Who is the Target of the US Anti-missile System Deployed in Eastern Europe?*
Corresponding author. Email: riqiangwu{at}yahoo.com.cn
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US–Russian Dialogue Concerning US Deployment of an Anti-missile System in Eastern Europe |
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 Top US-Russian Dialogue Concerning... Research Methodology and...Interception Range of the...A Potential Russian Response:...A Second Potential Russian...ConclusionAppendix I: Models of...Appendix II: Interceptor Missile... |
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The United States announced in January of 2007 that it would hold talks with Poland and the Czech Republic on the possible deployment of a missile defence system in their countries. The system's purpose would be to guard against potential missile attacks from Iran and the DPRK. The United States proposed deploying a 10-interceptor anti-missile launch site in Poland, an X-band radar installation in the Czech Republic and a radar station on edge of the Caucasus.1 US officials stressed that as these detection devices and interceptor missiles would be trained on ballistic missile launch sites in the Middle East, they would not prejudice Russia's military might in Europe.2 US Officials also made the point that the several hundred ballistic missiles in Russia's possession are far in excess of the minimum capacity necessary to overwhelm an Eastern European-located anti-missile system of just 10 interceptor missiles.3
The United States at the same time argued that the system's location in Poland rendered it physically incapable of threatening Russian security interests. As the interceptors would be trained on Iran, any Russian ballistic missile attack would force them to pursue and out-fly a Russian ballistic missile in order to intercept it.4
Russia was unconvinced by these reassurances. President Putin sharply criticized US security policy on 10 February 2007 at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, with specific reference to the proposed Eastern European anti-missile system.5 Russian officials followed his lead, taking hard-line positions in later policy statements and public speeches on the matter. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov questioned US motives, arguing that an anti-missile shield installed in Poland and the Czech Republic would be ineffective against a North Korean attack; also that Iran lacks the long-range missile capability necessary to launch an attack on the United States. Ivanov called to question why the United States did not deploy missile defence systems on the territories of its other allies, such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Turkey.6 Russian Chief of General Staff Yuri Baluyevsky advanced from simply questioning US motives to issuing the warning that Russia would, if necessary, unilaterally withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nucelar Forces Treaty (INF). Such a move, Baluyevsky said, would constitute an ‘adequate asymmetric response’ to the United States deployment of an anti-missile system in Europe.7 High ranking Russian military confirmed that Russia indeed has the capability to destroy a US anti-missile system installed in Poland and the Czech Republic.8 President Putin announced on 26 April 2007 in his annual state of the nation address to the Federal Assembly that Russia would temporarily suspend the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).9 Baluyevsky commented on 10 May, after attending the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council Meeting in Brussels, that the Treaty was on the brink of collapse.10
Russia's critique of the proposed US anti-missile system in Eastern Europe continues the debate ongoing between the two nations since the Cold War period. It was during the Cold War that the United States and the USSR first formulated arms control measures limiting their respective strategic weapons. Restricting ballistic missile defence systems (strategic anti-missile systems) that could potentially undermine US–USSR strategic stability was a vital component of the arms control framework incorporating these measures.11 The United States resumption of its development of strategic ballistic missile defence since the end of the Cold War has antagonized Russia, generating tension between the two nations.12 The initial point of primary contention was the United States proposal to install a missile defence system in Alaska. Its stated purpose was to intercept potential missile attacks from the DPRK. But from an Alaskan location, the system could also intercept missile attacks from the Russian far-east and from China, although not from Russia's European territories. The Alaskan system was controversial, but as it still left the United States vulnerable to potential missile attack from Russia's far west, Russia retained a level of strategic response capability.
The potential US move as regards Eastern Europe, however, would counterbalance the existing strategic equilibrium. Although the United States insists that the purpose of its proposed Eastern European anti-missile system is to intercept a potential Iranian nuclear attack, the question to be answered is: would this system also be capable of intercepting missiles originating in Russia's European territories? If the proposed Eastern European shield were capable of intercepting strategic missiles fired from Russia's western regions, this, taking into account the range of the Alaskan anti-missile system, would extend US strategic cover, shielding it from potential nuclear attacks from Western as well as Eastern Russia. The proposed deployment of an anti-missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic would complete the US's multi-layered defence, effectively sealing it off from Russian nuclear attacks. The continued expansion of US missile defence capabilities thus erodes Russia's strategic response capabilities.
Theories raised by respected American scholars in the field imply that US policy makers would transform the nuclear advantage gained by negating Russia's nuclear response capability into a forceful diplomatic tool; one that would compromise Russian security interests.13 The proposed anti-missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, whether or not its purpose is to counter an Iranian missile attack, undoubtedly threatens Russia's strategic response capacity. Russian concern over its security interests could, in this classic example of the security dilemma, evoke a text-book response.
The purpose of this article is to determine whether or not the US anti-missile installations in Poland and the Czech Republic are, from a technical point of view, capable of intercepting strategic missiles launched from Western Russia. It raises the question: could the US anti-missile system gain the United States a nuclear advantage strong enough to contain Russia? The article's focus, however, is not on the United State's implicit intent in developing the system but primarily on whether or not the proposed US installations in Eastern Europe have the anti-missile capability to intercept missiles from Western Russia.
If the United States does have this capacity, a security dilemma is bound to ensue. Deteriorations in security relations between Russia and the United States as a result of friction over security interests inevitably affect Europe's security environment.
The research expounded in this article explains Russia's hard-line response to the US proposal. As Europe cannot but be drawn into this US–Russian security conflict, the article also analyses the implications of its negative impact on European security.
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Research Methodology and Assumptions |
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TopUS-Russian Dialogue Concerning...Research Methodology and...Interception Range of the...A Potential Russian Response:...A Second Potential Russian...ConclusionAppendix I: Models of...Appendix II: Interceptor Missile... |
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This article considers, from a technical point of view, whether or not it is possible for US anti-missiles in Eastern Europe to intercept strategic missile attacks on the United States from Western Russia. As the United States has yet to publish the technical specifications of the missile defence system it proposes installing in Eastern Europe, certain assumptions are made. This article infers these specifications on the basis of the system's capability, as stated by the United States, to intercept missiles launched on the United States from Iran.
This is actually a comparative study, in that it compares one US anti-missile system that is hypothetically capable of intercepting Iranian missiles with one assumed capable of intercepting Russian missiles. There are two main indicators of an anti-missile system's intercept capability; the first is its range, or the optimum physical space through which it enters the trajectory of a strategic missile and intercepts it. The second is the probability of interception, or the level of certainty that the interceptor missile strikes the target from its ultimately guided position. The article focuses on the first indicator; that of range. In so doing it answers the question: if Iranian missiles launched on the United States fall within potential range of US interceptors in Eastern Europe, could these anti-missiles also intercept attacks launched on the United States from Russia?
The article does not consider the second indicator: the probability of whether or not a US anti-missile in Eastern Europe could, by virtue of being capable of intercepting an Iranian strategic missile, also eliminate a Russian missile, for several reasons:
First, the United States is still developing the types of interceptor missile that are critical to this study. The capabilities of many of these systems, in particular their target seeking devices, are not yet known. More important, Iranian intercontinental missiles are, from the US perspective, an unknown quantity. There is no way of knowing what kind of warheads Iran could potentially develop. For these reasons the probability of whether or not a US interceptor is capable of stopping both an Iranian missile and a Russian missile cannot reasonably be determined.
Second, it cannot be assumed that a US interceptor is more capable of intercepting an Iranian missile than it is a Russian missile. Cruder ballistic missiles might have an unsteady flight path and emit metallic waste. Either could affect US interceptor capability. The United States, moreover, has closely observed Russian missile tests. Its relative understanding of Russian strategic missile characteristics enables interceptors to be designed according to Russian particularities. But there is no way US interceptors can be adapted to the flight characteristics of Iranian-developed intercontinental missiles because they do not yet exist. Whether or not there is a greater probability of the United State's intercepting an Iranian missile than a Russian missile, therefore, is unclear.
Third, there is one definitive demonstration of whether or not the Russian strategic response capability is indeed under threat; that of firing Russian missiles at the United States and seeing whether or not they fall within US interceptor missile range. The two countries, therefore, have no way of gauging the probability of whether or not the US anti-missile installation in Poland and the Czech Republic could intercept a Russian missile. This implies, from the deterrence theory perspective, increased US scepticism of Russia's ability to deter, which weakens the psychological effect of Russian deterrence. This is the reason for Russia's unequivocal response to the proposed US anti-missile system in Eastern Europe.
It is for the above three sets of reasons that this article does not compare the probabilities of the anti-missile system deployed in Poland and the Czech Republic's successfully intercepting both Iranian and Russian missiles.
In recent discussions on missile defence and its security implications, academics in the field have focussed primarily on the first indicator of an anti-missile system's interception capability; that of its range.14
This is because, other than in the case of a dramatically updated interceptor capability, it is the geographical position of an anti-missile system that determines its interception range. Anti-missile system range is consequently a focal point of international security.
The range of an anti-missile system is determined by its radar, interceptor capabilities and the flight duration of the attacking missile. Each of these variables is considered in turn. Reports indicate that the United States plans to relocate its X-band radar, currently positioned on the Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific, to the Czech Republic.15 This article uses the capabilities and specifications of this radar system, based on these reports, to conduct its analysis. At the time of writing, the United States has not made public the types and specifications of the anti-missiles it proposes installing in Poland. Interceptors, in comparison with radar systems, are relatively mobile and therefore easy to deploy. As almost all American interceptor missiles, other than the Ground-based Interceptor (GBI) installed in Alaska, are mobile enough to be re-deployable, the United States can install in Poland the type of interceptor missile best suited to its purposes. Determining whether or not the range of these anti-missiles enables them to intercept ballistic missiles fired at the United States from both Iran and Russia requires consideration of the wide range of interceptors already in the US arsenal, as well as those it is currently developing.
The United States has four types of land-based interceptor missile with the capacity to intercept intercontinental missiles. The article will later assess them, from the angle of whether or not either Iranian or Russian missiles would fall within their range. The four types of interceptor are listed subsequently, along with the bases of their selection. A detailed list of the parameters of the selected missiles appears in Appendix I. These parameters may not be identical to those of the actual interceptor missiles, but are similar enough to reflect each missile's basic characteristics.
- Boost Phase Interceptor (BPI): The capabilities of this missile match those of the interceptor missile identified and described in the report of the American Physical Society (APS).16 It is specified as a boost phase interception missile.17
- Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD): This missile's burn-out speed of less than 3 km/s qualifies it as a TMD as defined by the Clinton Administration. The United States has begun production of this missile. It is deployable in 2009;
- GBI: This missile's burn-out speed of 7 km/s is equivalent to that of an intercontinental missile. The Bush Administration has deployed the GBI in both Alaska and at Vandenberg Air Force Base.
- Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI): This system has a burn-out speed of 6 km/s and high speed capabilities. It activates at both boost and ascent phases. The United States is currently developing this system and will test the booster in 2008.
Further assumptions made in the course of this analysis may be inaccurate, but not to a degree that alters the significance of its results. They are:
(1) The radar detection range is 4,000 km.18 It is actually geometric position rather than distance that triggers a radar alert. This is to say, it is the angle at which an offensive missile enters the radar field that distinguishes it. (2) Missiles in Poland will be installed in Warsaw. Anti-missiles could just as well be installed at a military base in Poland other than Warsaw. As, however, there is no great distance between Warsaw and any other Polish destination, the exact location has low bearing on the calculations below. (3) The radar system will be placed in Prague. Again, whether or not the Czech Republic anti-missile base is specifically in Prague has low impact on the article's calculations. (4) Tehran is the launch site of Iranian ballistic missiles. This is a crude assumption but, in view of Iran's geography, does not prejudice calculations. (5) The Russian missile launch site is Plesetsk. Plesetsk is a main test site for strategic missiles in Western Russia. (6) All calculations of missile trajectories take New York City as the target. (7) The Earth being spherical, its rotations are not considered.
The main objective of the article's research is to consider the capabilities of the proposed American missile defence system in Eastern Europe as regards its potential to change the structural balance of US–Russian strategic capabilities. Observing the changes in the two nations’ relative capabilities enables an explanation of their security behaviour and projections on it. Taking a structural realist line of thought, the effect of changes in the power dynamic between the two states on their security relations is then considered.
The main point of this research is not to consider United States motives for deploying a missile defence system in Eastern Europe, for several reasons. First, American and Russian statements differ, the United States expressing explicit motives that Russia refutes. Details of the United States internal policy debate on these issues are yet to be made public. Publicly available materials, therefore, do not provide sufficient research material for an analysis of United States intentions, explicit and implicit, behind establishing Eastern European anti-missile bases. Second, United States motives could alter in sequence with changes in the power dynamic between the US and Russia. Current perceptions of United States motives have low bearing on what they might actually become in the face of military conflict between the two nations.
The next section focuses on changes in the relative power dynamic between the two nations, taking a structural realist line of thought. Changes in relative US–Russian power affect their respective security behaviour, which could jeopardize the security of all Europe. For this reason, the article considers the implications of changes in the US–Russia power dynamic for Europe's security environment, and the likely European response, based on the results of the technical analysis subsequently (Interceptor and offensive missile models are shown in Appendix I; intercept missile launch delay times are calculated in Appendix II).
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Interception Range of the Proposed Eastern European Anti-missile System |
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TopUS-Russian Dialogue Concerning...Research Methodology and...Interception Range of the...A Potential Russian Response:...A Second Potential Russian...ConclusionAppendix I: Models of...Appendix II: Interceptor Missile... |
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The analysis subsequently considers four types of anti-missile: the BPI, THAAD, GBI and KEI interceptors. They encompass all US-developed, land-based interceptor missiles with strategic capabilities. Whether or not the range capability of each of these four types of interceptors includes both Iran and Russia is a primary point of analysis.
The BPI has a range of less than 1,000 km, according to available resources.19 The closest distance from Warsaw to the nearest Iranian border is 2,200 km. When launched in Poland, therefore, the BPI does not have the capability to intercept strategic missiles launched from Iran on the United States. The US missile defence system deployed in Poland, therefore, would not include the BPI, which puts it out of the equation.
The second possible anti-missile is the THAAD. Deciding whether or not it is suitable for deployment in Poland entails first calculating whether or not hypothetical Iranian ICBMs launched on the United States would fall within the THAAD interceptor range. As earlier mentioned, it is assumed that Iranian offensive missiles are fired on New York from Tehran. In Figure 1 subsequently, the dense arcs to the left represent the missile trajectories falling within the THAAD range; the surrounding dotted line encompasses the entire flight trajectory of an Iranian-launched ICBM, whose altitude and distance from assumed interceptors in Warsaw are plotted on the axes. Intercepting an ICMB requires the offensive and interceptor missiles simultaneously to intersect. As the graph below shows, the THAAD has a 700 km range. The ICBM takes 570 seconds to reach a 700 km distance from the THAAD, at an altitude 876 km or more above the 400 km maximum THAAD altitude. The THAAD system when based in Warsaw, therefore, lacks the capacity for intercepting Iranian strategic missiles directed at the United States.
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The same conclusion is reached when computing the THAAD ‘footprint’. Research conducted at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) shows20 that although the THAAD system was designed specifically as an anti-theatre missile, its defence missile capabilities also extend to strategic missiles. The THAAD defence range is a pear shaped zone surrounding the launch site and which covers a 200 km area—equivalent to a large metropolitan region. Its strategic missile defence range, however, is narrower than that needed to intercept theatre missiles. These results have been approximated through the Arms Control Technology Research Group of the Beijing Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics.21 It is now clear that an Iranian missile destined for New York would be far outside the range capability of a THAAD system based in Warsaw.
A THAAD system in Warsaw, by the same token, also lacks the capability to intercept Russian strategic missile attacks on the Unites States. The THAAD system, therefore, lacks the capability to achieve any potential US objective, and does not figure in the analysis.
The next point to consider is that of the range of a GBI interceptor hypothetically deployed in Eastern Europe, and whether it could intercept strategic missiles launched from Iran on the United States. Teheran is, again, the assumed launch point of the missiles, New York is the target and interceptor missiles based in Warsaw react to radar signals from the Prague installation.22
Figure 2 depicts the flight path of an Iranian missile as it would appear on the Prague radar. The time that has expired since the missile launch is depicted on the horizontal axis; the missile's angle of elevation above the radar is plotted on the vertical axis. The missile enters the radar field upon reaching an elevation greater than zero above the Prague radar horizon. The figure shows that the Prague radar detects the offensive missile 333 seconds after launch. Taking into account the 5 seconds needed to track and filter information, the Warsaw-launched interceptor activates 338 seconds after the offensive missile attack. The offensive and interceptor missiles achieve intersect 600 seconds after the offensive missile launch, and the intercept occurs in Ukrainian airspace, as demonstrated in the calculations subsequently. Figure 3 is a geometrical depiction of the offensive and interceptor missile trajectories. It shows that US-installed GBI interceptors in Warsaw have the range necessary to intercept missiles launched on the United States from Iran. The GBI, therefore, is potentially deployable in the Eastern European defence system.
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But would US-installed GBI interceptors in Warsaw be capable of intercepting Russian missiles targeted at the United States? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then Russia's security fears are certainly warranted. As earlier mentioned, the assumptions are that Russian missiles launched on the New York target from Plesetsk are picked up on the Prague radar, which launches Warsaw-based interceptors.
Figure 4 depicts the flight path of a Russian missile as it would appear on the Prague radar. The figure shows that the Russian missile is detected 271 seconds after launch. Adding on the 5 seconds needed to track and filter information, the interceptors activate 276 seconds after the offensive missile launch. It can be computed that the flight path of the Russian missile intersects with that of the interceptor 1,050 seconds after the offensive missile launch, and that the intercept occurs in airspace above the Labrador Sea between Greenland and Canada. Figure 5 depicts the trajectories of the two missiles.
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As GBI interceptors launched from Warsaw must pursue and turn on the Russian ICBM, the intercept takes longer, but is nonetheless feasible. This conclusion makes US assurances that the Warsaw base will not prejudice Russia's strategic missile capability ring very hollow.
It should, however, be noted that the Prague radar system lacks the capability to continue tracking the target after elapse of the 1,050-second time-delay between the ICBM missile launch and the GBI intercept. The United States then engages fire control of GBI interceptors by means of its radar systems in Cape Cod, Massachusetts and Thule, Greenland. Both, however, are early warning systems, whose target recognition capabilities fall far short of those of ground-based X-band radar. This factor lowers the probability of an accurate GBI intercept of an offensive missile attack.
The above calculations show that a GBI interceptor launched from Warsaw is capable of neutralizing an offensive Russian strategic missile, but only after travelling more than half the distance to the target. This raises the question: does the proposed US anti-ballistic missile base in Warsaw have a significantly better capacity than the United States base in Fort Greely, Alaska for intercepting Russian missiles? In other words, does an Eastern European anti-missile system armed with GBI interceptors constitute any greater threat to Russia's security than the existing Alaskan anti-missiles? Answering this question entails assessing the capability of anti-missiles based in Fort Greely, Alaska to intercept Russian strategic missiles. On the assumption that there is no United States base in Eastern Europe, interceptor missiles in Fort Greely, Alaska are deployed against a Russian attack after being detected on the Flyingdales, UK early warning radar system. The Flyingdales radar picks up the Russian ICBM 279 seconds after its initial launch and five seconds later fires the interceptors. The interceptor and the Russian ICBM cross trajectory 1,076 seconds after the initial offensive launch, above the Labrador Sea. As the offensive missile flight path is beyond range of the Shemya radar system, GBI interceptors are engaged and guided by the Flyingdales early warning radar system, a guidance system that limits the interceptor's scope of evasive action.
Figure 6 depicts the flight path of a Russian-launched strategic missile attack on New York, and that of GBI interceptors launched from Alaska. Table 1 compares the respective capabilities of interceptors launched from Warsaw and from Alaska.
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Table 1 shows that it matters little if GBI interceptors trained on offensive strategic missiles launched on New York from Western Russia are deployed either in Alaska or Eastern Europe; both systems have approximately the same intercept capability. Alaskan-launched anti-missiles intercept Russian ICBMs just 26 seconds later than those launched in Eastern Europe. The systems, furthermore, do not complement one another. A United States base in Eastern Europe, therefore, is merely one more unit of US interceptor missile cover, and of no particular advantage as regards intercepting Russian missiles. Calculations also reveal that the point at which the GBI intercepts the Russian strategic missile launched on New York is beyond the range of both the Czech Republic- and Alaskan-based X-band radar systems. The interception probability, therefore, is low. These calculations could be of help to the United States in their efforts to convince Russia that their deployment of interceptors in Eastern Europe does not threaten Russian interests. If the United States can guarantee that (1) the proposed anti-missile installation in Eastern Europe is, in common with the Alaskan base, limited to GBI interceptors, and (2) that the quantity of interceptors is limited to a specific number, the proposed Eastern European anti-missile system is no greater a threat to Russian security than the Alaskan system.
The United States, however, has made only blanket statements on the proposed Eastern European system, with no mention of concrete limitations on either the technology or capabilities of the missiles deployed. This implies possible United States deployment in Eastern Europe of considerably more advanced missiles, on the possible pretext of guarding against Iranian missile attacks.
The analysis now turns to the KEI, the fourth type of potentially deployable interceptor, which is more advanced than the GBI. Having established that Iranian missiles fall within the GBI range, it follows that they come also within the KEI range. This begs the question: Do KEI anti-missiles in Eastern Europe constitute a substantial increase in United States capability to intercept Russian strategic missiles?
The Defence Support Program (DSP) early warning radar is capable of detecting the rocket plume of offensive missiles above an altitude of 7 km, according to the APS report.23 It takes offensive missiles approximately 44 seconds to reach this altitude; allowing a further 20 seconds for tracking, the interceptors are fired 64 seconds after the offensive missile launch. The KEI interceptor fired from Eastern Europe, therefore, meets the Russian strategic missile over the Arctic Ocean, 585 seconds after the initial offensive launch. Figure 7 depicts the Russian strategic missile and KEI interceptor trajectories on the New York flight path.
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The calculations above show that GBI interceptors deployed in Alaska intercept strategic missiles launched from Western Russia 1,076 seconds after the offensive missile launch. The KEI interceptor installed in Eastern Europe, on the other hand, takes only 585 seconds to neutralize an attack. Combined, the systems provide the United States with multi-layered defence against a potential Russia missile attack that incorporates a double capacity for intercepting Russian ICBMs. This shield considerably reduces the chances of a successful Russian missile attack on the United States.
The KEI missile has other interception probability advantages that make it superior to the GBI in two ways: faster acceleration during the boost phase; and shorter launch delay (when launched by early warning satellite). The shorter launch delay is the more critical factor; a GBI launched by early warning satellite has approximately the same interception capability as the KEI, according to calculations. Acceleration capability, therefore, has low bearing on the respective intercept capabilities of GBI and KEI interceptors.
But it should be noted that switching launch mode from by ground-based radar to by early warning satellite is by no means straightforward. It is not accomplished merely through reconfigured software program or a specific electronic component. Interceptor missiles are made up of two components: the booster system and kill vehicle (KV). The booster system manoeuvres the KV to the designated position prior to intercept. It is the accuracy of the shift from booster system to KV that determines the interceptor's tactical capacity. As early warning satellites are less precise than ground-based radar, interceptors that respond to early warning satellite launches need a KV of divert capability greater than that of the GBI interceptor, evident in a greater engine thrust and more propellant. The GBI has a KV designed for a land-based radar launch of low divert capability. The GBI, therefore, is not deployable by early warning satellite other than with new, tactically capable KV. The KEI, on the other hand, has a KV whose divert capabilities imply a far higher probability than the GBI of intercepting a Russian ballistic missile. The computations discussed in this section are summed up in Table 2 subsequently.
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The findings in this section make clear that BPI or THAAD systems installed in Eastern Europe are not be capable of intercepting Iranian missiles launched on the United States. The United States can achieve its stated objective of defence against potential Iranian-launched strategic missile attacks by installing either of the two missiles discussed before: the GBI or the KEI.
Unless the Eastern European base becomes operational, United States defense against Western Russia-launched strategic missile attacks on the Eastern United States is limited to deployment of its Alaskan-based GBI interceptor. The above analysis shows that a GBI launched from Alaska is capable of intercepting Russian missiles, but only at the tail end of the ICBM flight path. Relatively low-capacity GBI interceptors installed in Eastern Europe are also capable of intercepting Russian strategic missiles, but at a point close to where Alaska-launched anti-missiles could also neutralize a nuclear offensive. More important, the point at which an Eastern European-launched GBI interceptor is capable of intercepting a Russian strategic missile is off the ranges of the US ground-based X-band radar installations in both the Czech Republic and Shemya. There is consequently low interception probability. If, therefore, the United States installs low capability GBI interceptors in Eastern Europe, it achieves the United States objective of anti-missile cover against potential Iranian missile attacks without threatening Russia's security environment.
United States installation of the higher capability KEI interceptors, on the other hand, makes possible an offensive missile intercept in the ascent phase, rather than at a point off the radar, as is the case with the GBI interceptor. As the entire interception process occurs within the range of the Czech Republic X-band radar, the chances of a successful offensive missile launch are significantly reduced.
The conclusions to this analysis, therefore, are: installing KEI interceptors in Eastern Europe greatly increases United States ability to intercept strategic missile launched on the United States from Western Russia. The more salient point, however, is that US anti-missile systems in Eastern Europe and Alaska combine to provide a multi-layered system of defence which dramatically diminishes the likelihood of successful Russian offensive missile attacks on the United States. Under this scenario, Russia's strategic defence capabilities are indeed under threat.
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A Potential Russian Response: Development of Defence Penetration Technology |
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TopUS-Russian Dialogue Concerning...Research Methodology and...Interception Range of the...A Potential Russian Response:...A Second Potential Russian...ConclusionAppendix I: Models of...Appendix II: Interceptor Missile... |
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The last section determined that United States installation of low capability GBI interceptors in Eastern Europe would not threaten Russian security interests; installation of high capability KEI interceptors, however, would. The United States has given no guarantee of whether or not it will install KEI interceptors, in the light of which the proposed Eastern European anti-missile system could prejudice Russian security interests. The matter has consequently generated security policy responses from a number of countries. The next point of discussion is the possible Russian response to a US anti-missile base in Eastern Europe, on the basis of the above technical analysis.
In addition to maintaining missile defence systems in Alaska and Vandenberg, the United States also exports anti-missile systems to its allies. It has anti-missile radar installations in Fylingdales, UK; Danish Greenland and Vardo, Norway. Aomori, Japan became site of the first US-installed X-band radar in late June of 2006. In November of the same year the United States proposed a second X-band radar system in Japan, naming Kyushu as a potential installation site.24
The United State's current and proposed anti-missile radar installations in Eastern Europe, the Caucuses and Japan, west, east and centre of the globe effectively envelope North Korea, Russia and China (Table 3).
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Proposed and existing US anti-missile installations, therefore, would act as a multi-layer missile defence shield comprising international and domestic US anti-missile bases. Figure 8 uses the example of a Russian strategic missile launch to demonstrate this phenomenon. It shows that the United States is capable of intercepting Russian missiles (launched from Plesetsk on New York) from either Poland, which would launch the KEI interceptor, or Alaska, site of the US GBI interceptor missiles.
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Figure 8 shows that interceptors based respectively in Alaska and Poland would constitute two more units of US multi-layered defence against Russian strategic missile attacks. The THAAD system is capable also of protecting specific cities from ICBM attacks. The United States thus has three-tier defence against Russian strategic missiles. The United States’ advance from single-layer to multi-layer defence denotes a fundamental change in US anti-missile system capabilities. Russian missiles may be capable of penetrating one layer of US anti-missiles, but not of what may soon be multi-layer US defence. This incongruity has negative impact on Russia's strategic deterrence capability.
Two articles jointly written by American scholars Keir Lieber and Daryl Press in 2006, and published25 in the most influential journals of international politics and policy in the USA, argue that Russia's nuclear capabilities have inexorably weakened in the post-Cold War period and that Russia lacks the time necessary to re-position its strategic nuclear submarines and mobile ICBMs; also that Russia is deficient in radar bases and early warning satellites. The United States, on the other hand, despite having reduced its stocks of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War period, has nevertheless considerably strengthened its offensive capabilities. The comparison Lieber and Press draw between the two countries’ respective capabilities implies that a US-launched nuclear attack on Russia in peace time when Russian nuclear missiles are not on high alert could potentially neutralize Russia's entire long-distance nuclear weapon arsenal. As some of the assumptions the articles make are questionable (for example, that the United States has 100% ability to identify target nuclear weapons), their calculations may also be deemed less than accurate. But even if the United States is not (despite Leiber and Press's claims) capable of destroying all of Russia's long-range missiles, the articles’ conclusions are nonetheless reasonable: that few of Russia's long-range nuclear missiles could survive an American nuclear attack.
Lieber and Press estimate that a pre-emptive, exclusively offensive nuclear attack on Russia from the United States would leave Russia the quantity of long-range nuclear weapons necessary to mount a counterattack. Russia, therefore, would retain minimal deterrence capabilities, most particularly if the surviving missiles happen to be in Western Russia and albeit on the assumption that the United States relies on none other than its Alaska-based anti-missile system. The low probability of a Russian nuclear missile's penetrating a multi-layered missile defence shield and successfully connecting with its United States target, however, substantially decreases Russia's nuclear deterrence. The United State's continued expansion of missile defence system could moreover achieve a defence capability sufficient to repel a Russian nuclear counterattack. This nuclear magnitude gives the United States considerable bargaining power. Lieber and Press further argue that the United States would exploit its nuclear might at times of crisis by pushing its adversaries to the brink of war, in the common knowledge of the potential power the United States has to launch devastating nuclear attacks on its enemies.
Russia consequently has every reason to be concerned about its national security. When news broke of the proposed Eastern European anti-missile system, Russian political and military leaders immediately took a hard line in their public responses, critiquing the American proposal in order to provoke a response from US officials.
From a defensive realism approach, Russia's weakening deterrence capabilities in the face of expanded United States offensive might and missile defence motivate the nation to strengthen its nuclear capacities. If United States intentions behind installing an anti-missile system in Eastern Europe are indeed to counter a potential Iranian threat and not to threaten Russia's strategic missile capabilities, the United States should give Russia some sign that it will limit the technological capabilities of its proposed Eastern European-based defence system. The United States having failed to give any such signal, Russia has cause for concern about its security. Its next move, from the defensive realism perspective, is to increase Russian missile capacity, one that is perceived by the United States and its European allies as a threat; an arms race ensues.
Bruno Tertrais, among others, is sceptical of such an arms race, on the primary grounds that Russia lacks the resources to engage in an arms race with the United States.26 The United State's steady, wide scale development of its anti-missile systems since the end of the last century has inexorably weakened Russia's strategic deterrence ability. Russia, according to the defensive realism logic, has long been aware of the need to develop its nuclear weapon capabilities in order to compensate for its US-eroded deterrence ability. The reality, however, is that despite the consistently harsh Russian criticism of US missile defence system development, Russia's behaviour has not once reverted to that of the USSR during the Cold War period. Russia has not, in other words, made any move towards increasing its long-range missiles. Those that Russia has been able to maintain operational have, to the contrary, decreased. This absence of nuclear development activity endorses Tertrais’ opinion that Russian resources are insufficient to expand its long-range missile arsenal. But the possibility remains of Russia's compensating asymmetrically for its waning strategic deterrence capabilities. An asymmetrical warning or punishment wielded by Russia in response to United States expansion of its strategic capabilities could increase Russia's bargaining power and trigger an arms race of sorts; one stemming from a security dilemma rather than a Cold War period scenario arms race between contending hegemons.
States engaging in an arms race prompted by a security dilemma act on defensive realism motivations. Under the security dilemma scenario, security concerns motivate at least one of the states contending in an arms race to develop nuclear weapon capabilities in order to counteract the adversary's nuclear power development. States involved in a traditional, Cold War period type arms race, on the other hand, seek to weaken the other state by expanding their nuclear power to a degree that exceeds that of its adversary. The two states thus act on offensive realism motivations. In the classic arms race between hegemons, each state is acutely aware of the types of weapon the other is developing, and responses to any variance are rapid and direct. During the Cold War, the United States developed and expanded its nuclear advantage as the USSR moved expeditiously towards a state of nuclear parity with the United States.27 The two states were aggressive in their moves to neutralize each other's nuclear development, whether expressed in quantity or type of missile, and a high profile arms race ensued. There has been no reversion to the Cold War arms race scenario for two reasons: (1) as Tertrais argues, Russia lacks the resources to engage in a high profile arms race; (2) having abandoned its quest to match American hegemonic power by means of nuclear missile development, Russia feels no need to respond tit-for-tat to the United States development of strategic missiles. But from a defensive realism perspective, Russia, in the face of continued United States development and deployment of anti-missile installations, has no choice but to develop its missile capabilities. The United States is otherwise unimpeded should it decide to neutralize the entire Russian nuclear arsenal. Yet Russia lacks the resources to expand its nuclear weaponry to a capability sufficient to overwhelm US anti-missiles. A more prudent solution, both strategically and financially, is that of Russia's technologically determining exactly which interceptors have the capability to neutralize the current Russian arsenal. Developing missiles that could penetrate the US anti-missile shield also falls within Russian budgetary constraints.28
In the face of the expansion of American anti-missile capabilities since the Cold War, Russia has demonstrated through its research efforts, military exercises and new weapons installations that its latest missiles could well have the capability to break through an American anti-missile system.29 These developments have strengthened the technological capabilities of Russian missiles, to the extent that under an actual war scenario the United States system might not be capable of intercepting a Russian missile attack. But do the fruits of these efforts maintain Russia's strategic deterrence? Answering this question entails defining strategic deterrence. Deterrence, in Kissinger's view, depends not only on power, but on other states’ acknowledgement of such power.30 During the Cold War, ICBMs were the yardstick by which the United States and the USSR assessed their respective power. Both sides understood the tremendous capacity of ICBMs, manifest in the weapon's extent of power and breadth of range. The ICBM range encompassed all the territory of the opposing states, and had the power to destroy a medium sized city. The two states, through nuclear testing and missile test fire, could determine the dimensions of one another's missiles and exert mutual deterrence on that basis.
With the introduction into the equation of anti-missile systems, two variables arise: (1) the range of the interceptor missile, and (2) the probability of interception. In the first section, this article focussed on determining the interceptor range. Computations similar to those above, as well as missile test findings, enable the United States and Russia to make equally clear determinations of the interceptor range of the adversary missile. But the probability of interception is far less calculable. As the second variable depends on situation-specific variables that affect both interceptor and offensive missiles, it cannot be calculated on the basis of military exercises or nuclear tests. Russia has no way of demonstrating that its missiles are actually capable of penetrating the US anti-missile system, because the Russian offensive capability can only be tested by an actual attack on the United States. It is consequently difficult for the United States to assess Russia's response capability which, in Kissinger's view, limits Russia's deterrence. As long as the trajectory of Russian missiles falls within the range of US interceptors, Russia's deterrence capability remains weak. Technological determinations, therefore, compensate little for Russia's weakened deterrence.
US missile defence developments, however, have provoked an asymmetric response from Russia, manifest in enhancements to Russian missiles that enable them to penetrate a defence system. Russia's response does not signal a high profile arms race, but does imbue security dilemma characteristics. The Russian response, as expressed in the nation's missile enhancement, could enable it to maintain its counterattack capability against a US strike, but as this capability is difficult to demonstrate, it enhances little Russia's strategic deterrence. Russia will undoubtedly advance from where it currently stands on the issue, potentially to a move that upsets the security balance between the two countries and makes waves in the European security environment.
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A Second Potential Russian Response: Reneging on Arms Control Commitments |
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In the prisoner's dilemma, a way of maintaining cooperation is for one player to stop cooperating with another in penalization for its defection. If, during the Cold War period, either the United States or the USSR began developing quantities or calibres of missile that violated the AMB Treaty, one state penalized the other by adding offensive missiles to its nuclear arsenal. As offensive missiles were relatively cheap and effective, the penalties of violating the AMB Treaty outweighed any advantage. The treaty consequently worked as an effective deterrent until the end of the Cold War period.
Russia's economic situation in the post-Cold War period precludes penalizing the United States for development of anti-missiles by increasing the Russian offensive missile stockpile. The United States is in any case no longer threatened by such a response. It is actually nudging its way towards full withdrawal from the AMB Treaty, to a point where the United States has begun installing anti-missile systems in regions formerly within the sphere of Soviet influence.
Russia formerly tied START II to the AMB Treaty,31 in hopes that the potential consequences of a START II collapse would encourage the United States to abide by the AMB Treaty. But, as earlier discussed, whether or not the United States and the USSR signed agreements on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, Russia has insufficient resources to increase its offensive weapons. The United States is consequently unconcerned over Russia's attempts to link the two treaties. The only punitive measure that Russia wields in its efforts to deter the United States and the countries that support it from unilateral development of anti-missile systems is that of withdrawing Russian arms control commitments in Europe. The United States expansion of its anti-missile systems to Eastern Europe thus offers Russia the perfect opportunity so to penalize its Eastern European neighbours.
The United States proposal to install new anti-missile bases in Poland and the Czech Republic has antagonized Russia, to the extent that it has made its displeasure clear to both states.32 Russia is likely to penalize the European countries such as Britain and Denmark that permit the United States to establish anti-missile bases on their territory by withdrawing from the arms control agreements it has with them.
Europe was on the Cold War front line for decades. Years of living in constant fear of both nuclear and conventional missile attacks made countries in Europe avowedly and volubly anti-nuclear. European security issues placed enormous pressure on the United States and the USSR, obligating them to sign both bilateral and multi-lateral agreements, including the INF Treaty33 and the CFE Treaty.34
The INF Treaty was signed by the United States and the USSR on 18 December 1987, and took effect on 1 June 1988. The treaty required that both states destroy their current stocks and cease future production of intermediate range missiles of a 500–5,500 km range. Missiles that the United States destroyed included: Pershing 1A, Pershing 2A and its BGM-109G land-based Tomahawk missiles. The USSR destroyed its SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, SS-23 and its SSC-X-4 cruise missiles.35
Europe's security interests benefited greatly from this treaty. Prior to the INF Treaty, all medium-range missiles installed in Europe (including Russian Europe) were trained on European countries (both Warsaw Pact and NATO countries). These forward deployed nuclear weapons were controlled and triggered by lower rank officers than that of ICBM. If the United States and the USSR were to have entered into conflict, the countries in Europe would have almost certainly been the first to meet nuclear disaster. The signing and ratification of the INF Treaty, however, eradicated most medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, enabling many European countries to keep a safe distance from the US–USSR nuclear struggle.
Post-Cold War, two factors changed. The first: after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia failed to inherit most of the USSR territory in Europe. The second change was that of NATO's eastward expansion into what had formerly been Soviet territory. These changes greatly reduce Russia's sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. They imply, for instance, a considerable diminution of the security benefits to Russia of the INF Treaty. NATO countries, on the other hand, enjoy many new benefits. Under these circumstances, where the INF Treaty is of no great value to Russia, she, unlike Europe, stands to lose little by withdrawing from it. Russian withdrawal is also a feasible means of warning and punishing European countries that support and accommodate US anti-missile systems. Dropping out of this treaty, as earlier mentioned, is precisely what Russia threatens to do.
Other points to consider with respect to Russia's withdrawal from the INF Treaty are: first, European countries such as France and Germany maintain a certain distance from US foreign military policy, and the Russian withdrawal from the treaty would have the unintended consequence of harming their interests. As Russia has numerous and substantial economic, political and social interests of its own in Europe, this side-effect would undoubtedly influence Russia's decision to drop out of the treaty.
Second, Russia must, if it does opt to withdraw from the treaty, demonstrate the ability to resume production and deployment of medium-range missiles in order to send out a credible warning. It was according to the conditions of the INF Treaty that the SS-20 missiles produced by the USSR during the Cold War were destroyed. As the SS-20 used technology is now several decades old, Russia cannot, upon withdrawing from the treaty, simply resume SS-20 production. But Russia could use its available technology to develop a new class of medium-range missile. Russia could, for example, construct an intermediate-range missile system using two of the three stage engines of its Topol-M missiles. The cost of such development would be relatively low, and enable Russia to begin rapid deployment of intermediate-range missiles. It would also give Russia a unified, standardized missile system.
KBM, designer of the SS-23 missiles that were destroyed in accordance with the INF Treaty, went on to develop, in compliance with the INF Treaty, a SS-26 Tender missile with a range of 400 km. KBM developed a second version of this missile, the Iskander-E, which has a range of 280 km, for export. The SS-26 missile has a full range control system, including both infrared and radar systems for high precision missile guidance. The missile's launch vehicle delivers two missiles, both with a short preparation-to-launch time delay.36 Russia plans to install a brigade with 100 SS-26 missiles in the region the north of the Caucuses.37
Unfettered by INF Treaty restrictions, Russia could further increase the range of its SS-26 missiles. Enhanced SS-20 missiles stand to change the nuclear balance in Europe, and SS-26 missiles to alter the regional balance of conventional weapons. Modifications to the initial missile technology could increase the SS-26 missile range to 500 km, or even farther.
Russia's treaty exit would also negate United States responsibilities with respect to the INF Treaty. The United States is unlikely to resume production of the Pershing missiles that were, along with Russia's SS-23 missiles, destroyed in accordance with the INF Treaty. But it could recommence its production of ground-based Tomahawk missiles. As the US sea- and air-based Tomahawk missiles are almost fully deployed, changing the dimension of deployment would not be difficult. Ground-based Tomahawk missiles pose a security threat to Russia, but one of low impact in relation to overall United States military might. But the United States security benefits of deploying ground-based Tomahawk missiles pale in comparison to the intimidation value of the enhanced missiles that Russia could develop as punishment to the US's European allies. Russia's limited resources, however, impede its wide-scale deployment of medium-range missiles.
The above analysis shows that the Russian bid to dissuade the US's European allies from providing the United States with anti-missile system bases in Europe could take the form of Russia's threatened withdrawal from the INF Treaty. Further security threats might then prompt Russia also to deploy a number of its own medium-range missiles.
The CFE Treaty was signed on 19 November 1990, and took effect on 9 November 1992. It later underwent revisions and additions of addenda. The treaty, which places limitations on conventional forces throughout Europe, was Europe's salvation during the Cold War arms race, when the two main military powers constantly vied for the conventional force advantage. As the CFE Treaty has been of considerable security benefit to European countries, Russia's withdrawal from it acts as both a warning and punishment to the European countries that provide the United States with anti-missile defence bases. The treaty, as the names suggests, is with respect to conventional weapons and, in contrast to the INF Treaty, does not directly relate to missile defence. Freed from the constraints of the CFE Treaty, Russia could deploy its conventional forces in the west as it sees fit, and in so doing exert still greater military pressure on countries in Eastern Europe not to become part of the US anti-missile shield. The potential Russian suspension or withdrawal from the CFE Treaty represents a direct and credible threat to the Eastern Europe countries that accommodate US anti-missile systems.
As discussed before, Russia's reneging on its arms control commitments would harm the security interests of the European countries that provide the United States with anti-missile bases. But the unintended consequences of this move would also harm the interests of other countries in the region. The United States, Europe and Russia might then engage in an arms race, motivated by their respective security interests within the classic security dilemma. This could considerably prejudice European and Russian security interests.
The United States move to expand its defence systems into Europe has caused ripples in the region. The protection that the United States offers the countries in which it installs anti-missiles bases must meet the high security threat that potential United States adversaries constitute. It is therefore worth considering whether or not the United States is capable of neutralizing such a threat.38
Britain's special relationship with the United States, based on its having no nuclear capabilities independent of the United States, gives her no choice but to support the US anti-missile system. France and Germany, as primary advocates of a united Europe, however, are more influenced by Russia's attitude. Should the United States choose to ignore Russia's warnings and proceed with installation of its multi-layer anti-missile system, it will undoubtedly incur strong Russian displeasure, which would almost certainly harm European security interests. Former French President Jacques Chirac warned that an anti-missile system in Europe would create new divisions in the region.39 Germany's calling for a formal NATO discussion and resolution was rejected, this issue was considered as a purely bi-lateral issue among the United States and Poland or the Czech Republic.40
New European countries, having been under the historical control of the USSR, are more fearful of Russia than of the United States. But these new member countries of the European Union are relatively weak and need American military, political and economic support. They are consequently overtly willing to cooperate with the various United States initiatives in the region. So-called ‘new European’ countries participate in United States defence plans in order to improve their international political position, obtain security assurances from the United States and develop their economies through the construction of American military bases.
The benefits to new European countries of cooperating with the United States, however, are at a cost. The absence of a United States anti-missile base in Eastern Europe does not threaten the security interests of Poland or the Czech Republic. The attention and warnings the proposed base attracts from potential United States adversaries, however, do. Also, the anti-missile, from a technological perspective, is at the experimental stage of development whereby it has low intercept probability. This, from a cost benefit point of view, is another reason why Poland and the Czech Republic might question the benefits to them of US anti-missile installations on their territories.
Acceding to US foreign policy plans also creates tension among new European countries and certain Western European states, which jeopardizes resolution of internal European affairs. But most important is that permitting the United States to install anti-missile systems in Eastern Europe would provoke a strong Russian reaction; Russian generals have stated clearly that in the event of conflict, Eastern European anti-missile bases would be one of Russia's primary targets of attack. As Poland and the Czech Republic are close to Russia, they are within range of its long-range offensive missiles. Both countries consequently face serious national security risks as a result of supporting the US anti-missile plan.
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Conclusion |
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This article has shown that, whether or not the objective of the United States’ missile defence system in Eastern Europe is to guard against potential Iranian missiles targeted at the United States, it is nonetheless capable of intercepting missiles fired from Western Russia at the United States. This article also determines that the United States installation of high capability interceptors in the proposed Eastern European anti-missile base would complete a multi-layered missile defence system. As Russia possesses few missiles of the calibre necessary to respond to a United States attack, this multi-layer defence system seriously compromises her capacity for retaliatory nuclear response, and therefore weakens Russian strategic deterrence. Even if Russia were to develop missile technology capable of penetrating the US defence systems and ensuring maintenance of the ability to mount a counterattack, it would be an essentially hypothetical capability, by virtue of being impossible to prove. Russia's enhanced missile technology, therefore, does not exert enough psychological effect on the United States to act as a strategic deterrent.
Another potential Russian response to an anti-missile installation in Eastern Europe is that of reneging on its arms control commitments in Europe. This would warn countries in Eastern Europe against permitting the United States to establish anti-missile bases within their territories and punish those that already have. Russia would most likely withdraw from two treaties (1) the INF Treaty and (2) the CFE Treaty. The first relates closely to anti-missile systems. Withdrawing from the second would offer Russia greater flexibility, and act as a more credible threat to the European countries that are willing to install, or that already accommodate, US anti-missile bases. Russia could potentially announce its suspended participation in these treaties, or simply withdraw and begin developing and deploying arms that the treaties specifically ban. This move could imperil the security interests of other European countries and evoke responses that worsen the overall regional security environment and culminate in a security dilemma-provoked arms race.
There are steps that the United States could take to avoid or at least lessen the impact of such a security crisis. This article determines that if the United States were to install slightly older GBI interceptors with less advanced capabilities in its Eastern European base, the new system would not constitute a threat to Russian security. If, on the other hand, the United States installs the advanced KEI interceptor it is presently developing, the US anti-missile systems, taken as a whole, constitutes a multi-layered missile defence system, which seriously weakens Russia's strategic deterrence capabilities. The former option that of installing GBI interceptors in Poland, would give both the United States and Russia the chance of avoiding a security dilemma. By providing Russia with guarantees of that it will install GBI interceptors in its Eastern European base and not KEI interceptors, the United States could achieve its objective of intercepting Iranian missiles without harming Russian security interests. The United States and Russia could then take steps to establish trust and build Russian confidence in such an American promise. The United States, for example, could invite Russian experts to visit anti-missile bases in Eastern Europe, most particularly the interceptor installations. Allowing experts in the field to assess the specifications of the United States interceptor and KV could help dispel Russian security concerns. Such cooperation between Russia and the United States would reduce tension, and help to avoid a security crisis in the region.
Russia has proposed that the United States move its Eastern European anti-missile system to countries further south.41 This is one potential trade-off, as it still enables defence against Iranian missiles, and does not provide a good geographical position for defence against Russian missiles bound for the United States. If the United States were to accept this proposal, therefore, it would also enable Russia, the United States and Europe to avoid a security crisis. This plan, however, requires considerably greater changes to United States plans than the earlier proposition regarding the installation of GBI interceptors in Eastern Europe. This is perhaps why the United States has yet to reassure Russia of its intentions in Eastern Europe. If, in any event, if the United States has no intention beyond defending against Iranian missiles, there are a number of available low cost options that would avoid destabilization of Russian and European security interests.
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Appendix I: Models of Offensive Missiles and Interceptors |
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Model THAAD
The THAAD interceptor is powered by a single stage solid fuel rocket motor with a maximum speed of 2.7 km/s.42 The THAAD specifications appear in Table A1.
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Model GBI
The specifications of the model GBI are based on the US Midgetman missile, the payload for which is the same as that of a small intercontinental missile. In reality the payload of the GBI's Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) is smaller than that of an intercontinental missile, but an approximation of the general characteristics of the missile suffices the purposes of this article; the results of the analysis should not be significantly affected by slight variations.
Table A2 gives the specifications of a model GBI.
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Model KEI
The KEI has extremely powerful acceleration capabilities that enable it to reach a speed of over 6 km/s in less than one minute.43 The model KEI's reduced boost phase period, as compared with that of the GBI, also reduces its impulse. The KEI model specifications appear in Table A3.
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Model ICBM
ICBMs are two-stage, liquid fuel missiles. The model subsequently is based on the DF-5 missile parameters given in the APS report.44 Note that several small adjustments are made to APS specifications. The specifications for the model ICBM appear in Table A4.
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Appendix II: Interceptor Missile Launch Delay Time |
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Definition of Interceptor Launch Delay Time
Interceptor launch delay time refers to the amount of time that passes from the point at which an offensive missile is launched and at which an interceptor is fired. This time lapse is determined by the characteristics of the offensive missile trajectory and by the position of the early warning system. Launch delay has great impact on the range of protection that an interceptor missile provides, as the shorter the launch delay, the greater the range of interceptor defence.
Launch delay time has two components: detection delay and tracking delay. Detection delay refers to the time that passes from the launch of the offensive missile to its early warning system detection. Tracking delay refers to the time that passes from discovery of the target by the early warning detection system to the time at which the interceptor is launched. It is during this period that the detection device gathers and processes the information that enables it to determine the offensive missile flight path and select the appropriate intercept coordinates.
Calculation of Launch Delay Time
Early Warning Satellite Detection Delay: The APS report notes that the early warning satellite is able to detect the plume