Is the United States Complying with MTCR Rules?*
Corresponding author. Email: zhaot2005{at}gmail.com
Global proliferation of ballistic missiles and related technology during the 1970s was a source of extreme unease to the United States. Rather than single-handedly facing this challenge, the United States actively sought the establishment of a multilateral organization to stem the phenomenon. After a series of meetings on the issue from 1983 to 1987 between the United States, Britain, Canada, France, Italy, West Germany and Japan, all seven nations announced, on 16 April 1987, the formation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the first international mechanism controlling proliferation of missiles and related technology.
The core limitation imposed by the MTCR is on proliferation of high propulsion ballistic missiles and related technology. It strictly limits the export of missiles capable of delivering a 500 kg payload at a 300-km distance, otherwise known as 500 kg/300 km standard missiles. Components and technology relating to these missiles fall into two categories: Category I items comprise components and technology for express use in high propulsion ballistic missiles; Category II items comprise dual-use components and technology applicable to such missiles. The MTCR imposes strict limits on exports of Category I missiles, components, technology and production equipment, and exerts particularly stringent restrictions on transfers of complete 500 kg/300 km standard missile systems. More flexible regulations apply to Category II exports. The MTCR permits their export on confirmation of their final end-use, or the guarantee that such missiles, components and technology are not used in the construction of high propulsion ballistic missiles.
The MTCR also sets clear rules regarding the export behaviour of its member countries. The export limits guiding interaction among non-member countries apply equally to MTCR members. In other words, membership of the MTCR carries no exemption as regards exports of MTCR-prohibited items. The United States, therefore, in its capacity as a member of the MTCR is obligated to adhere strictly to MTCR rules when conducting missile and related technology exports, regardless of the end-user. But small heed has been paid to whether or not the United States indeed abides by the MTCR.
For example, suspicions exist that the joint research and development conducted by the United States and Japan on the Standard-3 (SM-3) missile are in violation of the MTCR. But no convincing argument has been raised or conclusion reached as regards the exact nature of this cooperation.
In view of this background information, this article raises the key question: Is the United States complying with the MTCR? Answering it raises two further questions: (1) Are specific actions on the part of the United States in violation of the MTCR?; (2) Does the United States have the will to comply with the MTCR? In other words, if the first question is proven to be true and specific actions of the United States do violate the MTCR, are they the result of carelessness or accident, or does the United States in reality lack the will to implement the MTCR? In its investigation of this international security issue, so long overlooked, this article presents case studies using the MTCR, an international mechanism for the prevention of the spread of missiles, as a basis for discussion.
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Research Methodology |
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The primary research methodologies employed in this article are: case study, technology research and documentary research.
Case Study
The authors’ two primary case studies are the technical cooperation between the United States and Japan on research and development of missile defence systems, and cooperation between the United States and Israel on research and development of the Arrow missile defence system. The bulk of information pertaining to these case studies, as regards possible violation of the MTCR, is classified and consequently difficult to locate. In order to limit the scope of relevant facts, therefore, the article proceeds on the following premise: interaction between the United States and other MTCR member nations is mainly manifest in the United States’ urging its fellow members to abide by the MTCR. Investigations from this angle, however, give no indication of whether or not the United States itself actually adheres to the MTCR. Answering this question entails examining the United States’ export behaviour as regards relevant missile components and technology. As the article's focus is on whether or not the United States is consciously proliferating missile technology, research is limited to specifically military-use components and technology, and excludes civil items and technology, for example, that relating to carrier rockets. There are two types of export behaviour that potentially violate the MTCR: (1) export of traditional offensive missiles and technology (the article's emphasis is on land-based ballistic missiles) and (2) export of missile defence systems and technology (specifically, anti-ballistic missile systems).
As regards traditional offensive missile exports, since the signing of the Soviet-United States Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Intermediate Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (Intermediate-Range Missile Treaty) by the United States and the former Soviet Union (and its successor state Russia), there have been no intermediate-range missiles for export within the United States stockpile, their having been replaced with intermediate-range cruise missiles. Any US violation of the MTCR, therefore, could only occur at the strategic level of offensive missile exports. Suspicions in this regard were aroused in connection with US exports of Trident ballistic missiles to Britain. Such exports would ordinarily be in obvious contravention of the MTCR, but having occurred relatively early, during the 1990s, could have been an aspect of earlier nuclear cooperation between the two nations. As this instance does not fit the research scope requirements of this article, it focuses instead on the export of anti-missile systems.
The United States, along with other nations, has in the past few years frequently engaged in activities involving cooperation on missile defence technology, some of which could well be in violation of the MTCR. This article takes as its central focus the cooperation between the United States and other nations on missile defence technology. Joint programmes include cooperation between the United States and Japan on missile defence, the United States and Israel on missile defence and the United States and Europe on Medium-Range Extended Air Defence System (MEADS). Among these, technical cooperation between the United States and Japan and the United States and Israel on missile defence technology constitutes two classic cases. The propulsion capability of these intercept missiles being relatively great, they are in all likelihood equivalent to missiles falling within the scope of the MTCR. As Japan is a neighbour of China, its development of missile defence merits China's attention. This article, therefore, concentrates on technical cooperation between the United States and Japan rather than the United States and Israel.
In sum, when analysing differences between the use of anti-missile interceptors and ordinary ballistic missiles, that the actions of the United States may be in violation of the MTCR are easily overlooked. This article consequently undertakes a case study investigation whose research focuses on technical cooperation between the United States and Japan and the United States and Israel.
Technology Research
The United States, among other countries, has during the past few years increased the intercept range of its missile defence systems, steadily increased their dimensions and also promoted new missile defence system series. All aspects of missile defence systems have undergone optimum advancements. In view of the MTCR 500 kg payload limit on delivery systems, they potentially exceed the MTCR-imposed 300 km range limitation. This article, taking the SM-3 missile under joint development by Japan and the United States as an example, uses a technology analysis methodology to analyse the range of the SM-3 missile by creating a flight model. The article conducts a comparison on the assumption that the SM-3 intercept warhead has a 500 kg payload, and proceeds on this premise using a range of 300 km. Obtaining the range under this model entails determining the velocity and height of the missile trajectory. This, in turn, necessitates knowledge of and differentiation between the ISP or specific impulse (thrust per unit flow rate of propellant) and the mass of each stage of the missile engine. Gathering this data requires a survey of sources and calculations.
The data used in the article come from the following primary sources: project plans provided by the US military to Congress (or issued in other formats); test data and analytical reports; data and information on missile intercept systems appearing in military technology journals; details of missile intercept systems in domestic and foreign news reports; presentations of these missiles in monographs (for example those regarding missile defence systems); descriptions of research advancements in these missile systems by researchers and non-governmental organizations; and discussions of these missiles on domestic and foreign military websites that indicate other web-based materials that also give information relating to these missile systems.
The next step is data verification. Of the data sources listed above, project plans submitted by the US military to Congress (or issued in other formats), test data and analytical reports are most reliable. On the basis of this data it is possible to make calculations regarding other data. For example, data on the mass of each missile stage that indicate the final velocity they respectively reach makes it possible to calculate the approximate ISP range of the engine at each stage. These calculations enable further testing of data already located. Other data that are problematic to obtain can also be estimated using this method, and subjected to rigorous testing by analysing the interrelationship between data already calculated. Should a predicted outcome be found inaccurate, it is subjected to adjustment and further testing.
Upon this foundation, knowledge derived from aerodynamics may be used to conduct calculations determining whether or not a missile carrying a 500 kg payload is capable of exceeding a flight range of 300 km (see the Appendices for a detailed discussion of the article's technological analysis). Such a finding would mean that the missile concurs with MTCR Category I. If, therefore, the United States exports, or engages in technological cooperation with other nations on, this missile, such activities are in violation of the MTCR. The SM-3 model raised in this article cannot be considered as identical to the actual SM-3 missile. The calculation principles featured in the model, however, reflect the basic characteristics of the SM-3 missile under development. Using this model to estimate the range of an SM-3 missile carrying a 500 kg payload could result in certain discrepancies. But using these results as a basis of comparison with MTCR standards may be deemed sufficient to initiate this study. This subject is addressed in greater detail in the conclusion.
Documentary Research Methodology
The utility of documentary analysis is evident in two regards. First, data on the SM-3 missile extend over a variety of source materials. This article undertakes a comparison of data contained in an array of documents regarding different missile types in order to build an SM-3 model that enables the authors to investigate the range of the missile under heavy payload conditions. Second, this article uses US government documents to ascertain the United States’ attitude towards compliance with the MTCR. The following elements feature in analytical judgments undertaken: US government policies as to whether or not to abide by the MTCR; domestic discussions in the United States as to whether or not implementation of the MTCR is in national interests; the official stand of the US government; US government explanations and statements at forums relating to export control policies and implementation of the MTCR; and explanations of and justifications for instances of United States criticism of others deemed to be engaged in behaviour that violates the MTCR. One example in this connection is the statement by the US government in a policy document of May 2003: ‘The United States intends to implement the MTCR in a manner that does not impede missile defence cooperation with friends and allies’.1 This statement suggests that should cooperation between the United States and its allies on missile defence be in violation of the MTCR, the United States would circumvent MTCR restrictions in order to ensure cooperation with its allies. Source materials of this kind aid the authors’ analysis and judgment of the actual attitude of the United States government towards the MTCR and their arrival at a convincing conclusion.
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Cooperation between the United States and Japan on Missile Defence and the MTCR |
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Brief Review
Technical cooperation between the United States and Japan on missile defence may be divided into the three stages of discussion, research cooperation and development.
Discussion Stage
On 18 March 1985, US Defence Director Caspar Weinberger invited 18 allies, including Japan, to participate in a US plan entitled the Space Defence Initiative (SDI), or the so-called ‘Star Wars Plan’. At that time Japan, in order to avoid the sensitive political issues of space weaponization and nuclear weapons that the SDI plan raised, combined with misgivings at the US invitation, took no practical measures to become a part of the plan; it went no farther than making a statement of support.
Japan's position, however, underwent a gradual shift. Japan and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 1987, as regards participation in the SDI programme. During a conference on security assurances at the end of 1988, Japan declared that, in view of the end of the Cold War and the advent of the primacy of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, missile defence had become an important factor of defence and had assumed an important position in Japan's own security considerations.2 Japan consequently made the decision to participate in the US missile defence plan. From this point forward, Japan and the United States embarked on joint technical research into ballistic missile defence. Japan decided in 1989 to focus its research interest on ‘Research on Western Pacific Ballistic Missile Systems’, conducted by means of cooperation between Japanese and American companies, to ensure the protection of the Western Pacific and Japan. This research work plan, which recommended Japan's implementation of a land-based and sea-based dual level defence system, to be conducted over a 4-year period for completion in 1994, required an investment of US$ 8 million.
Research Cooperation Stage
Japan's partial cooperation with the US ‘Navy Theater-Wide Defence (NTWD)’ programme began in 1989. It participated in four specific areas of research into the ‘Naval Complete Theater Defense System’: ‘Standard-3’ (SM-3) anti-missile research; cluster warhead research; infrared guidance research; and second-stage rocket engine research.
During the second half of 1990 the Japan Defence Agency (JDA) and the United States’ Department of Defence (DoD) exchanged a Memorandum of Understanding. Japan and the United States began preliminary stages of joint research into refitting the four J.S. Kongo destroyers with missile defence systems at the time they were in service in Japan's Self-Defence Forces.3
The United States Secretary of State and Secretary of Defence and Japan's Foreign Ambassador and Defence Minister set up a US–Japan Security Advisory Committee in 1993, after the DPRK test-fired a ‘Rodong-I’ ballistic missile into the Sea of Japan. The US–Japan Security Advisory Committee established the ‘Japanese–U.S. Theater Missile Defense Working Group’ (TMD WG), whose aim was to discuss TMD-related technology, politics and strategy, in December of the same year.
The Japanese Prime Minister's Special Advisory Group recommended in August of 1994 that Japan cooperate with the United States in developing and deploying a missile defence system. Japan and the United States reached an agreement during September of the same year on joint research into missile defence. Research work, that included simulation and system analysis to determine missile defence programmes that could be initiated, had begun by January 1995. The JDA concurrently established in April of 1995 an office of research into missile defence and engaged in coordinative research work with the US DoD. On the basis of the results of their cooperative research, as well as input from Japan's Naval Self-Defence Force and industrial departments, the JDA decided in 1997 that Japan should participate in US technical research relating to the ‘Navy Theater-Wide Defence (NTWD)’ system. Japan had hoped to announce cooperation with the United States in developing NTWD system technology in 1998. However, divergent domestic opinion and pressure from surrounding East Asian countries resulted in Japan's decision to postpone the announcement.4
It was after pieces of a three-stage rocket fired by the DPRK landed near the Sea of Japan that Japan and the United States officially signed in August of 1999 a Memorandum of Understanding on technological research cooperation on the NTWD system. The Japanese parliament, moreover, finally agreed to allow government appropriations for this research plan. Joint research included design showpiece production and missile intercept testing of the SM-3 missile (sea-based intermediate-range intercept missile defence system). Missile components for which Japan was specifically responsible included: (1) dual spectral infrared detection equipment capable of recognizing and tracking targets; (2) missile nose cone (infrared transducer and other equipment to protect the missile against heat damage caused by air friction); (3) propulsion installation for a two-stage missile intercept rocket; and (4) a kinetic warhead for interception and destruction of enemy ballistic missile warheads.5
Development Stage
Japan's JDA and the United States’ DoD reached agreement in February 2005 on taking Japan's and the United States’ missile defence technology research plan to the development stage. The goal was to improve the research and manufacturing function of ‘Standard’-3 II type intercept missiles. The improved version of the SM-3 missile was based on research, conducted with Japanese participation, into an enlarged diameter two-stage rocket booster that ensures a maximum flight velocity of 4–4.5 km per second, allowing for the expansion of the defence area radius from approximately 100–1,000 km,6 and with the ability to defend against missiles at a much farther range. The improved version incorporates a dual spectral infrared seeker with the potential to improve the SM-3's target detection capabilities. The programme officially began in 2007, and completion of drafting is scheduled for 2012. When the time arrives for deployment by Japan and the United States, the sea-based intermediate-range capabilities of the system will be greatly improved.7
The Japanese government held a security assurances and Cabinet meeting on 24 December 2005, in which it was formally decided that as from 2006, Japan would engage in joint development of next-generation new intercept missiles to be used in missile defence systems. The Japanese government, moreover, clearly stated that missile defence development conducted between the United States and Japan would not be subject to limitations under the ‘Three Principles on Arms Exports’.8
Throughout this period of joint development, Japan has been primarily responsible for the following three project areas: (1) the missile warhead nose cone; (2) the second stage of the rocket engine and upper- and lower-stage separation; and (3) participation in important research on the third stage rocket engine. The United States is responsible for three work areas: (1) the directed hit-to-kill kinetic warhead; (2) the infrared guidance device; and (3) the missile guidance system. Infrared devices installed on new missiles are likely to continue using technology already possessed by Japan.
The Japanese government decided in its 2006 budget to invest JP¥ 3 trillion in joint development. The joint development work plan is scheduled for completion in 2014, with production beginning in 2015. Japan is estimated to be shouldering approximately US$ 1–1.2 trillion of the expenses, and the United States approximately US$ 1.1–1.5 trillion.9 As regards developing missile defence, therefore, the United States and Japan are indisputably engaged in long-term, comprehensive and broad-based technological cooperation. In order to determine whether or not this cooperation behaviour is in violation of the MTCR, it is necessary to grasp the basic structure and capabilities of the improved SM-3 missile and make calculations as to its range.
Improved SM-3 Missile Capabilities and Range Calculations
The missile design structure and working principles of the basic SM-3 and improved SM-3 missiles are fundamentally the same. The primary difference between the two is that the diameter of the improved SM-3 second stage is 53.4 cm as compared with the 34.3 cm-diameter of that of the basic SM-3. This expansion increases both the missile's fuel carrying capacity and delivery capability. The SM-3 missile is a key link in the United States’ sea-based theatre missile defence system, capable of intercepting both intermediate- and long-range missiles. It has three missile-boost phases: (1) the first stage MK 72 engine initiates the first boost phase during the initial ignition boost that launches the rocket directly into the atmosphere from an Aegis military vessel. The system ignites and operates for approximately nine seconds before shutting off and separating. (2) The rocket's second stage MK 104 engine then initiates the rocket's second boost phase, whereby the system ignites and operates for approximately 40 seconds before shutting off, separating and launching the intercept missile into the outer atmosphere, where it reaches its predetermined velocity. (3) The rocket's third boost phase then ensues.
The third rocket boost phase comprises dual pulse operation of a solid-fuel rocket. The system ignites its initial pulse, of an operational duration of approximately 10 seconds, and casts off the nose cone. The second pulse ignition, which also lasts approximately 10 seconds, then begins. At the end of this boost phase, a navigation device on the kinetic warhead conducts calibration. With the third boost phase of the rocket complete, the kinetic warhead instantly reacts, tracking, identifying and taking aim. The rocket, by means of guidance system control, then automatically closes in on its target and concludes the process by executing a direct hit. In other words, it intercepts and destroys the target.
Building a suitable kinetics model in order to calculate the range of the improved SM-3 missile and make inferences as to the basic capabilities of the improved SM-3 missile was accomplished by utilization of available open source materials. Certain parameters of the SM-3 missile are drawn from reliable sources, for example, company research reports. Others might lack reliable provenance, in which case the authors have relied on analogies made with similar existing missile components on which information is openly available. Drawing analytical analogies is a frequently employed method of technological research relating to international security. This methodology is based on inferences drawn from previous technical developments and advances. Results derived from these analogies are often reliable but, in the face of leaps in modern technological development, may be excessively conservative. Technological developments that render the authors’ predictions overly conservative, however, do not affect this article's conclusion that the SM-3 missile, when carrying a 500 kg payload, has a range of at least 300 km. If, therefore, SM-3 missile technology parameters derived from existing parameter predictions are excessively low, the authors’ predicted SM-3 missile range may also be less than is actually the case in reality. Hence, determining whether or not SM-3 missile exports are in violation of the MTCR on the basis of a conservative estimate means only that this article's conclusions underestimate, rather than overestimate, SM-3 missile capabilities.
Data regarding the basic and improved SM-3 missiles appear in Tables 1 and 2. These tables show that the only difference between the basic SM-3 and improved SM-3 missiles is that of the diameter of the second stage of the improved SM-3 missile has been enlarged from 34.3 cm to 53.4 cm,10 which alters the second stage payload and burn time. There are no other differences between the basic SM-3 and improved SM-3 missiles.
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Calculations of the range of the SM-3 missile are based on data in the Tables 1 and 2. Some of this data are taken from open and reliable sources (for example, a comprehensive test programme report from the ‘Standard’ missile company). Other data are the result of calculations and tests that provide a reliable basis for further calculations, details of which appear in Appendix I. Specific aerodynamic-related calculations and other measurements and statements as to the missile range appear in Appendix II.
The above calculations conclude that, when carrying a 500 kg payload rather than a kinetic warhead, the SM-3 missile velocity reached at the point of shut-off is 1.69 km/s with shut-off occurring at an altitude of 62.7 km, giving a maximum range of 358 km. Consequently, the improved SM-3 missile could work both as a type of missile defence and, taking into account its significant thrust capability, as a ballistic missile. The above analytical calculations indicate: (1) An improved SM-3 missile carrying a 500 kg payload, taking into account its orbital flight trajectory, is capable of a range of at least 358 km. (2) The MTCR places strict controls on the export of and technical cooperation in Category I items. The absence of an end-user certificate and the export of these items is a serious violation of the MTCR. On the basis of MTCR ‘500 kg/300 km’ rules and the results of calculations conducted in this study, the improved SM-3 is equivalent to a Category I item as defined under the MTCR. (3) The end-use of technical cooperation between the United States and Japan and the technical proliferation in which this cooperation results are impossible to verify. This type of cooperation, therefore, is in certain violation of the MTCR.
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Joint research and development conducted by the United States and Israel on the ‘Arrow’ missile defence programme has garnered international attention. The Arrow 2 system is the first experimental conventional-charge high-level tactical anti-ballistic missile weapon system to be deployed in actual combat. The Arrow 2 tactical missile defence system—the fruit of joint US–Israel cooperation—is used primarily to intercept short and intermediate range ballistic missiles. The thrust capabilities of the Arrow 2 are, among Arrow missiles, particularly great. Whether or not the Arrow 2 qualifies as a Category I item under the MTCR or, in other words, whether or not the technical cooperation between the United States and Israel on the Arrow 2 missile violates the MTCR, is a topic worth exploring.
The Arrow 2 system, from its inception to its modern incarnation, has undergone four phases: pre-research; test series; deployment; and system improvement.
Pre-Research Phase
Israel and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 1986 setting in motion their ballistic missile defence research programme. The United States and Israel had by 1988 begun work on jointly realizing the Arrow missile system development plan. The two nations first developed the Arrow 1 missile as a basis for work on the Arrow 2. Realization of the Arrow missile plan involved concretizing its conceptual guidelines and researching Arrow missile prototype and launch facilities. The US Ballistic Missile Defence Organization (BMDO) and the electronics division of Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) signed a contract in 1988 regarding the manufacture and testing of a one-stage Arrow 1 tactical anti-missile system. The Arrow 1 is derived from a one-stage solid fuel rocket booster and a warhead ‘kill vehicle’ with a mass of 2,000 kg. The Arrow 1 missile underwent as from 12 June 1994 a total of nine tests. It then entered the stage of small scale development and pre-production.
Test Series Phase
The second stage of Arrow missile development is known as the ‘Arrow Cooperative Experimental Series’ (ACES) plan. The Gulf War compelled Israel and the United States to accelerate research on the Arrow missile system in order to develop the more advanced Arrow 2 missile defence system. Arrow 2 emerged primarily from research conducted by MLM Systems Engineering, which is under the IAI. Six flight tests of the Arrow 2 had been conducted by 14 September 1998. Prior to completion of the ACES plan, total expenditure amounted to US$ 3.3 million, of which the United States was responsible for approximately 72 percent.12
Deployment Phase
The objective of the Arrow missile deployment plan is to combine the ‘Arrow Weapons System’ and the ‘User Battle Decisive System’ (UOES). The primary goal of the Arrow Deployability Project (ADP) is that of achieving synthesis of all the various components of the ‘Arrow Weapons System’ (AWS). The United States and Israel signed an agreement in March of 1996 stipulating an investment of US$ 556 million over 6 years, in the form of allocations to research into the Arrow 2, of which Israel was to be responsible for 64 percent. The plan initiated intercept testing by simulating a range of threats that broadened the scope of completion of the Arrow 2, by means of the guarantees that these experiments provided. Israel formally deployed the Arrow 2 Theater Missile Defence System after the successful second missile system intercept experiment on 14 March 2000. Israel Defence Forces (IDF) released a statement on 17 October 2000, declaring that the Arrow Theater Missile Defence System developed by Israel and the United States would from that day forward begin strategic operations. Upon this 12-year development plan and programme entering active service, Israel became the first nation to deploy a Theater Missile Defence System. Israel subsequently conducted multiple flight tests of the Arrow 2 missile, the tenth of which was completed on 5 January 2003. Israel first displayed its Arrow 2 missile defence system on 7 November 2002 at its Palmachim air force base. The Arrow 2 missile undertook its first actual combat deployment in January of 2003, shortly preceding the outbreak of the Iraq War. Israel deployed a total of nine surface-to-air missile companies within its borders to counter any retaliatory strikes from Iraq in the face of a military attack.
The IAI and Boeing signed an agreement in February of 2003, stipulating that the United States establish basic facilities for the production of Arrow 2 missile components. Boeing was responsible for the production of approximately 50 percent of the missile components, including electronics components, booster engine casings and missile launch canisters. Boeing was also to monitor the 150 or more US companies producing Arrow 2 components. They included the ATK Company, which was in charge of producing first and second stage rocket engine casings and first stage engine nozzles. The IAI was responsible for integration and final assembly of the components.
System Improvement Phase
The ‘Arrow System Improvement Plan’ (ASIP) projected one portion of tests conducted by Israel and another set by the United States over a 5-year period.
The twelfth Arrow 2 missile flight test took place on 16 December 2003, the system having achieved intercept on the sixth test. It occurred while the Arrow improvement plan, in which both Israel and the United States participated, was already underway. The test verified the system's advanced capabilities, including intercept at a higher altitude.
The United States ratified a measure in June of 2004 whereby an additional US$ 80 million would be invested in advancing ‘Arrow’ missile system research to the next stage. The US Congress had by 2005 once more agreed to allocate funds to the Arrow programme, this time by US$ 167 million, to be divided between the areas of research and production.13 This allocation enabled Israel to maintain an ammunition stockpile sufficient for its Arrow 2 missile, and at the same time to begin production of a third Arrow missile. Israel and the United States began on 29 July 2004 to continue improvements and launch tests of the Arrow missile defence system. The US Department of Missile Defence, the Israeli Air Force and Israel Aircraft Industries completed a launch test at the US Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCWPNS) in California, where the Arrow 2 missile successfully intercepted a Scud B short-range tactical ballistic missile in the troposphere. This was Israel's first test of the Arrow missile defence system in foreign territory. It entailed transporting the entire system, including the Arrow launch equipment, ‘Green Pine’ ground-based multiple function radar, ‘Hazelnut Tree’ launch control centre and ‘Citron Tree’ fire control centre along with US survey equipment, to the California testing ground.
The Arrow system conducted its second intercept test in the space of a month on 26 August 2004. Its emphasis was on testing target survey, detection and destruction capabilities. The test was a failure. An Israeli official stated that in view of the test results, the current Arrow 2 system would be installed with new components. Israel Aerospace Industries (FKA Israel Aircraft Industries) and Boeing subsequently signed a joint production agreement, stipulating their joint development of the Arrow 2/3 missile. It was this third stage of improvements to the Arrow missile system that produced the Arrow 2/3 (abbreviated term for Arrow 2 Block 3 missile). The primary components and parts for this system were produced by Boeing and assembled in Israel. The Arrow 2/3 missile software was considerably more sophisticated than that of the original Arrow 2 missile.
Since the announcement in March of 2000 of the Arrow 2 battleground capabilities, Israel has deployed two lines of Arrow missiles in the cities of Tel Aviv and Haifa, where 85 per cent of the Israeli population lives. Israel is keen to deploy a third Arrow missile line, but the emphasis of work so far has been on producing adequate numbers of Arrow 2 missiles, as evident in the two lines in current use. Israel has plans to reduce the production costs of the Arrow 2 to an estimated US$ 1.5 million per missile, and the IAI and Boeing have signed an agreement to jointly produce the Arrow 2. In order to go one step farther in reducing costs, Israel Aerospace Industries hopes to obtain US permission to export the Arrow missile to India and Turkey.
The results of range calculations for the Arrow 2, based on the same formulas and methods of calculation used to evaluate the SM-3 missile (see Appendix II), are as follows: when the Arrow 2 carries a 500 kg payload, rather than a warhead, the velocity at shut-off is 2.01 km/s and the shut-off altitude is 18.7 km with a calculated maximum range of 446 km.
The results of the above discussion and calculations indicate that, when carrying a 500 kg payload, and in accordance with its orbital flight path, the Arrow missile jointly developed by the United States and Israel has a maximum range of 446 km. The Arrow 2 may consequently be considered a Category I item, as defined under MTCR regulations. Cooperation between the United States and Israel on the Arrow 2 missile, therefore, constitutes a serious violation of the MTCR.
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US Missile Defence Exports and the MTCR |
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It is clear from the above discussion that the improved SM-3 and Arrow 2 missiles qualify as Category I items, according to MTCR guidelines. As such these products and technology are banned from export. The United States’ illegal export behaviour, as regards MTCR rules, however, also extends to SM-3, SM-2 III and SM-2 IV missile exports.
Standard Missile Series Exports
The United States has, from the 1990s to date, exported the above mentioned missile defence systems to nations including Japan, the ROK, Australia and the Netherlands. Specific details are as follows:
The United States has since 1993 exported SM-2 III and SM-2 IV missiles to Japan on a number of occasions. It agreed as from June 2005 to export SM-3 missiles to Japan on a yearly basis. The United States also began as from 1998 to export SM-2 III missiles to the Netherlands, as from 2003 to export SM-2 III missiles to Taiwan and as from 2005 to export SM-2 III missiles to Australia.14
It is evident from the comparison of related data on the Standard missile line appearing in Appendix III that the strategic delivery capabilities of the SM-3, SM-2 III and SM-2 IV missiles fall short of those of the SM-3. These missiles, therefore, qualify as Category II, rather than Category I items, according to the MTCR ‘500 kg/30 km’ standard. But Category II items that have not been subject to end-user verification are also prohibited from export, according to MTCR regulations. Consequently export of the above mentioned Standard missiles, according to the most conservative estimate, is in contravention of the regulations and spirit of the MTCR.
Arrow 2 Missile Exports
The United States has played a major role in each of the four stages of Arrow missile development. US investment in the second and third phases amounts to respectively 72 percent and 36 percent of the financial outlay, according to available sources.15 From the perspective of the entire Arrow missile development process, US investments stand at approximately 55 percent of the total.16 Although specific comparative details vary according to the reports in which they appear, the consensus is that US investments total more than half of the cost of the development process. This being the case, and in line with the United States’ and Israel's agreement, Israel is not authorized to export Arrow 2 missiles unless it receives ratification from the United States.
In view of the advantageous capabilities of Arrow 2 missile defence as compared with similar systems, the Arrow 2 is of a relatively high economic value. Israel, therefore, has continued to aspire towards opening the international market for Arrow 2 missile defence systems in order to compensate for its high level of expenditure during the development process.
The United States has to date not permitted Israel's export of the Arrow 2 missile system. But in view of the progressive nature of such alliances and the importance of missile defence deployment, the United States’ attitude towards Israel's export of the Arrow 2 missile system to a third country is relaxed. A high-ranking US DoD official has actually stated that the United States is considering allowing Israel to export the Arrow 2 missile to India.17 The delivery capabilities of the Arrow 2 missile are of a higher level than the improved SM-3 missile, to the extent that export of the Arrow 2 would constitute behaviour that seriously contravenes the MTCR. The US tendency towards relaxation of Arrow 2 missile export control restrictions, therefore, reflects a disregard for MTCR rules.
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Analysis of US Commitment to Implementation of the MTCR |
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TopResearch MethodologyCooperation between the United...Cooperation between the United...US Missile Defence Exports...Analysis of US Commitment...ConclusionAppendix I: Data Calculations...Appendix II: Missile Range...Appendix III: Data on... |
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In examining whether or not the United States is committed to implementing the MTCR, this article conducts its discussion from the following two perspectives: (1) Examination of the actual conduct of the US government in MTCR related areas that indirectly reflects the attitude of the US government; (2) Examination of the policies and stand taken by the United States in relation to the MTCR that directly reflect the United States’ commitment and attitude.
Actual Conduct
In discussing actual conduct, this article refers to actions undertaken by the United States relating to the MTCR as well as those governing its export of MTCR related items and technology. There are, within the confines of the research area covered by this article, two types of behaviour relating to military items and technology that are in violation of the MTCR: (1) Transfers of traditional offensive missiles and technology that include intermediate range and strategic missiles. Transfers that are exclusive of restrictions on US intermediate-range missiles under the Intermediate-Range Missile Treaty, but which might contravene the MTCR, encompass those of strategic missiles. (2) Transfers of missile defence systems and technology that include the sharing of technology and missile defence intercept equipment and products by means of technological cooperation on missile defence systems. Findings summarized as US behaviour that is in all probability in violation of the MTCR encompass the following three areas: (1) strategic missile exports; (2) technology transfers resulting from technical cooperation on missile defence; and (3) missile defence intercept equipment exports (Figure 1).
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Strategic Missile Exports
Missiles may be classified as short-range, mid-range and strategic (long-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles). The above mentioned descriptions of the United States’ export control behaviour are employed in this discussion in order to deepen the level of analysis. In view of the limited delivery capabilities of short-range missiles, they are not subject to MTCR controls and consequently do not figure in the said discussion.
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles. Since 1987, when the United States and the former Soviet Union signed the ‘Soviet–US Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Intermediate Short-Range Ballistic Missiles’ (Intermediate-Range Missile Treaty), Cruise missiles have replaced intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the US arsenal.18 It is, therefore, impossible to ascertain the current US attitude towards the export of intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
Strategic Ballistic Missiles. The United States exported to Britain at the beginning of the 1990s submarine-launched Trident ballistic missiles. Britain began deployment in 1994 of 48 Trident II D-5 submarine-launched 7,400 km-range ballistic missile that it received from the United States. The yield of these warheads is between 100 000 and 300 000 tons, and the range exceeds 7400 km.19 The Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile possesses one of the largest delivery capabilities of its time and far exceeds the MTCR ‘500 kg/300 km’ standard that strictly prohibits export of such items. The United States’ export of Trident missiles to Britain is consequently behaviour that violates the MTCR.
In sum, as regards short-range and medium-range missiles, the United States’ missile export behaviour does not violate the MTCR. In the area of strategic missile exports where it is possible to violate the MTCR, however, the United States is indeed in direct contravention of the MTCR.
Missile Defence System Exports
As, strictly speaking, ballistic missile defence systems and offensive missile systems are of different significance, it is necessary to discuss independently the export of ballistic missile systems. As earlier mentioned, the United States has exported SM-3, SM-2 IV and SM-2 III intercept missiles and associated equipment to Japan, the ROK, Australia, the Netherlands, and Taiwan. This article, by means of the authors’ calculations, arrives at the conclusion that the improved SM-3 missile is classifiable as a Category I item. The article neither makes calculations nor discusses characteristics of the SM-3, SM-2 IV or SM-2 III intercept missiles. They nevertheless qualify as MTCR Category II items, even from the most conservative perspective, as without end-user verification the export of any one of these missiles constitutes violation of the regulations and spirit of the MTCR.
The United States’ attitude to the potential export of US–Israeli jointly developed Arrow 2 missile defence systems to India, moreover, is gradually relaxing. As the Arrow 2 intercept missile constitutes a Category I item under the MTCR, permitting the final end-user to re-export it is an act that is in serious violation of the MTCR.
Technology Diversion from Missile Defence Technical Cooperation
Technological diversion stemming from technical cooperation in missile defence relates to US work with other nations on joint missile defence system programmes. The calculations and analyses contained in this article demonstrate that the improved SM-3 missile jointly developed by the United States and Japan and the Arrow 2 missile jointly developed by the United States and Israel both qualify as MTCR Category I items. The behaviour of the United States as regards cooperating with Japan and Israel on developing missile defence systems, therefore, is in violation of the MTCR.
The above mentioned cases demonstrate that the United States’ behaviour contravenes the MTCR in all MTCR-related areas. This is to say, its actions are not isolated instances of behaviour that may be regarded as accidental or careless infractions of the MTCR. The United States, on the contrary, has displayed an unmistakable lack of concern as regards export behaviour violations that has resulted in several instances of actions that contravene the MTCR.
Related Policies and Stance
US Attitude towards its Own Conduct
The US export of SM-2 IV and SM-3 missiles to Japan during the United States’ and Japan's joint development of the improved SM-3 missile violated the MTCR. Yet the United States government offered no explanation for these actions, other than in a US Congressional Service Research (CRS) report which gives an indirect reflection of US attitudes.20 The CRS report, in the absence of any official US document explaining either the United States’ and Japan's joint development of missile defences or the US export of intercept missiles to Japan, gives a certain perspective on US views on this issue.
The report, entitled ‘Japan–US Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defence: Issues and Prospects’21 provides a detailed and complete account of the evolution of US–Japanese cooperation on missile defence, summarizing all technological areas relating to this joint project. It explores viewpoints within the United States, Japan and the global community, analysing the debates, position and attitude of each player and the reasons surrounding US–Japan missile defence cooperation. This analysis provides an in-depth discussion of the multiple layers of impact that US–Japan cooperation creates in the domestic and international sphere, including its violation of and impact on, the ‘Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty’. The report, however, does not raise the issue of the impact of US–Japan cooperation on the MTCR. Although this does not necessarily constitute conscious avoidance of the issue, it at the very least suggests that the United States is unconcerned about whether or not its cooperation with Japan violates the MTCR.
No statements by the US government that convey any particular stance or give any explanation as to existing suspicions that joint US–Israel cooperation on development of the Arrow missile defence system violates the MTCR have been found. The United States has to date maintained an attitude of opposition to Israel's desire to export Arrow 2 missile defence systems to India. The justification for the US position is that the export of the Arrow 2 missile defence system to India could potentially shatter the military balance in South Asia and cause military competitiveness and destabilization of the region. But the United States Congress, according to a United States Senate Armed Services report, has maintained its attitude towards Israel's export of the Arrow missile for two reasons: (1) Sale and export of the Arrow 2 missile would be of great economic benefit to Israel but of none to the United States, despite the latter's significant investments; (2) Congressional concerns exist that once Israel began transferring Arrow type missiles to other countries, the US Patriot-3 missile defence system would lose its international market.22 US opposition to Israel's export of the Arrow missile defence system, therefore, takes no account of MTCR violations. As regards the US export of the Trident ballistic missile to Britain, which represented a serious violation of the MTCR, the United States has also neglected to give any explanation of this action in connection with the MTCR.
Attitude towards Other Nations’ Missile Exports
Since the establishment of the MTCR, the United States has consistently employed strict use of the regime to place limitations on the behaviour of other nations and their related export behaviour. The United States, furthermore, has enacted such measures as economic sanctions, financial punishments and import and export limits in censure of nations and companies it perceives as being in violation of the MTCR.
Using China as an example, in June of 1991 the United States used China's transfer of Dong Feng 11 (M-11) missile technology (MTCR Category II items) to Pakistan as the rationale for placing sanctions on the related Chinese companies, in the form of limits on their supercomputer, satellite and missile technology-related imports.23 On 24 August 1993, the Clinton administration used China's transfer of a portion of equipment relating to the Dong Feng 11 to Pakistan as its rationale for adding sanctions to those already faced by the relevant Chinese companies.24 On 21 November 2000, the Clinton administration again called for sanctions on Chinese companies that had exported MTCR Category II missile components to Iran. In view of the Chinese government's new commitments as regards missile non-proliferation, however, the United States did not pursue further sanctions.25 The United States government stated on 1 September 2001 that the China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation had provided Pakistan with missile components (MTCR Category II items) destined for its Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-2 missile programmes, and imposed sanctions on the relevant company.26
It is apparent from the above examples that the United States applies extremely rigorous standards to other nations’ export behaviour. It takes the line that exports of MTCR Category II items in violation of the MTCR merit sanctions, while those of Category I items are even more befitting of such punishment. It is, therefore, difficult to conclude, simply on the basis of US actions that violate the MTCR, that the United States applies similarly loose standards to its overall judgments regarding the MTCR.
Moreover, the US State Department released on 1 September, 2001 an explanatory document entitled ‘Missile Defence and Non-proliferation’.27 It, in common with other such releases, stresses the importance of other nations’ preventing missile and missile technology proliferation, while omitting to address its own related export behaviour that could potentially result in proliferation. These examples reflect the United States government's ‘narrow’ attitude towards its treatment of the missile non-proliferation issue.
Direct Policy Stance
An explanatory document released by the US State Department provides a still more direct explication of the US government's attitude towards and treatment of its own implementation of the MTCR. The document, released on 20 May 2003 and entitled ‘Ballistic Missile Defence National Strategy’, describes in detail the change in the US security situation in the wake of 11 September 2001 and the importance, development and deployment of a missile defence programme. Most notably, the document ends by describing a policy of cooperation on missile defence among the United States and friendly nations and allies. Within this section, the document states: ‘The US will develop and deploy missile defences capable of protecting not only the United States and our deployed forces, but also friends and allies; We will also structure the missile defence programme in a manner that encourages industrial participation by friends and allies, consistent with overall US national security; and We will also promote international missile defence cooperation, including within bilateral and alliance structures such as NATO. As part of our efforts to deepen missile defence cooperation with friends and allies, the United States will seek to eliminate impediments to such cooperation. We will review existing policies and practices governing technology sharing and cooperation on missile defence, including US export control regulations and statutes, with this aim in mind. The goal of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is to help reduce the global missile threat by curbing the flow of missiles and related technology to proliferators. The MTCR and missile defences play complementary roles in countering the global missile threat. The United States intends to implement the MTCR in a manner that does not impede missile defence cooperation with friends and allies’.28
This explanatory document released by the US State Department clearly reflects the attitude of the United States government towards implementation of the MTCR: that if US cooperation with its allies conflicts with the MTCR, the United States is prepared to circumvent MTCR limits in order to ensure the smooth implementation of missile defence cooperation.
Sub-Conclusion
It is evident from Figure 1 that the United States, by virtue of its behaviour, has violated all areas of the MTCR. From yet another angle, when examining the degree of constraints that the US places on other nations’ export behaviour, in the light of its own comparatively lax missile export behaviour and approach to missile defence cooperation with its allies, as well as its overall policy stance in this regard, it is also clear that the United States is unconcerned about whether or not its actions abide by the MTCR. In other words, the United States lacks commitment earnestly to implement the MTCR. This conclusion correlates with the US attitude throughout the entire evolution of the MTCR.
From the 1970s to 1983, the United States began gradually to become aware of and acknowledge the threat posed by missile proliferation. The United States entered into negotiations as from 1987 with neighbouring Western countries. The same year, it united with these nations in announcing the establishment of the MTCR, whose mission was to establish global control of missile and missile technology proliferation. Following this milestone, as observed by Wyn Q. Bowen,29 from 1987 to 1989 the United States continued striving to resolve the dilemmas that occurred early in the establishment of the MTCR. The United States took steps in 1989 towards systematically building the MTCR mechanism and strengthening its regulatory capabilities. Specific measures included cautious expansion of the scope of membership, increased non-proliferation export controls, controls on technology exports in the aerospace arena, and convincing non-members to abide by MTCR regulations. The United States began in 1993 slowly to lower the MTCR entry threshold, a move that attracted more nations, particularly major missile exporters, to MTCR membership. These efforts, which promoted the benefits of non-proliferation to regional stability as a motivating factor, were an attempt to advance the regime and at the same time override the limitations imposed by individual suppliers who simply operated according to their own regulations.
In other words, the United States’ main goal in promoting the MTCR has from the start been that of controlling other countries, in particular those it does not trust as regards missile exports, while overlooking missile and technology proliferation committed by those it considers its allies. As stated in the report released by the US State Department, the MTCR and missile defence are one in the same two mutually reinforcing tools to reduce the missile threats that the United States faces.30 It is only by maintaining this attitude and pursuing this objective that the United States is able to engage in practical behaviour that contravenes the MTCR.
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Conclusion |
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TopResearch MethodologyCooperation between the United...Cooperation between the United...US Missile Defence Exports...Analysis of US Commitment...ConclusionAppendix I: Data Calculations...Appendix II: Missile Range...Appendix III: Data on... |
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This article's emphasis is on analysing the two specific cases of joint research on and cooperative development of missile defence by the United States and Japan and the United States and Israel. The United States’ participation in bilateral cooperation in these two programmes is a classic case of technology transfer, stemming from technical cooperation, which violates MTCR regulations. As regards export behaviour, the United States’ export to Britain of the submarine-launched Trident missile and US export of Standard missile defence systems are also prohibited under the MTCR. In sum, the United States has violated the MTCR in all areas in which it is possible to do so. These cases serve as evidence that the United States is contravening the MTCR. The policy stand taken by the United States government relating to missile defence and missile non-proliferation, moreover, is an extension of the US government's attitude towards the MTCR. As the United States views the MTCR as merely a tool with which to reduce the threat of missile proliferation, it consequently pays no attention to conditions relating to its own implementation of the MTCR. The United States, in the interests of avoiding any hindrance to missile defence cooperation with allies, is willing to circumvent MTCR restrictions.
It is important to point out that owing to the difficulties encountered as regards data availability, the calculations and estimates in this article regarding the improved SM-3 and Arrow 2 intercept missiles may contain errors. Moreover, calculation results regarding the intercept missiles’ ranges when carrying a 500 kg payload also lack a degree of verifiability. The data assembled, however, rely on low figures that have undergone verification through comparison. While not entirely verifiable, this data nonetheless provide a conservative estimate of the thrust capabilities and range of these missile types. Although there may be differences between estimates and reality, these inconsistencies do not affect the authors’ judgment that the United States is violating the MTCR. Given the profusion of declarations by the United States that its building of missile defence systems is entirely transparent, its government should go one step further by releasing related information and conditions regarding its programme. This would give the international community a clear understanding of missile defence cooperation and enable it to make judgments in this regard. From another perspective, if the United States government is indeed earnest in its intention to implement the MTCR, it should conduct a serious examination of all aspects of its behaviour relating to the regime. This would prevent the incidence of nebulous items within cooperative arrangements. Although this article's calculations may be vulnerable to questions regarding verifiability, the relevant data nonetheless reflect the United States government's attitude insofar as its lack of intent to undertake conscientious implementation of the MTCR.
The United States’ attitude in regard to the MTCR imbues the following implications: First, it reduces the credibility of the MTCR. As one of the founders and main supporters of the MTCR, the United States’ lack of intent to engage in its strict implementation reduces confidence in the regime. Consequently, in the event of other members, or even non-members, of the MTCR engaging in export behaviour that violates the MTCR, the regime lacks the public credibility and confidence necessary to block or punish such behaviour.
Second, the said attitude on the part of United States has a negative effect on efforts to stem missile proliferation in the international community. The United States’ export and technology transfer behaviour, manifest in its above mentioned actions, inhibits efforts to prevent other countries from engaging in similar MTCR infringements. This, in turn, hinders the MTCR in its intended function of stemming the proliferation of missiles, and has negative impact on its overall effectiveness. A notable example is the current proposal by members of the US-led MTCR of an International Code of Conduct (ICOC) in the interests of combating ballistic missile proliferation. This is regarded as a pioneering effort in the area of international missile non-proliferation. But the United States’ own behaviour as regards violating MTCR regulations undoubtedly causes misgivings in other nations, which casts a shadow on the effectiveness of the ICOC programme, and indeed all efforts towards missile non-proliferation.
Third, the US attitude constitutes a threat to China's security environment. The United States should not cooperate with Japan in the research and development of ballistic missile defence systems, much less deploy such systems on Japanese territory, according to MTCR regulations. The joint research, development and deployment of missile defence systems so far conducted by the United States is detrimental to regional strategic stability and has a negative impact on China's national security.
Finally, the United States has for the past few years sought to gain China's entry into the MTCR, and China has expressed willingness to become a MTCR member. The United States’ negative conduct and attitude, however, potentially weakens the Chinese government's confidence in the MTCR, influencing China's missile non-proliferation policies.
The conclusions this article draws play a positive role as regards providing impetus for theoretical research in related fields. In sum, there are two types of attitude evident in any particular country's treatment of international mechanisms: one is that of opposition, which prompts the decision not to join; the second is that of support, from which participation ensues. Using the United States as an example, in view of its opposition to its non-exemption from lawsuits, and concerns that an international criminal court could bring a lawsuit against or arrest its military personnel, the United States refused to participate in the ‘Rome Statute’ and the International Criminal Court. The United States’ attitude towards this mechanism caused it vigorously to oppose and obstruct the formation of the International Criminal Court. An example from another perspective is that of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The creation, development and popularization of the IMF to a large extent benefited US financial interests. The United States has consequently undertaken a leadership role and actively promoted the IMF throughout its development. The United States has, moreover, maintained an exemplary record as regards respecting and implementing IMF regulations. The cases cited in this article, however, differ from these examples. That is to say, as regards the United States’ treatment of the MTCR, on the one hand it is a major proponent of the regime, yet on the other it does not abide by the regime. This study, therefore, is of unique significance.
The article's second area of innovation pertains to the revisions it suggests to country-specific research. Power Transition Theory broadly divides countries into status quo powers and powers that challenge the status quo. Within traditional perceptions it is generally accepted that hegemonic powers seek to maintain the status quo, and that challenges to the status quo emanate from rising powers. This article, however, provides an anomalous case in which it is the existing hegemonic power that challenges the status quo. On the one hand, it builds and strengthens international mechanisms, at the same time demanding of other countries that they comply with such mechanisms; on the other hand, it rejects the limits placed on its own actions by these mechanisms. The hegemonic power's consistent violation of these regulations, therefore, contravenes the very mechanism it upholds. In sum, this article brings to light a relatively unique international phenomenon; that of an international mechanism's primary proponent being, conversely, one that also undermines it. This conclusion has the potential to elicit new insights within the field of international relations theory research.
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Appendix I: Data Calculations and Examination of the SM-3 Missile and Improved SM-3 Missile |
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Basic Data on the SM-3 Missile
Missile Mass 1,501 kg;31 Length 6.55 m;32 First Stage MK72 Booster: Length 1.82 m; Diameter 53.4 cm; Equipped with 474.6 kg HTPB propellant; Burn time 6 s.33
Second Stage MK10 endurance engine: Length 288.3 cm (with nozzle) or 249.9 cm (without nozzle); Diameter 34.3 cm; Booster propellant explosive load 157.6 kg; Number TP-H1206C; Endurance propellant explosive load 200.9 kg; Number TP-H/205C.34 Engine operating time: 40 s.35
Third Stage Engine (TSRM): Length 96.5 cm; Diameter 34.3 cm; Uses graphite/epoxy resin composite material body and aluminium additive HTPB propellant.36 TSRM uses approximately 205 pounds (92 kg) of TP-H-3340 aluminium/ammonium perchlorate (AL/AP) propellant. Engine operating time: 20 s.37
Third Stage Shut-Off Velocity: 4000 m/s.38 Kinetic Warhead: EX-142 kinetic warhead, Mass 18.2 kg.39
This article summarizes the above data in the main body of the text (see Tables 1 and 2).
In terms of ballistic missiles, it may be hypothesized that immediately following launch and during the boost phase the missile makes a vertical ascent (flight trajectory and the earth at a 90 degree angle). At the end of the boost phase, the missile's attitude and orbit control systems adjust its trajectory to the desired degree.40 The ballistic missile frequently conducts several seconds of straight vertical ascent to minimize loss of velocity during the initial boost phase. Procedural turns commence at the end of the boost phase. The hypothesized vertical ascent during the boost phase, therefore, simplifies the following calculations. This, at the same time, is a conservative hypothesis and does not affect the final conclusion. Under this hypothesis, the orbital path of the missile is shown in the Figure A1.
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This article hypothesizes that the final velocity of a missile's n stage is vn, n-stage specific impulse of its engine is Isp(n), burn time is tn, and the total mass of the n stage engine is M0(n). When the n-stage of the engine begins its burn, the total mass of the missile is M(n), the n-stage fuel mass is mn, and the n-stage casing mass is Ms(n). It is possible to find the stage n final velocity from a mechanics equation relating to the dynamic equations of the variable mass system:
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Among the data contained in Tables 1 and 2, those regarding the length, diameter, propellant explosive load and fuel burn time originates in the US Standard Missile Company's Navy Theater-Wide Defense AEGIS LEAP Intercept (ALI)/STANDARD Missile Three (SM-3) Flight Test Program Overview and is, therefore, reliable. This report contains one section entitled ‘SM-3 Missile Solid-Propellant System Overview’.41
But the other data contained in Tables 1 and 2 lack reliable sources, particularly regarding the net mass and velocity of each stage.
As regards the known net mass of the missile's first, second and third stages, it may be hypothesized that the net mass and surface area are directly proportional; this type of hypothesis is not appreciably divergent from reality. Under this hypothesis, it can be assumed that the net mass of the missile's first, second and third stages are: 313.1 kg, 208.8 kg and 34.8 kg, respectively.
An engine's specific impulse has a relatively strong correlation with its propellant capabilities (specific heat ratio, temperature, etc.) and at the same time its working conditions (burn room pressure, nozzle width ratio, engine working altitude, etc.) have an impact on its structure.42
The SM-3 missile first-stage engine is the MK-72, and similar engine types have specific impulses that measure as follows: Pershing 2-1: 2283.4–2606.8 m/s.43 The Pershing 2-1 solid-fuel rocket engine is the first stage engine of the US Pershing 2 ground-to-ground tactical missile.
Pershing 2-2: 2283.4–2606.8 m/s.44 The Pershing 2-2 solid-fuel rocket engine is the second stage engine of the US Pershing 2 ground-to-ground tactical missile.
MK-11 Mod 2: 2088.8 m/s.45 The MK-11 Mod 2 solid-fuel rocket engine is the US Navy's Talos RIM-8 long-range, mid- to high-altitude missile booster engine.
MK-13 Mod 0: 2167 m/s.46 The MK-13 Mod 0 solid-fuel rocket engine is the US Navy's Terrier RIM-2 (original number SAM-N-7) missile booster engine.
MK-39: 2255 m/s.47 The MK-39 solid-fuel rocket engine is the US Shrike AGM-45A's counter radiation missile engine.
The above mentioned missile engine types are akin to the MK-72 and have a similar structure, all using HTPB, a specific impulse within a range of 2088
2606 m/s, with an average of around 2200 m/s. Consequently, it can be postulated that the MK-72 engine has a specific impulse of approximately 2200 m/s.
The process of calculating the specific impulse of a second and third stage engine is somewhat complicated, but the basic conceptual outline is as follows: given that the specific impulse of the first stage engine has already been calculated, using (1), it is possible to calculate the final velocity of the missile's first stage as it ends its burn as v1. Hypothesizing that the specific impulse of the second stage is already known to be Isp(2), formula (1) can be used to find the final velocity of the second stage as v2. With this as its basis, given the pre-existing knowledge that the final velocity of stage three as represented by v3 is 4000 m/s, it is possible to use formula (1) to find the specific impulse of the third stage engine as Isp(3). Given the specific impulse of the second stage engine Isp(2), it is therefore possible to find the specific impulse of the third stage engine Isp(3).
This cognitive process continues to base its calculations on the improved SM-3. The diameter of the second stage of the improved SM-3 compared with the diameter of the first stage, however, has been expanded from 34.3 cm to 53.4 cm. This expansion has lead to a comparative increase in fuel mass to 867.6 kg and a burn time increase to 70 s. Regarding the final velocity of the third stage of the improved SM-3 missile, however, W.J. Kearney and E.D. Casillas suggest in their report entitled ‘High Performance Boost Propulsion for Navy Theater Missile Defence’ that the final velocity of the improved SM-3 missile can reach up to 5,500 m/s.48 If, therefore, it is hypothesized that the second stage engine specific impulse is already known to be Isp(2), it is also possible to calculate the specific impulse of the third stage engine as Isp(3).
Synthesizing the above two conditions, (in reality, the restrictive relationship between Isp(2) and Isp(3)), and satisfying other restrictive conditions (including: solid-fuel rocket engines generally have a specific impulse range of 2,000–3,000 m/s;49 the final velocity of the third stage of the SM-3 missile is v3 = 4000 m/s; the final velocity of the third stage of the improved SM-3 missile as v3 can reach an amount greater than 5,000 m/s), it is possible to calculate the second stage engine specific impulse Isp(2) as approximately 2,500 m/s and the third stage engine specific impulse Isp(3) as approximately 2,400 m/s.
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Appendix II: Missile Range Calculations and Feasibility Analysis of Intercept Missiles as Ground-to-Ground Missiles |
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This section presents specific range calculation methods and the primary dynamics formulas used in this study.
With the data included in Tables 1 and 2 of the main text, it is possible to calculate the farthest possible range using the following methods: