore proved. His case study analysis also lacks the necessary control mechanism over variables, which places it under the inductive school simple enumeration method. Simple enumeration, although acknowledged as the most commonly used of methodologies, is of low scientific credence. Cases studies so conducted, therefore, lack positivistic strength and persuasiveness.
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Understanding the Power of a State |
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A State's Dual Function as Actor and Instrument
In Xun Zi's works, the concept of the state refers to both polity and governing instrument. As such, it is consistent with modern political science's conceptualization of the state, from the international politics perspective, as a type of unit actor, and from the perspective of domestic politics as an instrument with which to order and govern the people.11
As regards power differentials, Xun Zi differentiates between Son of Heaven and feudal lord states. He says: ‘In antiquity, the Sons of Heaven had a thousand offices in his government and the feudal lords each had a hundred. To use these thousand offices to execute orders in all the countries of the Xia Chinese traditions is what is meant by being "King". To use these hundred offices to execute orders within the boundaries of the states so that although there might be unrest in the state, it does not reach the point where the lord might be displaced, or destroyed – this is what is meant by being a lord.’12 The states in the above citation are obviously political units, but the Son of Heaven is sovereign and considerably larger in size and strength than the feudal lord, and therefore has far greater power.
From a functional perspective, Xun Zi sees the state as a political instrument. He says: ‘Since the state is the greatest implement and heaviest burden in the world, it is impermissible that he who rules the state should not be good first at determining the right position and then placing (the state) there, for if he locates it in a precarious place, danger will result.’13
The Relationship between Political and Military-Economic Power
Xun Zi's concept of the functions of political, military and economic power, and the relationships among the three, is quite different from that of modern times. Modern understanding generally sees economic power as the foundation of political power; Xun Zi holds a directly opposing view.
Political power, in Xun Zi's opinion, is the foundation of economic and military power because no matter how immense, they lack meaning without a solid basis of political power. Xun Zi's ideas in this regard are similar in logic to former CIA Chief Ray Cline's comprehensive power formula: Pp = (C + E + M)x(S + W),14 according to which comprehensive power is the multiplied product of both hard and soft power. When soft power is zero, comprehensive power is also zero and hard power has no function. Xun Zi points out: ‘King Wen had carried it out in a territory only a hundred li square and the world was unified. Jie Gui and Zhou Xin cast it aside and although they possess the much more substantial power of the whole empire, they were unable to obtain the status of a commoner and grow to a ripe old age. Hence if one makes good use of the Way, then a state only a hundred li square is sufficient to establish an independent rule. But if one does not make good use of it, then like Chu, 6,000 li in extent, it will become the servant of its adversary.’15 The collapse in 1991 of the mighty former Soviet Union illustrates Xun Zi's point. The Soviet Union's military power at that time was equivalent to that of the United States, and its economic capability was number three in the world. But hard power was insufficient to sustain the state's survival upon the Soviet government's losing the capability for internal and external political mobility.
Xun Zi also believed that political power is the basis for hard power growth and that the correctness, as regards morals and ethics, of state national policy determines the state's core strength and prosperity or weakness. If policy is ethically correct, national power increases; morally incorrect policy leads to its destruction. Xun Zi says: ‘If the ruler does not exalt ritual principles, then the army will be weak. If he does not love his people, then the army will be weak. If when he prohibits or approves something he is untrustworthy, then the army will be weak. If his commendations and rewards do not penetrate down to the lower ranks, then the army will be weak. If the generals and marshals are incapable, then the army will be weak. If the ruler is fond of achievement, then the country will be impoverished. If he is fond of profits, then the country will be poor ... Thus, although under Yu there were ten years of flood and under Tang there were seven years of drought, there were no vegetable-coloured people in the world. Yet after this ten-year period when the grain ripened again, there was still an accumulated surplus of old grain. This was due to no other cause than that they knew the application of the principle of root and branch and of source and outflow.’16 In Xun Zi's view, therefore, that people did not starve to death during the ten years of floods in Yu's time or in the ten years of drought in Tang's time, and the yearly abundant harvests and food surpluses that followed these two decades were for reasons none other than Yu and Tang's knowledge of what actually constitutes the state's foundation and what are merely superficial factors. Similarly, the United States’ checking and balancing of the three powers, Japan's Meiji Restoration, and the Soviet Union's socialist system gained for those states tremendous increases in national power. These historical examples confirm Xun Zi's view that political power is the basis on which to strengthen hard power.
Xun Zi thus believed that rapid economic growth depends upon the state's political system, and not that economic development forms the basis of the political system. Xun Zi explains: ‘Hence, one who cultivates ritual principles becomes a king; one who effectively exercises government become strong; one who wins over the people will be secure; and one who merely collects tax levies will perish. Accordingly, the True King enriches the people; the lord-protector enriches his scholar-knights; a state that can barely manage to survive enriches its grand officers; and a state that is doomed enriches only the ruler's coffers and fills up his storehouses.’17 This brings to mind that since 1978, when China implemented the Reform and Opening policy replacing that based on ‘class struggle’, the Chinese economy has raced ahead. It is an event in history that endorses Xun Zi's view of the political system as the basis for economic growth.
Xun Zi also regarded principled foreign relations as a basis of national security. In his opinion, whether or not a state is secure is determined by its good relations with other states as well as its military power. He says: ‘A humane man would keep in good order the obligations between small and large countries, between the strong and weak, and would sedulously maintain them. The important point of ritual would be observed with the extreme of good form. The gui jade baton and the bi jade insignia would be very sumptuous. The presents and contributions would be very munificent. The means he uses to persuade others must be those of a gentleman who is elegantly correct in form and of discriminating intelligence. Should others have designs against him, who among them could become angry with him? This being so, those who act out of anger will not commit aggression against him. If for the sake of a reputation, or for the sake of profit, or because of anger, others do not commit aggression against him, then his country will be as secure as a boulder and as long-lived as the Winnowing Basket and Wings constellations.’18 An historical comparison that confirms Xun Zi's view of principled foreign relations as the basis for national security is that of China's foreign policy. China was in the 1960s in simultaneous opposition to the United States and the Soviet Union. By the beginning of the 21st century, however, China had implemented a policy of good-neighbourliness and friendly relations with both of these hegemonic powers. This policy change transformed China's situation from one of military confrontations in Vietnam with the United States and Soviet military pressure to its north of the 1960s to China, the United States and Russia's (since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991) maintenance of normal great power relations in the early 21st century. As such, it represents a considerable improvement in China's security environment.
Xun Zi also believed that political power is more effective than economic power in the event of diplomatic confrontations. Using wealth to buy other countries’ support, he says, is pointless; the most effective way of strengthening the state is through moral and ethic principles. He says: ‘If I attempt to serve the state by using valuable and precious goods, then these costly objects will be depleted, yet friendly relations will not be secured. If I trust in treaties and solemnly swear to covenants, then although the terms of the agreement are firmly settled, they will be overturned without a single day elapsing. If I cede territory bit by bit, then although the amount to be ceded has been settled, the desire will not be satiated. The more I acquiesce to their demands, the more they will encroach, the inevitable end being that at the depletion of my resources, they will not stop until they have taken the whole country. ... Thus, the intelligent ruler does not proceed along this path. He invariably cultivates ritual principles in order to arrange the court in an orderly fashion, rectifies the laws in order to make the governmental bureau uniformly arranged, and adjusts the operating of the government in order to handle the people uniformly. It is only after this has been done that emergencies and reports are uniformly disposed of by the court, the various tasks and duties uniformly handled by the bureaus, and the multitude of commoners uniformly handled by their subordinates, ... In such a situation, those who are nearby zealously try to become close to the ruler and those who are in distant regions long to reach him. The ruler and his subjects will be of one mind, and the three armies will make a common effort. When his fame and reputation are sufficient to sear and scorch them and his majesty and strength enough to thrash and flog them, he simply folds his hands before his breast in salute and signals with his finger. Then not one of the strong and aggressive states will fail to come in haste to serve him. The situation would be like the case of Wuhuo, the Crow Catcher (a big and powerful fellow), battling the Jiao Pygmies (a small and short guy).’19
Xun Zi's wisdom is again demonstrated in the cases of Japan in 2005 and China in 1971. Japan, in an attempt to obtain permanent membership in the UN Security Council, invested US $16 billion in developing countries in 2005 as a means of buying their support. It, however, failed.20 The United States in 1971, a time when American foreign aid to the Third World was much higher than that from China, opposed Beijing's application for UN membership. With the support of African countries, however, Beijing successfully restored its UN membership. These two historical events prove Xun Zi's theory that political power is more important than economic power in global diplomatic affairs.
Reasons for Uneven Development of Power
Xun Zi believed that it is the failed governance of other countries that makes a country powerful. He says: ‘In this way, while for my enemy the accumulated effect of each day is further decay, for me it is greater preservation in good order; while for him the accumulated effect of each day is greater impoverishment, for me it is greater wealth; while for him the accumulated effect of each day is greater burden, for me each day brings greater ease. While the relationship between ruler and subject, superior and subordinate, for him is increasingly pervaded by stern oppression and is marked by mutual estrangement and hostility, for me it's increasingly pervaded by liberality and is marked by closeness and affection. On account of this, I can merely await the imminent decay of my enemy. Anyone who can make his country like this could become lord-protector.’21 Xun Zi's idea is identical to the current concept of relative power in modern international relations (IR) theory, whereby one state's power status is relative to that of other states; widening the gap between it and others, therefore, is the key to strengthening its power. The main result of widening this gap is that it decreases the power status of others. If the power of all states increases at the same rate their power status relationship does not change.
Xun Zi also argues: ‘All others are given to anarchy, I alone am controlled. All others face peril; I alone am secure. All others fail and are destroyed; I alone succeed and control them. Thus, when a humane man has control of the state, he does not want merely to maintain what he possesses and nothing more, but instead wants to unite all people.’22 Xun Zi is thus not against annexation. In his view, different types of annexation bring different results, insofar as annexation based on the power of morals and principles strengthens, while that more rudely accomplished can weaken. As he says: ‘One who uses moral power to annex people will become a True King; one who employs raw power to annex them will become weak; and one who employs wealth to annex them will become poor. In this regard, antiquity and today are one and the same.’23
The conclusion that Xun Zi reaches in his ideological determination of why there is uneven development of power among states, therefore, is that it is the result of the different ideas of their respective rulers. He says: ‘There are sham ministers, presumptuous ministers, meritorious ministers, and sage ministers. ... Accordingly, one who employs sage ministers will become a king; one who employs meritorious ministers will be strong; one who employs a presumptuous minister will be endangered; and one who employs a sham minister will be doomed.’24 This argument sets out a logical relationship: the change in a state's power status is caused by change in a state's policy, made by ministers who administrate the state, who are selected according to the ruler's idea (see Figure 3):
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Xun Zi says, ‘Without exception all who exercise rulership desire strength and have an aversion to weakness. They all desire security and have an aversion to danger. They desire honour and have aversion to disgrace. In this both Yu and Jie were the same. What way is convenient to bring the fruition the three things all men desire and allow them to avoid the three aversions? I say that there is not way more direct than relying on the careful selection of a prime minister.’25 In his summary of the historical lessons of doomed states, Xun Zi points out: ‘In antiquity there were ten thousand countries; today there are only ten odd.’26 In other words, the reason why states failed is, without exception, because they did not select the right ministers.
Xun Zi believed that the appointment of different qualities of official relates directly to the increase or decrease in state power. He consequently emphasises selection of suitable officials as a core state-strengthening strategy. He says: ‘If he should desire to gain the harmonious unification of the world, controlling the likes of Qin and Chu, then he could do not better than an astute and intelligent gentleman. His use of knowledge penetrates into the smallest crevices. His actions and undertakings are not toilsome, yet his accomplishments and reputation are extremely grand. His management of affairs is extremely easy and reaches the ultimate of what is enjoyable. Accordingly, an intelligent lord will consider him a precious treasure, and a stupid one will consider him a vexatious difficulty.’27 Xun Zi also emphasizes merit-based principles as the guideline for selecting officials. He says: ‘What possible reason could there be for the lord of men not to search wide and far without regard for consanguinity or nobility and rank, being concerned solely to seek out those who are genuinely able? If a man were like this, then his servants would consider official positions less vital. They would yield to those who are more worthy and able and would be content to follow after them. In such a situation, it would be as though Shun or Yu had returned again and that the undertakings of True King had just recommended. To accomplish the splendid achievement of unifying the world and gaining a reputation the equal of that of Shun or Yu – what could possibly give pleasure of equal refinement?’28
Xun Zi's understanding of how changes in national power occur represents the traditional ‘wise ruler—virtuous minister’ concept espoused by ancient Chinese political thinkers, whereby talented political officials constitute the basis for strengthening the state. But Xun Zi sees institutions as humanly-determined, as opposed to the concept of modern democratic electoral systems wherein unsuitable officials are removed from office on the principles of self-correction and self-adjustment. During the time of Xun Zi, it was not generally believed that institutional innovation is the fundamental reason for a state's change in power status.
As Xun Zi regarded unification of the world as true Kingship's highest goal, he is not unconditionally against state annexation, and uses the nature of annexation as the criterion on which to judge whether or not it is justifiable. This idea is obviously not consistent with post-WWII international norms. Xun Zi may also have had an exaggerated idea of the importance of political power as regards preserving national security. The foreign policy of one small state, no matter how ethical and moral, does not necessarily protect it from the aggressive ambitions of larger powers. The 1990 Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait is an apposite example.
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Understanding International Authority |
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Discussions of power in modern IR theory are on three dimensions. The first is that of power relations: whether international relations are cooperative, competitive or confrontational. The second is power differentiation: whether the kind of power a country holds is dominant, supplementary, or participatory. Third is the content of power: whether the accent of a country's power is on its politics, economy or security. Xun Zi's discussion of international power, however, concentrates on the different natures of power. This is an area of scant research in contemporary IR theory.
The Definition of Tianxia (World) and You Tianxia (Having the World)
The concept of tianxia is at the foundation of Xun Zi's analysis of the nature of international power. Clarification of his view of tianxia gives a better understanding of Xun Zi's thoughts on Kingship, hegemony (Lord-Protector), and might (Power).
In Xun Zi's view, tianxia is ‘world’ and you tianxia is ‘having the world’ or achieving leadership of the world. But the power status of ‘having the world’ is gained through peoples’ and other states’ voluntary submission, rather than through use of force. He says: ‘Since the world is the weightiest burden, only the strongest person will be able to bear it. Since it is the largest thing, only the most discriminating will be able to allocate social responsibilities properly. Since it is the most populous entity, only the most enlightened will be able to make it harmonious. Only a sage is capable of fully meeting these three conditions. Thus, only a sage is capable of being a True King. A sage thoroughly perfects himself in the Way and is a person of complete refinement, so he can be the balance scale of judgment for the whole world ... The empire is the greatest of all, and only a sage can possess it.’29 He refutes the idea that Jie and Zhou did once ‘have world leadership’ in the clarification: ‘In accord with popular opinion, persuaders offer the thesis: Jie and Zhou Xin truly possessed the empire; Tang and Wu usurped it and stole the throne. This is not so. If one means that by the normal rule Jie and Zhou Xin would have possessed formal title to the empire, then it would be so. If ‘empire’ refers to the fact that the world was with Jie and Zhou Xin, then it would not be so.’30 Xun Zi, therefore, rejects the proposition that Jie and Zhou once possessed world leadership.
Xun Zi differentiates titular and actual world leadership. He says: ‘In the descendants of sage kings who inherited the empire in later generations is vested the position of political power and authority and in them is contained spiritual authority over the empire. Although all this is so, when a descendant is untalented and does not hit the mark, the Hundred Clans, on the one hand, will loathe him, and the feudal lords, on the other, will desert him. Nearby those within his own borders will not be united; far away the feudal lords will not heed him. His commands are not carried out even within his own borders, and in the worst case the feudal lords first encroach on him, slicking off territory, then they openly attack and invade. Given such a situation, although he might not yet perished, I would say that he no longer really possessed the empire.’31 A current example of this differentiation is that of the Afghan government's titular governance from 2002 to 2006 of the country, when its real power was actually restricted to the capital city of Kabul. This example, although not of world leadership, is helpful to an understanding of what Xun Zi means by you tianxia (having the world).
Xun Zi also distinguished between state power and world leadership. He believed it was possible to seize state power, but not world leadership, which is organically achieved: ‘Accordingly, although it is possible for a state to be taken by force, it is impossible for the whole empire to be taken by force.’32 In other words, it may be possible to seize the power to govern the state, but there is no possibility of seizing world leadership. An historical example is that of Nazi Germany's military and economic power surge in the early stages of World War II and its military expansion abroad, which enlarged Germany's presence in global affairs. But rather than achieving world leadership Germany, to the contrary, became the enemy of many more states. This is a valid example of Xun Zi's proposition that state governance and world leadership require different qualities of power.
Kingship Based on Political-Moral Principles
Xun Zi believed that the power of true kingship is the highest in the world, and that it is based on kingship's ethical and moral principles. He says: ‘There is the ancient saying: they uniformly applied moral principles throughout the land, and in a single day it was plainly evident. Such were Tang and Wu. Tang began with Bo and King Wu with Hao, both territories only a hundred li square, yet they unified the world, made the feudal lords their servants, so that wherever news of them penetrated there were none who did not submit to them and follow after them. This was due to no other cause than that they perfected moral principles. This is what is called ‘moral principles being established and becoming a universal king.’33 A current example is that of the Vatican: it is smaller than Singapore, of far lower economic power and has no army. But Singapore cannot match the Vatican's powerful influence on global affairs. This example endorses Xun Zi's belief that respected ethical and moral principles are a basis for world leadership.
Xun Zi believed true kingship is defined by its moral principles He says: ‘The Way of a True King is not like this. His humanity is the loftiest in the world, his justice the most admirable, and his majesty the most marvellous. His humanity being the loftiest is the cause of none in the world being estranged from him. His justice being the most admirable is the cause of none failing to esteem him. His majesty being the most marvellous is the cause of no one in the world presuming to oppose him, his majesty permitting no opposition coupled with a way that wins the allegiance of others is the cause of his triumphing without having to wage war, of his gaining his objectives without resort to force, and of the world submitting to him without his armies exerting themselves.’34
Xun Zi believed that: ‘true King ... The empire is the greatest of all, and only a sage who thoroughly perfects himself in the Way and who can possess it’.35 In other words, the sage is morally and totally perfect, thus fit to possess the world. Finding a leader that meets Xun Zi's high standard is unlikely. But the moral principles of individual leaders to which Xun Zi refers, as regards the role that moral leadership plays in establishment of international norms and effecting change in the international system become obvious when comparing former US President F.D. Roosevelt's deportment during WWII and that of current American President George W. Bush. Roosevelt's ideal of world peace promoted and helped to establish the United Nations after WWII, while Bush's Christian fundamentalist beliefs prevented US compliance with international norms and lead directly to the decline and fall of global nuclear non-proliferation.
Hegemony Based on Hard Power and Strategic Candour
Xun Zi regarded hegemonic power as inferior to that of true kingship. In his view, states willingly submit to kingship's world leadership, while the hegemon wins it through formidable power and strategic candour. In other words, the sage organically ascends to true kingship, while hegemony is won by a ruler's hard efforts.
Hegemony is nonetheless hardly achieved. Although of a lower moral order than true kingship, the hegemon must nonetheless display at least candour in its efforts towards supremacy. Xun Zi thus describes the hegemon: ‘Although the moral force of their inner power had not yet reached perfection and although moral principles had not yet been fully attained, yet, in a general way, they displayed rational principles for ordering the world. Their punishments and rewards, their prohibitions and assents, were believed by the world. Their ministers and subjects fully and clearly knew that they were capable of exercising constraints over them. When the rules and edicts of government had been set forth, then although they might see opportunity for profit or danger of loss, they would not deceive their people. When agreements had already been settled, then although they might see the opportunity for profit or danger of loss, they would not deceive their allies. Since they behaved in this fashion, their army was strong, their cities well defended, and hostile countries stood in awe of them. Then the unity of their own countries was a brilliantly evident beacon, and their allies had faith in them. Although from despised and backward countries, their majestic authority shook the whole world. Such were the five Lords-Protector ... Thus, that Duke Huan of Qi, Duke Wen of Jin, King Zhuang of Chu, King Helü of Wu, and King Goujian of Yue, all of whom were of despised and backward countries, held majestic sway over the world and [that] their might held peril for all the Central States was due to no other cause than that they were in the main trustworthy. This is what is called "established trust and becoming a lord-protector".’36
But Xun Zi believed that although strategic candour wins the trust of allies, hegemony cannot succeed without the backing of hard power. Without it, the state is not acknowledged as a lord-protector. Xun Zi says of the hegemon: ‘The way of the lord-protector is quite different. He opens up wilderness lands to cultivation, fills the granaries and storehouses, and provides useful implements. On the basis of careful recruitment and assessment, he selects scholar-knights of genuine talent and ability and then gradually encourages them with commendations and rewards or strictly disciplines them with rebukes and punishments. He offers survival to those who face destruction; he provides for the continuation of those whose lineage faces extinction; he guards the weak and forbids aggressive behaviour. Yet if he has no mind to annex territory of other states, the feudal lords will draw close to him. If he cultivates a way that treats them as friends and equals and strictly observes forms of respect in his dealing with them, the other feudal lords will be pleased with him. ... Hence by making clear in his conduct that he has no intention to annex lands and by inspiring trust in his friendship and his sense of equality with them, if there happens to be no True King ruling the world, he will invariably triumph. Such is one who knows the way of a lord-protector.’37
Might Based on Military Strength and Strategy
Xun Zi regarded might as a type of power inferior to that of lord-protector (or hegemony), because it depends entirely on military strength and strategy. As might is expanded by military aggression and occupation of other states’ territory, a powerful state makes many enemies. This creates greater potential for arbitrary incursions that weaken the state's power status. Xun Zi says: ‘When others defend the ramparts of their cities and send out knights to do battle with me and I overcome them through superior power, then the number of casualties among their population is necessarily very great. Where casualties have been extreme, the population is bound to hate me with vehemence. If the population detests me, then each day their desire to fight with me will grow. Where other defends the ramparts of their cities and sends out knights to do battle with me and I overcome them through superior power, then the number of casualties among my own people is certain to be very great. If the number of casualties among my own people has been great, they are certain to have a fierce dislike for me. If my own people hate me, then each day they will have less desire to fight for me; so as others grow more willing to fight, my own people will grow less willing to defend me. In this way, the cause of my former strength is reversed and produces weakness. Lands may be acquired, but their inhabitants will flee. As involvement become more numerous, accomplishments decrease. Although there is more to defend, the wherewithal to defend it diminishes. In this way the basis of my former greatness is reversed and is taken piece by piece from me.’38
Table 2 sets out the three different natures and bases of power according to Xun Zi: true kingship, hegemony and might.
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Xun Zi's analysis, however, underestimates the importance of hard power to true kingship. Although the Tang and Wu territories of Hao and Gao comprised only a hundred li (square km), other lords and kingdoms of the time were even smaller and weaker. States during the Spring-Autumn Period were much larger, and as Qi and Qin were at one time actually bigger than Chu, it was not always the most powerful country. Xun Zi's mention of the state of Chu's superior size to that of Tang and Wu in his argument about the extent of importance to true kingship of morality and just principles, therefore, is not entirely convincing. It is less so when recalling the end of WWI, when US President Woodrow Wilson was internationally accorded high respect for his proposition of the just and moral ‘Fourteen Points’ on which to establish a League of Nations. The US's isolationist policy, however, precluded the Wilson administration's adequate participation in international affairs. This prevented the United States from achieving world leadership. This example suggests that a leader's moral and ethical background is a necessary but insufficient condition for achieving world leadership. A state without big power, or that does not wholly participate in world affairs, cannot obtain world leadership solely on the grounds of high morals and ethics. Hard power is thus of equal importance to both true kingship and hegemony. As Hans Morgenthau notes, the domestic ethics, mores, and laws limiting the struggle for domestic power do not function in international politics, as the ethical norms of domestic and international society differ.39 But Xun Zi, in his insistence that domestic social norms also apply to international society, obviously makes no such distinction.
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Understanding International Order |
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Xun Zi's understanding of the effect of ideas concurs with Constructivist theory, but his views on international conflict and stability are more aligned to realist theory, while his ideas about preventing conflict and maintaining international order and stability are compatible with institutionalist theory.
Human Nature as the Root Cause of Conflict
Xun Zi believed that human nature inclines naturally towards evil, and that competing for selfish interests is a natural social phenomenon that leads inevitably to violent conflict. He says: ‘Now, the nature of man is such that he is born with a love of profit. Following this nature will cause its aggressiveness and greedy tendencies to grow and courtesy and deference to disappear. ... This being the case, when each person follows his inborn nature and indulges his natural inclinations, aggressiveness and greed are certain to develop. This is accomplished by violation of social class distinctions and throws the natural order into anarchy, resulting in a cruel tyranny.’40 It is interesting to note that the first of Hans Morgenthau's six principles of political realism is also that of human nature: ‘Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature ... Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India and Greece endeavoured to discover these laws.’41
Xun Zi makes a specific analysis of human nature: ‘Mencius contended that "since man can learn, his nature is good." I say that this is not so. It shows that Mencius did not reach any real understanding of what man's inborn nature is and that he did not investigate the division between those things that are inborn in man and those that are acquired. As a general rule, "inborn nature" embraces what is spontaneous from Nature, what cannot be learned, and what required no application to master. Ritual principles and moral duty are creations of the sage. They are things that people must study to be able to follow them and to which they must apply themselves before they can fulfil their precepts. What cannot be gained by learning and cannot be mastered by application yet is found in man is properly termed "inborn nature". What must be learned before a man can do it and what he must apply himself to before he can master it yet is found in man is properly called "acquired nature". This is precisely the distinction between "inborn" and "acquired" natures.’42
Xun Zi also believed that man's evil nature is the root cause of international conflict. Since man's desires have no limits and it is impossible to satisfy unlimited desires by material means, he says: ‘Men are born with desires which, if not satisfied, cannot be lead men to seek to satisfy them. If in seeking to satisfy their desires men observe no measure and apportion things without limits, then it would be impossible for them not to contend over the means to satisfy their desire. Such contention leads to disorder. Disorder leads to poverty.’43
The Constraining Function of Social Norms
Xun Zi did not believe that increasing social wealth resolves the conflicts arising from human competitiveness. He defines human beings’ desires as a natural emotive reaction: ‘Inborn nature is the consequence of Heaven. Emotions are the substance of that nature. Desires are the resources of nature. Seeking what is desired is the responses of the emotions.’44 Xun Zi, based on this reasoning, believed that strengthening the ability to reason constrains desire and therefore avoids social disorder. He says: ‘What men desire most is life, and what they hate most is death. Be that it may, men sometimes [pursue life and end up with death? polisher] [give up?] the pursuit of life and end up with death. It is not that they do not really desire life and rather desire death; it is that it proved impossible to continue living and it was possible to die. Thus, when desires run to excess, actions do not reach that point because the mind stops them. If what the mind permits coincides with reason, then although the desires are not strong enough the mind has ordered them to do so. If what the mind permits conflicts with what is reasonable, then although the desire[s] be few, how could it stop at disorder! Thus, order and disorder lie in what the mind permits and not with the desires that belong to our essential natures. Although you claim to have succeeded in finding the cause of order and disorder, if you do not seek it where it lies but instead seek it where it does not lie, then you will miss the truth.’45
Xun Zi is thus convinced that strengthening mental reasoning is a way of establishing social norms, in particular, ritual principles. He makes a point of discussing the content of ritual: ‘Ritual principles are the guiding ropes that pull the government. Where the exercise of government does not make use of ritual principles, the government will not succeed ... The relationship of ritual principles to the correct governance of the nation is like that of suspended balance and steelyard to the determination of weight or that of the darkened marking line to straightness. Thus, a man without ritual will not live, an undertaking without ritual will not succeed, and a nation without ritual will not be tranquil.’46 He also says: ‘Now, since human nature is evil, it must await the instructions of a teacher and the model before it can be put aright, and it must obtain ritual principles and a sense of moral right before it can become orderly. Nowadays, since men lack both teacher and model, they are prejudiced, wicked, and not upright. Since they lack ritual principles and precepts of moral duty, they are perverse, rebellious, and disorderly.’47
Xun Zi explains, from a supply–demand balance perspective, how social norms constrain a state's behaviour, avoid violent conflicts and maintain international order. He believed that norms make human desires reasonable and so help to achieve satisfaction. In other words, that they achieve the balance between decreased human desires and increased satisfaction. Xun Zi says: ‘The Ancient Kings abhorred such disorder; so they established the regulations contained within ritual and moral principles in order to apportion things, to nurture the desire of men, and to supply the means for their satisfaction .... In this way the two of them, desires and goods, sustained each other over the course of time. This is the origin of ritual principles.’48
Xun Zi's ideas regarding norms as a means of preventing violent conflict between states shares certain common assumptions with modern institutionalism; both hold that certain norms exist in the human mind that in some way control and constrain the temptation to pursue individual self-interest. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye say: ‘All these regimes were designed to resolve common problems in which the uncontrolled pursuit of individual self-interest by some governments could adversely affect the national interest of all the rest.’49 ‘Over time, governments develop reputations for compliance, not just to the letter of law but to the spirit as well. These reputations constitute one of their most important assets.’50
The Hierarchical Foundation of Social Norms
Xun Zi believed that social norms enact two functions in their prevention of state conflicts. The first, as discussed above, is that of achieving balance between temptation and satisfaction; the second, the design of a social hierarchy within which human behaviour is accordingly regulated, thus preventing conflict. He says: ‘It is of the inborn nature of human beings that it is impossible for them not to form societies. If they form a society in which there are no class divisions, strife will develop. If there is strife, then there will be social disorder; if there is social disorder, there will be hardship for all. Hence, a situation in which there are no class divisions is the greatest affliction mankind can have. A situation in which there are class divisions is the most basic benefit under Heaven. And it is the lord of men who is the indispensable element wherewith to "arrange the scale" of the classes of men.’51 Xun Zi says, in his explanation of how social norms prevent social chaos or disorder: ‘The Ancient Kings abhorred such disorder. Thus, they instituted regulations, ritual practices, and moral principles in order to create proper social and class divisions. They ordered that there be sufficient gradations of wealth and eminence of station to bring everyone under supervision. This is the fundamental principle by which to nurture the empire.’52
Xun Zi believed, therefore, that international violent conflict is inevitable unless there is a social hierarchy in place that constrains human temptation to pursue material interests. He says: ‘Two men of equal eminence cannot attend each other; two men of the same low status cannot commend each other – such is the norm of Heaven. When power and positions are equally distributed and likes and dislikes are identical, and material goods are inadequate to satisfy all, there is certain to be contention. Such contention is bound to produce civil disorder, and this disorder will result in poverty.’53
Xun Zi's beliefs regarding the benefits to international norms of social hierarchy are based on his observations of the Western Zhou Dynasty's Five Ordinance System.54 He says that the Tang and the Wu decided on different ordinances because they: ‘observed the qualities inherent in the land forms and regulated with ordinances the vessels and implements. They judged the various distances and so differentiated grades of tribute and offerings’.55 In other words, the king decided upon a social hierarchy, according to distance and contribution, whereby no one was exactly the same. The United Nations has a similarly hierarchical membership, for example, in that of its Security Council, which has permanent, non-permanent, and ordinary members. The IMF also allots voting powers according to the extent of shares and contributions of each member. The WTO applies different tax and tariff levels according to a state's category of national development. All provide examples of the validity of Xun Zi's belief in hierarchical order as the basis for effective international norms. Figure 4 demonstrates Xun Zi's definition of the logical relationships among human nature, social hierarchy, social norms and international order.
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Xun Zi so describes the Five Ordinance System: ‘Accordingly, all states of Xia Chinese have identical obligations for service to the king and have identical standard of conduct. The countries of the Man, Yi, Rong, and Di barbarians perform the same obligatory services to the king, but the regulations governing them are not the same. Those who are enforced within [the royal domain] do royal service. Those who are enforced without [the royal domain] do feudal service. Those who are in the feudal marches zone do guest service. The Man and Yi nations do service according to tr eaty obligations. The Rong and Yi do irregular service. Those who do royal service provide offerings for the sacrifices of thanks; those who do feudal service provide for the drinking ceremonies; those who do service according to treaty present tribute offerings; and those who do irregular service come to pay their respects at the succession of the new king. This is just what is meant by they observed the qualities inherent in the land forms and regulated with ordinances the vessels and implements; they judged and [?] various distances and so differentiated grades of tributes and offerings – for such is the perfection of true kingship.’56 Figure 5 shows the diagram of the Five Ordinance System:
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Xun Zi's views on the causes of war are basically consistent with realist theory, i.e. that international war is caused by anarchy in social systems. Xun Zi, however, does not expand on the concept that a hierarchical system inhibits international conflict, failing to take into account that changes in power relationships also result in changed relations within the social hierarchy. If states whose power relationships change do not accordingly adjust their perceptions of one another, as regards relative power status, war remains possible. Xun Zi's analysis does not discuss how the hierarchical order can be adjusted to deal with changes in the power relationship among states. The reason for this is his emphasis on internal factor determination; he considers only how state policies influence a state's power relationship, and not how changes in power relationship influence a state's behaviour.
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Inspirations Offered by Xun Zi's Thoughts on China's Rising Strategy |
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The purpose of my discussion of Xun Zi's thoughts on international politics is not only to present the views of an ancient thinker on international relations but, more important, to offer enlightenment on China's rising strategy.
The Objective of the Rising Strategy
Xun Zi believed that true kingship is a higher form of world leadership than hegemony, because tianxia (heaven or the world) is attained through voluntary submission, rather than force. This understanding prompts the thought: what kind of state should China rise to be? A superpower could be either a hegemon or a true kingship. The different natures of the two are expressed not just in their power differential but also in their moral and ethical level. If China wants, in contrast to the contemporary leadership role enacted by the United States, to be a ‘true kingship’ state, her strategic goal must, in addition to narrowing the power gap between China and the United States, be to present to the world a better social role model.
International society pays ever greater attention to the kind of superpower China might become. It obviously does not want her to become another Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan. Yet it also would not want China to become another United States, as this would lead to one of two things: a world dominated by two hegemonic powers, which would trigger resumption of the Cold War, or China's simply replacing the United States and world order remaining the same. International Society wants neither scenario. If China becomes a true kingship country—a super state grounded in high morals and ethics—it should bring about a world order more peaceful and secure than that today. True kingship may not be the perfect international system but, compared with the current hegemonic system, would be one imbued with greater cooperation and security.
To become a super state of a true kingship nature, China must make itself a role model state. Academia has proposed two competing social models: the ‘Beijing Consensus’ and the ‘Washington Consensus’. If China could build a state deemed worthy of duplication by others, it would organically become a true kingship state. Beijing has since 1978, when China began implementing the Reform and Opening policy, focused on economic construction. Increasing material wealth strengthens China's power position, but does not gain China respect from the world. This is because a super state that perceives national wealth as its highest interest is generally a harbinger of disaster, and not blessing, to other countries. The Chinese government in September of 2005 proposed the new foreign policy of ‘a harmonious world’, whose emphasis is on building friendly relations as matter of key foreign policy objective.57 Yet the August 2006 Central Foreign Affairs Meeting Report again specified: ‘foreign affairs must centre on economic construction’.58 Two months later, the Sixth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party Sixteenth Congress reconfirmed construction of a harmonious society as the long-term task of socialism, raising social equality and justice as the basic conditions for social harmony.59 The level of inconsistency in these propositions implies that the Chinese government gives building a harmonious society priority over maximizing national wealth. Political inertia, as a result of long-term emphasis on economic construction, however, has impeded the government in its conscious formulation of this objective within its rising strategy to build a true kingship state.
The Power Basis for the Rising Strategy
The Chinese government has already established the strategic principle of the country's peaceful development path,60 but whether its main purpose is to increase material power or strengthen operational power (political power) remains unclear. Economic development as the fundamental means of strengthening comprehensive national power is the prevailing idea in China today. But Xun Zi's belief that political power is the basis on which hard power considers comprehensive national power brings to mind China's experience, since 1949, of political change followed by strengthened economic development and military power. The CCP established a completely new political system in 1949, which from 1949 to 1956, greatly expanded China's comprehensive national power. Implementation of the Reform and Opening policy in 1978 then created almost 30 years of rapid economic growth, and the 2002 policy of parallel development of national defence and economic construction rapidly strengthened China's defence capability.61 Ill-advised government policies, such as during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, on the other hand, caused a tremendous weakening in national economic and military power.
Xun Zi's concept of yi (moral and ethical principles) is different from the contemporary concept of ‘soft power’, because soft power does not distinguish between cultural and political power, Zi's yi concept regards a ruler/leader's ideas as political power, and as such constituting the element of comprehensive power. Moreover, if the soft power formula is divided into cultural and political power, it is obviously the latter of the two that is crucial to the functioning of other power elements. For example, American military, economic and cultural power grew steadily from 2003 to 2006, but its political mobilization, or political power, seriously weakened after the Bush administration's illegal launch of the Iraq War. During these three years, the comprehensive national power of the United States displayed a shrinking trend and its international status declined. Both this example and that of the disintegration of the former Soviet Union imply that political power is operational, while military, economic and cultural power are material; the latter cannot function properly without the former. Figure 6 shows the relationships among various elements of power:
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CP means comprehensive national power, M means military power, E means economic power, C means cultural power, and P means political power. Figure 6 enables a simplified comprehensive national power formula:
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This formula implies, on the assumption that China's current military, economic and cultural power remains constant, that if China greatly increases her political power, as regards strengthening strategic trust and honesty, she stands dramatically to increase the country's comprehensive power and international status. Taking the 2006 China–Africa Forum as an example, although the total amount of aid from China to African countries in the coming three years does not surpass that of the EU and the United States, the African reaction to Chinese aid is nevertheless much warmer and stronger than to EU and US aid. The Chinese aid program, unlike that of the EU and the United States, carries no political pre-conditions. The honesty and trust reflected in China's aid programme, therefore, greatly strengthens the political impact of its economic assistance. This implies that although the correct strategy for strengthening China's soft power includes both political and cultural power, its central focus should be on political power.
The Tactics of the Rising Strategy
If China's rising strategy is indeed based on strengthening political power, then the approaches to the strategy popularly proposed by Chinese academics propose are clearly inappropriate. The idea, for example, of economic construction as the central task makes materialism the dominant ideology in Chinese society, and also influences discussions of ‘strategies for the rise of great powers’. Discussions within China's academia outline four main strategies: reform strategy (multi-polarity or resistance), avoidance strategy (independence or isolationism), entry strategy (free-rider or bandwagon) and follow strategy (multilateral cooperation). All, other than the reform strategy, are logically based on the idea of increasing China's economic wealth.
Xun Zi proposes, in contrast, a great power, talented people-oriented, strategy. Xun Zi sees change in international politics as the result of leaders’ ideas, whose main focus is on selecting talent. Stalin said in 1935: ‘Cadres decide everything’. In 1938, Mao Zedong also stated: ‘When the political line is decided, cadres are the determining factor.’62 These views concur with Xun Zi's ideas. The human resource strategy in China is still mainly directed at enterprise development, and not viewed on the same level as strategies designed specifically for China's rise. Talent is still regarded in terms of technical workers, rather than politicians or high ranking officials. Xun Zi's idea of talented people gives inspiration in this respect, in that it demonstrates that the strategy of recruitment of talented people is beneficial to more than just enterprise development, having since ancient times been used to effect the rise of great powers. The most needed people in this case are not technical workers, but politicians and government officials with institutional innovation ideas. Innovative strength and capability in institutions, therefore, provides the fundamental impetus for the rise of a great power.
If the rise of great powers 2,000 years ago during the agrarian period depended on talented people, then it is also the main requirement for economic development in today's information economy era. It can thus be assumed that talented people are still the determining factor in the rise of a great power. Xun Zi's idea of talent is that of competent individuals of high moral fibre. Many such are available; the key is whether or not rulers select them. This idea raises two aspects of the human resource strategy for the rise of great powers. The first is a high level of openness, as regards selection of people from all over the world, based on high competence and moral standards; this enhances a government's ability to make the right decisions. The administrations at work during the golden age of China's Tang Dynasty and India's Moslems states, for example, owed their competence and high quality to the talented foreign bureaucrats that the administrative authorities employed, according to historical records. It is estimated that 70 per cent of the Indian Moslems states’ bureaucracy comprised Persians and Afghans.63 The United States’ rise to its hegemonic position is also largely attributable to its absorption of foreign elites and talented peoples. The second aspect of the human resource strategy is that of the need for rapid adjustment and corrective action to remove unqualified officials and reduce the probabilities of decision-making errors. All politicians and officials potentially stand to lose the ability to make the right decisions, for reasons of bribery and corruption, out-of-date knowledge, reduced thinking capacity, or poor health. Establishing a system that removes and replaces officials provides more opportunities for talented people, reduces decision-making errors and, in the end, strengthens political power.
Fair and Equitable International Norms
After the signing in 1648 of the Westphalia Treaty, equality of state sovereignty became a universal international norm. It is one in direct opposition to Xun Zi's belief that a differentiated, hierarchical norm helps prevent conflict between states. Certain countries worry that a rising China might revive the old East-Asian tributary system. But any such renewal would inevitably lessen China international political mobilization. Objectively, however, big and small states are not equal as regards power. Establishing a hierarchical norm, therefore, could help maintain a balance of power and responsibility, thereby reducing international conflict and strengthening cooperative relationships.
‘Hierarchy’ is a negative term in modern political language, synonymous with inequality. Because, however, the power status between states objectively differs, only a normative hierarchical order maintains fairness. The principle of absolute equality actually promotes unfairness. In a boxing match, for example, boxers are classed according to weight—a kind of normative hierarchical order intended to uphold fair play. Without differentiated weight ranking a fair match is obviously impossible. As regards international norms, differentiation depends on the concerned state's position in international society, according to Xun Zi's explanation of the Five Ordinance System. The closer a state's power status to the world centre, the more closely it should follow strictly designed international norms. International norms applied to peripheral states, on the other hand, should be more relaxed and flexible. This is an unequal but fair international norm. In the 10 + 1 (China and ASEAN) free-trade area, for example, China will be the first to levy zero tariffs on the agricultural products it imports from ASEAN countries. This unequal regulation enhances 10 + 1 development. Japan, in its pursuit of economic cooperation with ASEAN countries, however, demands parallel tariff levels, which impedes ASEAN development.
Historically, neither hierarchical orders nor those based on equal sovereignty have prevented large scale international wars. But when comparing eras of modern IR history, inter-state peace has been more widespread in areas in where a hierarchical system, rather than one based on equal sovereignty, is in place. During the Cold War era, for example, equal status between the United States and the Soviet Union forced them to launch proxy wars, but American and the Soviet special status respectively within NATO and the Warsaw Pact enabled them to prevent military conflict between member states of these two organizations. A rising China will inevitably influence the international security system. What kind of international norm should China propose to maintain international peace? Protecting international peace requires the level of power possessed only by a superpower. China should propose, according to Xun Zi's understanding, a normative hierarchical order that helps prevent conflict, whereby different countries bear different international security responsibilities, and promote a system wherein different countries abide by different security norms. For example, big and small states in international peace-keeping missions have different security responsibilities and possess different levels of authority; and, as regards nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear states stringently abide by their non-proliferation responsibilities while providing nuclear security guarantees to non-nuclear states.
This author believes that Xun Zi's ideas on statecraft can be summed up in one of his main statements: ‘One who uses the state to establish justice will be king; one who establishes trust will be a lord-protector; and one who establishes a record of expediency and opportunism will perish.’64 The inspiration that Xun Zi's thoughts provide for formulating China's rising strategy, therefore, comprises the following points: if China bases itself upon political power and persistently pursues institutional innovation, then it will rise to become the world's leading state; if China balances development of political, military and economic power, then it will become a strong global power; if China takes economic construction as the central priority, then it will gradually become a medium developed country; if China takes political struggle as the guideline, then it will perish. Xun Zi's ideas represent one school of thought on international politics among many expounded by various ancient Chinese thinkers. Exploration of his and other ancient's ideas and thoughts could be of help in both developing and constructing modern IR theory, and providing guidelines for reasonable strategies that promote China's rise. When exploring Xun Zi's ideas and thoughts, however, it should be borne in mind that their reasoning and rationale include certain irrational elements that call for prudent judgement.
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Footnotes |
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*Yan Xuetong is Professor of International Relations and Director of Institute of International Studies at Tsinghua University.
