International Institutions and the Chinese Red Cross Legislation*
Corresponding author. Email: chenhanxi{at}gmail.com
Scholars of globalization generally consider law as the least globalized of social fields.1 This is indeed the case; nation-states invariably view the right to make laws as a core element of sovereignty. International border restrictions also limit the influence of international institutions within the legal sphere. Consequently, as Lester Ross points out, ‘International institutions will not provide effective support for the establishment of laws’.2
The impact of international institutions upon the various sovereign nations that continue to join them, however, gradually grows, to the extent of affecting domestic legislation.3 This trend is clearly demonstrated in the influence of international institutions upon China's domestic processes, which is a focus of concern and debate within academic circles.
The century of humiliation and hardship that preceded the birth of New China in 1949 made China's rulers doubly cherish the country's hard-won independence. Sovereignty was consequently an extremely sensitive matter. By the late 1980s, however, China was participating in, and building extensive links with major international organizations. As Samuel S. Kim notes in his appraisal of this development, China became an active member of the world system for the first time in modern history.4 As the country's breadth and depth of participation in international institutions grew, the escalating influence of certain among them extended to China's domestic legislation.5
But growing international sway has produced few palpable changes in China's internal politics and legislation. This article, in observing and studying the impact of international institutions upon China as she continues to internationalize, raises the core question of why only certain international institutions have assimilated into the country's domestic politics and legislation.
Existing research into China's interaction with international institutions includes approaches such as changes in China's policies towards the United Nations and its various mechanisms; China's relationship with economic organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF and with international environmental organizations; China's interaction with international arms control and disarmament mechanisms; and the effects of China's interaction with international society on its policies, cognition and interests.6 Research in this respect focuses on the potential influence of a particular field of international institutions on China's related policies, and whether or not China's behaviour within international institutions conforms to international norms. None addresses the specific affect of international institutions upon formulation of China's domestic and foreign policy.7 This article, on the basis of current research into the process of China's assimilation of the International Red Cross, reveals why the International Red Cross Movement has had varying degrees of influence on China's internal political agenda at different times, and the affect of International Red Cross norms on the country's related domestic legislation. The article thus conducts a case study on the extent to which an international institution's influence has brought change to China's domestic politics and economics.
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The Differing Effects of International Institutions |
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 Top The Differing Effects of... The Internalization of...Why the Case of...Changes in China's Identity...International Pressure and Red...Sovereignty Cognition and the...Conclusion |
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How does an international institution influence a state's behaviour? Peter Gourevitch's article, ‘The Second Image Reversed’, which comprises research into the domestic effects of international institutions (i.e. international organizations legally established in a certain field, their treaties and rules, including the system of norms supporting these organizations), has renewed the interest of international relations scholars in this topic. The emphasis of current research is on system- or state- and society-level analysis, or analyses of individual decision makers.8 Although explanations given at these levels are of help in understanding of certain aspects of this phenomenon, those arising from analysis of the relationship between the International Red Cross and China fall far short of satisfactory.
The Inadequacy of System-Level Explanations
Analysis of the influence of an international institution at the system level raises the question, how do changes that occur within an international institution affect its influence on a country's behaviour? Martha Finnemore's research on scientific bureaucracy deals mainly with active UNESCO undertakings, whose function is to instil in various countries the use of scientific policies, as well as scientific organizations, as a means of developing their respective potential. She points out that the large degree to which international idea shapes countries’ preferences and behaviour, along with the increasing number of countries that accept the international concept, has given rise to ever-larger numbers of scientific bureaucracies in various nations.9
Audie Klotz poses a similar question: why, when South Africa adopted its apartheid policies, did so many international organizations and countries, even those that had close economic links with South Africa, pass sanctions against it? Klotz believes that the global-scale rise and sweep of the norm of racial equality was the fundamental cause of this phenomenon. More specifically, Klotz raises three main channels through which norms affect state policy; community and identity; prestige and communication; and discourse and institutions.10
Ronald Mitchell's research implies that it is the design of international institutions that influences the extent to which government and non-government actors observe international regimes. Mitchell, when comparing the marine oil pollution control mechanisms of two international institutions, finds that actors are most likely to observe the mechanism of an institutional design that heightens transparency of supervision and increases sanction credibility.11 Liliana Botcheva and Lisa Martin also find that the stronger, by virtue of institutional design, the external character of the fields in question and the supervision mechanism's guarantee of implementation, the greater the trend toward the convergence of behaviours among its members.12
Iain Johnston differentiates social and persuasive impact within international institution socialization mechanisms. He finds that the effectiveness of socialization mechanisms varies according to the design of the corresponding institution. Johnston raises cases of informal and ‘weakly institutionalized’ institutions established on the foundation of common knowledge—a design antithetical to that of liberal institutionalism. He considers this kind of institutional design as most conductive to ‘persuasion’ in international institutions. Johnston also takes issue with the hypothesis raised by free institutionism that the design whereby an institution has fewer members enhances cooperation. He, in contrast, believes that the larger the membership of an international institution, the greater its potential social impact.13
The above research focuses on the impact that changes in the international institutions had on state behaviour. But its explanation of the problems that occurred in the relationship between the International Red Cross and China hinges on the fact that although no intrinsic change occurred in the International Red Cross in the 1980s and 1990s, its influence on China had increased significantly.
The Inadequacy of Unit-Level Explanations
The above research focuses on the impact that changes in the international system had on state behaviour. But its explanation of the problems that occured in the relationship between the International Red Cross and China hinge on the fact that although no intrinsic change occured in the International Red Cross in the 1980s and 1990s, its influence on China did.
Owing to the inadequacy of system-level explanations, certain scholars attempt to explain the differing influence of international institutions on state behaviour through analysis of a country's domestic structure and organizational cultures. Thomas Risse-Kappen believes a country's structure determines the differing effects of transnational actors upon state policies. He differentiates, according to countries’ domestic and social structure and policy network, six types of state structure: state controlled; state-dominated; stalemate; corporatist; society-dominated; and fragile. Risse-Kappen holds that a country's structure influences the difficulty or ease with which a transnational actor enters its politics, and hence its potential domestic affect. He observes a sliding scale of resistance to transnational actors and their influence on domestic policy agenda from ‘state-control’ to ‘fragile’; the actor's potential influence on the country's politics also displays a gradually decreasing trend. ‘State-control’ structure countries, for example, offer the most resistance to transnational actors attempting to enter their domestic politics. Upon achieving entry, however, their potential effect is the greatest. It is, on the other hand, relatively easy for international institutions to enter the politics of ‘society-lead’ structure countries, but they conversely have the least potential affect on domestic political agendas.14
Jeffrey T. Checkel distinguishes four types of country structure: free; corporatist; statist; and state-above-society, and observes the different mechanisms through which international norms diffuse them. He finds that free country structures absorb social norms through the social pressure mechanism, as do corporatist structure countries, in which elite learning is the secondary learning mechanism. International norms diffuse statist structure countries primarily through elite learning and secondarily through social pressure. Elite learning is also the main means of transmission in state-above-society structures, in which the social pressure mechanism is an ineffective medium for disseminating norms.15 Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, Jr have conducted similar research into the differing effects of international norms and standards on domestic politics according to domestic structure.16
Jeffrey Legro's explanation is based on the organizational culture of a country's bureaucracy. He has researched the degree to which Britain, Germany, Russia and the United States abide by prohibitions on chemical weapons, the use of submarines to attack civilian-use vessels and strategic bombing. Legro examines each country's level of compliance with international norms in relation to its organizational culture and finds that organizational culture is the more significant factor than intensity of norm diffusion. But Legro also points out that strength of organizational culture as an explanation for compliance depends to a large degree on the salience of the organization within the country's bureaucratic structure.17
When examining China's relationships with international institutions, however, the conclusions reached in the above research meet major challenges. Why, during the 1980s and 1990s, when no significant change occurred in China's state structure or organizational culture, did International Red Cross influence on China nevertheless increase to such a great extent? Also, why, under certain conditions, do organizations of relatively low salience within the bureaucracy nevertheless persuade the government to abide by international norms?
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The Internalization of International Institutions: An Analytical Framework |
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An international institution passes through the stages of macroscopic spread and microscopic internalization before its influence on a country becomes apparent. The so-called diffusion of an international institution refers to heightened participation in it of both government and non-government actors, and the macroscopic process under which they accept related international norms and principles. The microscopic ‘internalization’ of the institution occurs after its macroscopic diffusion into a country's social, political and legal processes, and is observable in its lasting effect upon them.
Generally speaking, an international institution's diffusion is a prerequisite for its internalization. With increasing numbers of actors participating in international institutions and accepting their norms, there is a greater likelihood that these institutions and norms will be internalized within those actors.
If, however, countries’ behavioural adjustments correspondent to the emergence and diffusion within them of international institutions are monitored solely on the macroscopic level, neglecting the microscopic effect manifest in lasting impact on countries’ political and legal processes, there is no way of disclosing exactly why different international institutions have had varying effects on China during their internalization process. An examination of the process by which international institutions are internalized clarifies the effects of institutions on countries’ behaviour. In other words, whether or not an international institution becomes internalized in its target country is integral to this article's analysis of the degree of influence on countries that international institutions wield.
The internalization process consists of (1) the international institution's entering a country's internal discourse; and (2) its producing an effect.18 Entry of an international institution refers to the emergence of its norms in the country's internal discourse and achieving positive interpretation of them. In this article, the international institution is said to produce an effect when it influences countries’ legislation to the extent that its norms are directly confirmed within the countries’ legislative bodies. The article argues that the national identity orientation of a country, as determined by its relationship with international society, is the key factor as regards whether or not the institution can enter its target's domestic discourse and produce an effect.19
International society is a community formed of countries that identify with mainstream international institutions. A country's relationship with international society, therefore, influences the degree of difficulty or ease with which an international institution enters its domestic discourse. A country's relationship with international society cannot realistically be divided simply into those that identify with it and those that do not. Most countries are situated somewhere between the two extremes. For ease of analysis, however, countries may from a logical point of view be placed under the three categories of status quo; drifting; and revolutionary. ‘Status quo’ countries identify positively with the dominant international society; ‘drifting countries’ have a certain level of identification with international society; and ‘revolutionary countries’ have a negative identification with the international community (see Figure 1).20
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The national identity determined by a country's relationship with international society is often firmly established within a short period of time. A relatively stable identity orientation directly influences a country's decision-makers’ and elites’ interpretation of the legitimacy of international institutions, limiting the degree of ease with which it may enter the country's internal discourse and later produce an effect.22 Because, in general, status quo countries have a positive relationship with international society, they positively interpret the legitimacy of international institutions. A country's positive historical memory of the institution also influences its smooth entry into internal discourse and latent effect.
Drifting countries develop ambivalent attitudes toward international society, insofar as norms that do not affect their fundamental interests may possibly enter them. Revolutionary countries hold an identity opposing that of international society, which results in an antagonistic relationship and negative interpretation of their norms and standards. Painful historical memories of international institutions also impede their entry into revolutionary countries and consequently their effect upon them.
Certain aspects of international institutions are nevertheless nominally apparent within revolutionary countries’ internal discourse. The reason for this, Ian Johnston finds, is that within a multilateral international institution: ‘Who makes a proposal can sometimes be more controversial than the content of the proposal itself.’23 In other words, it is the legitimacy of the subject of a resolution within a multilateral institution that has major bearing on a country's acceptance of it. But what endows different resolutions with different levels of legitimacy? Similarly, what denotes the legitimacy of an international institution's creation of exterior pressure on the country's domestic politics? This author believes that a country's historical memory of a particular international institution largely determines whether or not it perceives the institution and the pressure it creates as legitimate.24 Collective historical memory shapes national identity; it is also instrumental in creating mutual relationships between state and non-state actors. A positive historical memory of international institutions makes even revolutionary countries more likely to approve of and participation in them. Painful historical memories, on the other hand, generally cause revolutionary countries to reject international institutions and resist the pressure they exert.
Hostile relationships with international society also cause negative interpretations of international institutions, making it extremely difficult for them to produce effect on domestic legislation. Hostile country-international society relationships, in other words, obstruct an international institution's actual entry into a country's internal discourse. The subject of non-proliferation, for example, entered China's internal discourse during the 1960s, but China's government, which at that time adopted a hostile attitude toward international society, perceived the system as hypocritical, and its underlying purpose as that of maintaining the United States’ and Soviet Union's nuclear advantage while limiting the ability of other states to develop their own nuclear power. As the non-proliferation system failed to achieve positive interpretation within China's internal discourse, therefore, it could not be said truly to have ‘entered’ China.
It must be noted, however, that the stable nature of national identity is relative to variances over time in country-international society relations. The changes in China's relationship with international society from 1949 to the early 1990s: from that of a revolutionary, to drifting, to status quo country, generated corresponding changes in China's interpretation of the legitimacy of international institutions. China's historical memory of the World Bank, the IMF, and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) from 1949 to the 1980s, for example, produced a mainly negative interpretation of their legitimacy. This resulted in a prevailingly suspicious attitude toward these multilateral economic organizations, to the extent that China referred to them as ‘the last fortresses obstructing the establishment of a new world economic order’.25 China's evolution from a revolutionary to status quo country created a better historical memory of these international organizations, and consequently a more positive interpretation of their legitimacy. It was then that international institutions entered China's internal discourse and produced an effect.26
The entry stage of an international institution's internalization in a country's internal discourse country is characterised by the varying interpretations of legitimacy its entry generates. Positive interpretation produces domestic and international pressure to accept and observe its norms. The second internalization stage, whereby the international institution influences domestic political and legal policy-making processes, ensues. Alexander Wendt discloses three main reasons why countries observe the norms of international institutions: (1) coercion by a foreign power, (2) calculations of interest and (3) perceptions of legitimacy. In the first instance, the country knows what the institution and norms are but conforms to them only as a result of external coercion. Under the second situation, the country faces no external pressure to accept the norms of an international institution but does so as a matter of choice, because cost–benefit analyses imply that obeying these norms suits its material interests. The moment the cost of obeying the norms exceeds the benefits, however, the country changes its behaviour. Under the third situation, the country respects the norms imposed because it believes them to be legitimate. These three situations reflect the three levels of internalization of international institutions.27 If the country observes the institution's norms upon its entry into that country's internal discourse, it is not generally as a result of external coercion; rather that the country's relationship with the international institution has undergone transition from the second to the third scenario of acceptance; that of the institution's perceived legitimacy. The internalization apex is reached when the institution both enters the country's internal discourse and achieves positive interpretation of its norms and principles to the extent that the country accepts and legislates according to them. It is only then that the country faces both international and domestic pressure to incorporate international norms into domestic policies.
Internalization of the international institution at the second stage, and whether or not the institution can produce an effect, depends largely on whether or not the institution accords with the country's culture. So-called cultural match refers to the degree of agreement among the norms of the international institution and those of the country's discourse, legal institutions, and bureaucracy.28 Since international institutions bear the weight of norms and their social significance, the degree to which the norms of an international institution match those of a sovereign nation constrains its impact upon the nation's domestic agenda. Cultural match with the international institution is thus directly proportionate to its influence. Specifically, the higher the level of cultural match, the greater the international institution's potential affect on political, economic, and legal processes, and vice versa. For example, because the ruling elites of a few Asian countries continue to maintain an ‘Asian values system’, they reject certain international institution requirements as regards human rights and pluralistic government, which reflect mainly Western concepts.29 As regards the question of cultural match, this article mainly investigates the effect of sovereignty cognition upon China's acceptance of the Red Cross international institution's norms, and upon the domestic process of Chinese Red Cross legislation.
The above analysis provides the basis on which to sketch a broad theoretical framework of China's internalization of international institutions. Figure 2 explains this theory and the relationships between its variables.
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Why the Case of International Red Cross Legislation was Chosen |
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This article chooses as a case study the effects of International Red Cross Movement norms on China's Red Cross legislation. It has two main points of focus: first, although acceleration of the process of international interaction has lead to establishment, one after another, of international institutions in various fields that perform increasingly important international government functions, whether or not sovereignty is permeable to them remains a question of hot debate among scholars in the field. If, by means of a case study of Chinese Red Cross legislation, it can be shown that international institutions indeed ‘permeate’ domestic legislation—the densest of sovereignty walls—there is reason to predict that international institutions relating to fields that do not seriously corrode sovereignty have the potential for similar or even greater effects.
Second, from a perspective of substitutability, China's Red Cross legislation is a ‘least likely’ case. From a domestic structure perspective, China in general can be defined as, what Thomas Risse-Kappen calls, a ‘state-dominated’ country. This implies that the International Red Cross movement and its norms should meet great resistance to entry into China's domestic discourse but, once internalized, could produce an effect with relative ease. Yet, although no great changes have occurred in China's domestic structure, the International Red Cross Movement has nevertheless smoothly entered its domestic discourse.
From an institutional design perspective, countries incline towards observance of international rules when they are administered by an institution with a strong oversight mechanism. As the Red Cross Movement does not possess effective oversight mechanisms, however, no significant change has occurred in the Chinese Red Cross simply as a result of Red Cross legislation in China.
From an organizational culture perspective, an organization's salience within the bureaucracy determines whether or not the organizational culture of a country promotes its observance of the international institution. A common social organization such as the Chinese Red Cross, however, is obviously not possessed of the level of salience within the bureaucracy that Jeffrey Legro finds is the case with the military. There is neither an organization concerned with vital interests within the International Red Cross Movement, nor a powerful and influential figure doing its utmost to promote Chinese Red Cross legislation. Consequently, the above explanations do not satisfactorily explain the case in question of Chinese Red Cross legislation. In-depth analysis of this case explains the advantages and disadvantages of these theories, as well as the process and principles of internalization that the international institution undergoes at the unit level of behaviour.
This article mainly employs process tracing and longitudinal comparison methods of analysis. Most of the literature on international institutions is based on case studies; relatively few scholars have used other methods.30
The reason for this approach is that research into the function of an international institution based on analysis of the external, objective environment only gives an indirect explanation of the significance of international norms. A micro-level analysis, on the other hand, demonstrates directly the relationship between an international institution and state behaviour.31 The advantage of process tracing is that it answers the question, ‘How?’ In other words, it examines the process the case undergoes from its original situation to the eventual result.32 Longitudinal comparison is a means of examining different behaviour by the same actor at different times, by drawing comparisons and approximations based on the results of multi-case research. This analytical technique thus achieves results based on case study comparison research without actually increasing the number of cases under discussion.33
Because relatively few public materials on the process of China's Red Cross legislation exist,34 this article relies heavily on materials stored at the China Red Cross General Headquarters’ archives that have yet to be published. To make up for the lack of written materials, the author also conducted interviews with Red Cross personnel who participated in the legislative process.
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Changes in China's Identity and Proposal of the ‘Red Cross Law’ |
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China's Red Cross was founded in 1904. At that time, owing to historical and practical reasons, the legislation work of the Chinese Red Cross was relatively weak, which meant that the Red Cross and its work had neither legal protection nor confirmation. The Red Cross first formally raised the matter of legislation in the ‘Chinese Red Cross Institutional Reform’ of 1988.35 This signalled the onset of the ‘Chinese Red Cross Law’ legislative process.
Why the Red Cross did not raise the question of legislation until the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s relates closely to entry of the International Red Cross into China's domestic system. The International Red Cross Movement stipulates that every country legally recognize its branch of the Red Cross, and through this legislation support the Red Cross’ work and its development according to Red Cross regulations. The Chinese Red Cross, however, did not substantively participate in the International Red Cross Movement until the International Red Cross Movement and its norms genuinely entered China's internal discourse. This being the case, the Chinese Red Cross had negligible understanding of the movement's norms and standards, and consequently lacked ability either to realize legislation that would develop the Chinese Red Cross or promote the International Red Cross Movement. It was only after the International Red Cross Movement had entered China's internal discourse several decades later that the Chinese Red Cross substantively participated in the International Red Cross Movement. The Chinese Red Cross finally requested legislation upon discovering that it needed domestic legal protection in order to carry out its related international duties.
China was regarded as a revolutionary country and outside the system until 1971, when it entered the United Nations and made the transition to a drifting country. China began clearly and closely to identify with the system from the 1980s onward. Its growing participation in international society expanded China's identification with both international society and the international system. China now appeared more likely to observe the principles of international institutions, whether or not it stood to gain material benefit from greater compliance, as a means to upholding its international prestige. China's growing participation in international activity made it a main member of international society, and changed its national persona from that of an isolated and intractable country to a positive and responsible participant in the international system. China's changed identification with international society had direct influence on the Chinese Red Cross. There are two distinct phases of Chinese Red Cross participation in the International Red Cross Movement: before and after China's reform and opening to the outside world.
Hostility and Suspicion Phase
The initial relationship between the Chinese Red Cross and the International Red Cross spanned the beginning of the 1950s to the end of the 1970s. During this time China maintained an antagonistic attitude towards Western-dominated international society that resulted in its diplomatic status as an isolated, recalcitrant state. Under these circumstances, the Chinese Red Cross presented to China an important window of contact with the outside world. The Chinese Red Cross born of New China, therefore, was the result of relentless government promotion.36 The body swiftly resumed its overseas work, but the process of government-assisted internationalization that the Chinese Red Cross had undergone gave it an essentially government characteristic.
Upon recovering its rightful place in the International Red Cross movement, China's first participatory act was its demand that the Taiwan Kuomintang representative be expelled from the movement. China's then Health Department Minister Li Dequan attended in October of 1950 the twenty-first meeting of the board of directors of the Red Cross Association in Monaco. This was the Red Cross of New China's first participation in a meeting of the International Red Cross Movement. Soon after, in 1952, China's government recognized four Geneva Conventions, including a 1949 convention on ‘the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field’.37 It was on this foundation that the eighteenth plenary meeting of the International Red Cross of 1952 formally recognized the Chinese Red Cross as China's sole lawful, nationwide Red Cross. But this did not end conflict between the Chinese and International Red Cross. That the International Red Cross still considered Taiwan a member of the United Nations was obvious in its having invited the Taiwanese representative to the nineteenth and twentieth plenary sessions of the Red Cross. This aroused intense resentment within the Chinese Red Cross. On the second occasion, it sent a letter to the chairman of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) requiring Taiwan's clear expulsion from plenary meetings.38 The president of the Chinese Red Cross, Li Dequan, gave a speech at the nineteenth Red Cross plenary session expressing his extreme displeasure with the Committee and its members: ‘The chairman of the Red Cross, as leader of an international organization, has unexpectedly dared to abuse his authority to serve the "Two-China" plot manufactured by the United States, and to use his attitude, which neither the Chinese delegation nor any upright and honest person can condone, to throw this meeting into chaos.’39 The two sides’ conflict thus became public knowledge.
On the topic of Taiwan, points of friction between the Chinese Red Cross and the International Red Cross also included: aid department of the International Red Cross donation statistics that juxtaposed the Chinese Red Cross and the Taiwanese Red Cross,40 and the world Red Cross map published by the International Red Cross that listed Taiwan as a country.41 Relations between the Chinese Red Cross, the ICRC, and the International Red Cross after the 1960s and 1970s became more politicized and complicated. The Chinese Red Cross twice refused, in 1967 and 1971, to participate in the International Red Cross Board of Directors Meeting because the International Red Cross had on those occasions invited the Saigon chapter of the Red Cross.42
China's a negative identification with this Western-dominated international institution precluded entry of the International Red Cross Movement and its norms into China's internal discourse. It was a situation consistent with the then government of China's general distrust of multilateral international institutions.43 The Chinese Red Cross was at this time regarded as little more than a convenient forum for government propaganda. The process of entry into China of the International Red Cross Movement and its norms, therefore, began long after the Chinese Red Cross recovered legitimate status within the International Red Cross Movement in the 1950s. From the 1950s through to the end of the 1970s, the Chinese Red Cross’ relations with the International Red Cross Movement were those of a drifting, occasionally antagonistic, state. The Chinese Red Cross, unsurprisingly, did not during this period of low acceptance of International Red Cross norms raise the question of domestic legislation. This did not occur until 1988. By that time, China's relationship with international society had changed; from that of a drifting country to a status quo country.
Integration and Positive Participation Stage
China's interpretation of the legitimacy of the International Red Cross changed in the 1980s. Efforts to promote economic development and improve China’ international image after entry to the United Nations—and particularly after becoming open to the outside world—greatly improved China's relationship with international society. China's first upsurge in international participation occurred during the ten years after 1979. The country's gathering participation in the multilateral treaties that form the foundation of international social order was a direct result of improvements in identity relationships. China, between 1979 and 1988, participated in 114 multilateral conventions. This constitutes 78.6% of the total treaties China concluded and signed between 1949 and 1988 (Figure 3).44
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The Chinese government's transformed relationship with international society occurred upon its changed understanding and appraisal of the International Red Cross Movement. Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress, Liao Chengzhi, when he met the Chair of the International Committee of the Red Cross Alexander Hay and his delegation at the congress during its 1980 visit to China, praised the International Committee's ‘outstanding accomplishments for world peace’.45 This was certainly a change of sentiment, bearing in mind that in the 1950s and 1960s the Chinese government frequently referred to the International Committee as ‘accomplices’ of the West. 46 As such, Liao Chengzhi's comment signalled the International Red Cross Movement's positive entry into China's discourse. The Chinese government's changed cognition lead it in 1983 to confirm the ‘Geneva Convention Additional Protocol on Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts’ and the ‘Geneva Convention Additional Protocol on the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts’. Published condemnation by the Chinese Red Cross of the International Red Cross Society and the International Committee simultaneously disappeared. It could be said that from the birth of New China to the 1990s, the Red Cross underwent transition from ‘Chinese government Red Cross’ to ‘the Chinese Red Cross within the International Red Cross Movement’.
This positive entry by the International Red Cross Movement into China's domestic discourse reflected the Chinese Red Cross’ active participation in the international organization, and further motivated that of the Chinese government. The Chinese Red Cross’ participant zeal in activities and conferences organized by the International Committee snowballed after the 1980s. The previous period during which the Chinese Red Cross had for reasons of fundamental distrust refused to participate, therefore, irrevocably passed. China's passive-approach participation also changed. The country began actively to accept and reject the views of other representatives; also to present opinions on the direction of Red Cross development. The Chinese Red Cross working plan of 1991 raised the proposition that the movement at international conferences: ‘strive to publish more effective proposals and present more worthwhile speeches’.47 The Chinese Red Cross actively participated in every kind of international conference and also strengthened its contacts with the International Committee and other international Red Cross organizations. The Chinese Red Cross delegation visited 65 groups and over thirty countries and regions between 1979 and 1985. During this six-year period it also received delegations from twenty-two countries and regions and from two international organizations.48 These activities signify heightened levels of Chinese Red Cross identification with the International Red Cross Movement. The activities of the Chinese Red Cross within the International Red Cross Movement thus evolved from ‘using the Red Cross Movement as a platform for government propaganda’ to ‘positively becoming a member of the International Red Cross Movement’.
Integration of the Chinese Red Cross into the International Red Cross Movement also motivated related government departments towards a better understanding of the movement. The Chinese Red Cross and the Foreign Affairs Department, as well as the General Political Department, for example, arranged for the Red Cross International Committee representative to visit workers that had been taken prisoner by the Vietnamese army. The Chinese Red Cross, along with the International Committee, also held a human rights study group.49 Deepened government understanding of the Red Cross Movement and its norms also established a basis for legislation supporting the Red Cross.
The Chinese Red Cross organized a foreign Red Cross legislation study geared to understanding other countries’ Red Cross legislation and improving Chinese Red Cross law to the optimum degree. In addition to inviting workers at the Central Administration Policy Research Department (responsible for grassroots law drafts), the Chinese Red Cross also invited the participation of Foreign Ministry, State Council Legal Department and People's Congress Legal Committee personnel. The study was under the two broad headings of east and west: eastern countries included Japan and the ROK; western countries included Switzerland and Turkey. Participants studied the basic substance of China's Red Cross law; government support for the Red Cross; and the nature of each country's participation in the International Red Cross Movement. This project increased lawmakers’ understanding of the Red Cross Movement and the basic norms and content implicit in Red Cross legislation. Its positive effect on legislative processes was later apparent in fewer arguments over certain basic clauses.
It was the Chinese Red Cross-sponsored large-scale International Red Cross meeting in Beijing at the beginning of the 1990s that signified the change in nature of Chinese Red Cross international participation, and its entry to a newly positive and active stage. The Chinese Red Cross’ sponsorship of such events was not artless, rather in the knowledge that it could increase government leaders’ knowledge of and support for the Red Cross. The Chinese Red Cross so summarized the work of this meeting, ‘We invited the country's leaders to send a letter of congratulations to the meeting, and to participate in the opening ceremony and make a speech, thereby increasing their understanding of the work of the Red Cross. Afterwards, this will be extremely beneficial for our work.’50
Entry of the International Red Cross Movement into China's domestic discourse and elevation of the status of the Chinese Red Cross within the International Red Cross Movement increased China's level of concern about its image within the International Red Cross Movement. The Chinese Red Cross consequently became more sensitive about its duties and to criticism. Conscious that most Red Cross branches had established their laws according to the Geneva Conventions, the Chinese Red Cross sought to change its identity in order to achieve the legitimacy provided by legislation. The Red Cross’ reason for first proposing legislation in 1988 was: ‘Many countries have established Red Cross legislation according to the Geneva Conventions, and have used it to make clear the character, status, and international and domestic functions of the Red Cross.’51 The State Council Legal Department and the People's Congress legal working committee also commented: ‘One of the factors in favour of establishing the "Red Cross Law" is that the Red Cross forms a part of the International Red Cross Movement, and we should consider aligning ourselves with international practice.’52 Both proposal and statement signify that the legislation proposal was raised as a result of the Chinese Red Cross Movement's change of cognition of the International Red Cross Movement since its entry into China's discourse. It is thus not difficult to understand why the question of Chinese Red Cross legislation did not genuinely make its way to the domestic agenda until the end of the 1980s.
The entry of an international institution into the domestic discourse of a country is a prerequisite for producing an effect at the domestic level. Entry signifies the institution and its norms having been accepted by the ‘corresponding domestic actors’. China's relationship with international society from the 1950s to the late 1970s severely limited the Chinese Red Cross’ ability to participate independently in the International Red Cross Movement, and also severely prejudiced the movement's chances of entering China. Improved relations between China and international society enabled the Chinese Red Cross to resume its relationship with the International Red Cross Movement, and signalled China's acceptance of the movement within its domestic discourse. The Chinese Red Cross’ request for legislation was established on the basis of its correct understanding of the International Red Cross Movement and its norms. But this occurred only after the International Red Cross Movement and its norms had entered China's domestic discourse, when the Chinese Red Cross finally understood the requirement for corresponding domestic law. The proposal for legislation by the Chinese Red Cross, therefore, was the direct result of the International Red Cross Movement's entry to China's domestic discourse.
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International Pressure and Red Cross Law |
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TopThe Differing Effects of...The Internalization of...Why the Case of...Changes in China's Identity...International Pressure and Red...Sovereignty Cognition and the...Conclusion |
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Increased cognition of the legitimacy of the Red Cross international system, in addition to gaining the Red Cross Movement entry into China's domestic discourse, caused China to accept the Red Cross institution and exert both foreign and domestic pressure for the right to guide its own behaviour according to Red Cross norms. China's adoption of the standard Red Cross symbol for domestic use was a main manifestation of the effect upon China's administrative and legal institutions of the International Red Cross’ entry into China's domestic discourse.
After World War II, the International Red Cross movement vigorously promoted standard use of the Red Cross symbol in peace time, and its emblem gradually became a main global norm. The International Red Cross Movement's criticism—on formal and informal, bilateral and multilateral occasions—of China's casual use of the Red Cross symbol generated pressure within the Chinese Red Cross, and also within the decision-making government elite. Whether or not international institution generated-pressure produces change in a particular policy, however, depends largely on the masses’ and decision-making elites’ understanding of its legitimacy, which, in turn, is greatly affected by the country's collective historical memory of the institution.
Historical Memory and International Institution Pressure
Restrictions on cognition of sovereignty make state decision-makers extremely sensitive to pressure from international systems. In many situations, acceding to international pressure signifies weakness, and could therefore influence the legitimacy of rule of the domestic political elite. A country and its peoples’ collective memory of an international institution largely determines its perceived legitimacy, and the lack of an unblocked channel of societal pressure in state-lead countries [I think this point should be expanded; I’m not sure what it means—polisher] makes the memory of their core decision-makers all the more important. As a result, as Thomas Risse-Kappen points out, ‘Whether or not a multinational concept will produce an effect on domestic policies depends to a large degree on whether or not leaders are willing to listen to these concepts.’53 The image of the Red Cross international institution as perceived by China's decision-makers directly affects China's understanding of the legitimacy of Red Cross norms, as well as the extent of its acceptance of them. This being the case, it was the Chinese Red Cross’ humanitarian accomplishments and its positive image in the eyes of China's legislative decision-makers that, in spite of China's respectively revolutionary and drifting identities from the 1950s through to the end of the 1970s, culminated in China's participation in the International Red Cross Movement. Upon the changes in international identity that followed, China more actively promoted development of ‘Chinese Red Cross Law’.
The Chinese Red Cross was formally established on 10 March 1904. During wartime it ministered to the wounded and, when re-established after WWII it provided disaster relief and civil medical treatment; it also worked towards improving sanitation and other essential areas. The Red Cross provided relief and protection to the Chinese people during the extreme hardship they suffered throughout China's history of foreign invasion, continuous war and modern domestic troubles. It consequently left a good impression on both China's political elites and the common people. During the Russo-Japanese war, for example, the combined efforts of the International Red Cross Movement and the Chinese Red Cross brought aid to 467,000 refugees, solicited donations of more than 10,000 kilograms of silver and enabled the purchase of 30,000 dan of rice.54 The Red Cross also participated in rebuilding work after the war. As many as 225,138 people have directly benefited from its work.55
The International Committee of the Red Cross’ provision of large-scale medical aid to soldiers and civilians during the Anti-Japanese War was of immense help to the war effort. The Red Cross Relief Unit and its subordinate medical teams (formed by Chinese Red Cross doctors and nurses and medical personnel from other countries mobilized by the International Red Cross Movement) collectively carried out more than 110,000 surgeries, treated 2,140,000 patients and gave 4,600,000 inoculations, according to incomplete statistics.56 Its work won the favourable opinion of soldiers of the Eighth-Route Army. Mao Zedong himself personally commended the medical team,57 having said in their praise, ‘To rescue the dying and heal the wounded is to implement the humanitarian spirit of the revolution.’58
The Chinese Red Cross completed its reorganization process in 1950, after the establishment of New China. The PRC at the time of its inception was relatively isolated from international society. The Red Cross, due to its non-governmental status and purpose of promoting humanitarian values, consequently played a positive diplomatic role as regards dealing with international matters that had no precedent within Chinese governmental practice. One example is that of the interaction between the Chinese and Japanese branches of the Red Cross that helped to promote normalization of Sino–Japanese relations. At the beginning of the 1950s, after consultations between the Chinese and Japanese Red Cross branches, the Chinese Red Cross helped 26,000 Japanese people residing in China to return to their homeland. Its work understandably received a positive response in Japan.59 China's vice-chairman Wang Zhen later stated when he met with the Japanese Red Cross representative: ‘The work of the Red Cross is extremely significant. The Red Cross organizations of China and Japan have done a considerable amount of work to develop friendship between these two countries and their people. Before the normalization of the two countries’ diplomatic relations, their respective Red Cross organizations used their special status to solve many practical problems. The governments and people of China and Japan will not forget these historical accomplishments of the Chinese and Japanese Red Cross organizations.’60
These commendations have given both the International Red Cross Movement and the Chinese Red Cross high status in the eyes of government elites in the recent modern era. Then Premier Li Peng wrote in a letter of congratulation to the Fifth National Representative Congress of the Chinese Red Cross of 1990: ‘The Chinese Red Cross abides by the aims of humanitarianism. It plays an important function in rescuing the dying and healing the wounded, helping those in distress, respecting the elderly and helping the disabled, and finding pleasure in helping others. It shares the cares and burdens of the government, and rescues the government from trouble. It enjoys the welcome of the masses.’61 State Council member Li Tieying in his speech at the congress gave a more specific explanation of the function of the Chinese Red Cross in the forty-plus years since establishment of the PRC. The Chinese Red Cross, he said: ‘helped the government mobilize mass health relief and social welfare work; it worked to establish socialism and advanced the peaceful unity of this country; it worked to promote exchange and friendship with Red Cross organizations in other countries, promoted the cause of world progress, and in these and other areas, performed much beneficial work and has had some striking results.’62 Chinese Red Cross personnel that participated in the legislative process that year also believe that it was the positive image of the Red Cross in the eyes of legislative decision-makers that made them accept more easily the variety of international norms put forward by the Red Cross.63
Normative Use of the Red Cross Symbol
Casual use of the Red Cross symbol in China is an historical problem. After the birth of New China, the Red Cross was described as a ‘health relief organization’, and received guidance from the related central government departments (mainly the Health Department and Ministry of Internal Affairs). Because the Red Cross lacked its rightful independent status, however, standardized use of the Red Cross symbol was difficult to administrate. Ubiquitous use of the Red Cross symbol—in hospitals, first-aid stations, ambulances, sanitation and anti-epidemic stations, clinics, and even veterinary clinics, as well as on a variety of health items—was the result.64 As the Chinese Red Cross had in no way merged with the International Red Cross Movement, it lacked understanding of the actual implications of the Red Cross symbol and the consequences of its overuse. Deepened participation in the International Red Cross Movement, however, enabled the Chinese Red Cross to comprehend the importance of correct use of its emblem. Its heightened status within the International Red Cross Movement, moreover, made the Chinese Red Cross sensitive to international society criticism as regards overuse of the Red Cross emblem; it was a main reason why the Chinese Red Cross of that time promoted the Red Cross law standardizing domestic use of the Red Cross symbol.65 Standardization of the Red Cross symbol in China also owes much to the constant efforts of the international efforts of the Red Cross Movement after World War II.
Standardized use of the Red Cross symbol was a goal that the ICRC had constantly worked towards since the end of World War II. It was physician Louis Appia (one of five members of the International Committee for Relief to the Wounded organized by Henry Dunant) that in 1863 first proposed use of the Red Cross symbol to signify the Red Cross Movement. The proposal was confirmed at the1949 signing of the Geneva Conventions. The thirty-eighth clause of the Geneva Conventions stipulates: ‘As a compliment to Switzerland, the heraldic emblem of the red cross on a white ground, formed by reversing the Federal colours, is retained as the emblem and distinctive sign of the Medical Service of armed forces.’66 The conventions, at the same time, required signatories to the treaty to create laws in their own countries or incorporate regulations on the Red Cross symbol within their respective Red Cross laws.67
The Geneva Conventions explicitly acknowledge potential misuse or overuse of the Red Cross symbol; that on ‘the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field’ includes related clauses standardizing each country's use of the Red Cross symbol. These clauses, however, did not prevent its misuse, as few signatory countries adopted the appropriate positive measures necessary to prevent and combat the phenomenon. As one scholar points out, ‘Effectively protecting the use of the symbol to a large degree relies on national legislation and court judgments, because only states can carry out the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.’68
Owing to the negligent legislative behaviour of signatory countries, the International Committee adopted measures impelling them to pass laws specifying use of the Red Cross symbol. The first was its provision to governments of a model law, in hopes that it would encourage countries that had not yet passed Red Cross law to do so. The second measure entailed bringing the matter of national legislation as a means of protecting the symbol's use to the direct attention of Red Cross representatives at national and regional assemblies. The International Committee, in its efforts to encourage countries to pass legislation and to impel those that had already done so to perfect current laws to prevent misuse of the Red Cross emblem, raised the matter at the eighth through to the twenty-fifth meeting of the International Congress.
The third measure related to each region's specific situation. The International Committee promoted discussions at regional congresses on each country's correct use of the Red Cross symbol and the status of related laws. The Committee at the same time offered policy advice appropriate to each country's particular situation. The ICRC submitted, at the first Asia-Pacific Region Red Cross Congress (the New Delhi Congress) convened by the International Committee in March of 1977, a draft pinpointing existent problems as regards protection of the symbol in countries of the region. The draft required countries that had already passed legislation to go a step further in supervising implementation of the law, and countries that had not yet passed relevant legislation rapidly to do so. As the Chinese Red Cross had recently resumed its work, it was only then that it responded to ICRC concerns. The Congress passed the draft, and it was a significant aspect of the post-congress report.69
The negative attitude of signatory governments, however, impeded positive results of the ICRC's continuous efforts; only fifty signatory countries had passed laws protecting the use of the Red Cross symbol by the beginning of July 1981, according to ICRC statistics, and legislation in only 41 countries produced real effect. Overuse of the symbol remained a serious problem in the remainder of member countries.70 As more Red Cross organizations began standardizing use of the Red Cross symbol, however, its protection gradually became a norm of sorts. Most countries had made specific laws normalizing use of the Red Cross symbol by the beginning of the 1990s; others duly activated corresponding regulations within their Red Cross law. These legal methods of standardizing use of the Red Cross symbol employed by increasing numbers of countries (particularly Asian and third-world countries) exerted ‘peer pressure’ on both the Chinese government and the Chinese Red Cross.71
The Chinese Red Cross received criticism for overuse of the Red Cross symbol in China from the International Red Cross Movement and other national Red Cross organizations under both bilateral and multilateral situations. Leaders of these organizations, moreover, used opportunities by virtue of interaction with high-level government officials to express directly their criticism and dissatisfaction. When chair of the ICRC Alexander Hay visited China in 1992, he was shocked to note that pharmacies and hospitals all over the country used the Red Cross symbol. Hay brought up the question of the Chinese government's standardized use of the Red Cross symbol with then Premier Li Peng, who agreed to recommend rapid government measures in this regard.72
Domestic pressure during the legislative process, in addition to formal channels of international pressure, also played a role in promoting Chinese Red Cross legislation. At the fourth meeting of the seventh session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference of 1991, six conference committee members jointly signed a draft resolution recommending adoption of measures to prevent misuse of the Red Cross symbol, setting a time limit. The resolution pointed out: ‘Since the Chinese Red Cross was established in 1904, it has had eighty-seven years of history, but to this day China still cannot correctly use the "Red Cross symbol". Certain foreign friends and international Red Cross friends are extremely sensitive to this problem in China, and have very frankly made known their objections.’73 It was under such pressure that the matter of standard use of the Red Cross emblem first entered the government agenda. The direct result of this resolution was the Health Department and the Red Cross Central Administration's: ‘Notice on the Correct Use of the Red Cross Symbol’, in February 1992. The Notice required adoption of the measure throughout the country and, to protect the dignity of the Red Cross symbol, specified a time limit within which to end its misuse and overuse.74 Gu Yingqi, in a report on the application for legislation, proposed that the purpose of passing the ‘Red Cross law’ was to ‘protect the Red Cross symbol’ because ‘it is a requirement for the Red Cross to effectively perform its specially designated duty.’75 Many conference participants expressed the opinion during discussions of the report that using the ‘Red Cross law’ to standardize the use of the Red Cross symbol was beneficial both to developing the Chinese Red Cross and protecting the Chinese government's image.76
The ICRC, as the main international organization promoting the correct use of the Red Cross emblem, has since the end of World War II adopted measures standardizing each country's use of the Red Cross emblem which have been largely effective in correcting its overuse and misuse. In the face of ICRC official measures standardizing the use of the Red Cross symbol, and other countries’ relatively standard use of it, Chinese Red Cross foreign affairs personnel came in for repeated criticism (particularly after the reform and opening of China) from ICRC members and other countries in international situations. This created pressure on China to correct misuse of the symbol.77 As the International Red Cross Movement has a governmental characteristic, government officials are susceptible to criticism and pressure emanating from it. Consequently, Red Cross demands for domestic legislation to rectify domestic overuse of the Red Cross symbol, along with its constant criticism, combined as a force that promoted the legislative process.
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Sovereignty Cognition and the Principles of the Red Cross Legislation |
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TopThe Differing Effects of...The Internalization of...Why the Case of...Changes in China's Identity...International Pressure and Red...Sovereignty Cognition and the...Conclusion |
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The extent to which Red Cross norms tally with state decision makers’ sovereignty cognition deeply influenced the content and process of Chinese Red Cross legislation. In general, the closer the agreement between the international institution and the sovereignty cognition of state decision makers, the more likely the international institution is to influence domestic legislation, and vice-versa. The argument and final resolution of the International Red Cross Movement's unity and independence principles during the ‘Chinese Red Cross Law’ legislative process embodies this point. As the principle of unity agrees with contemporary China's view of the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity, it consequently played a positive role in encouraging the State Council Legal Department to place Red Cross law on its agenda. The independence principle, on the other hand, is contrary to the ‘big government’ culture of China's sovereignty cognition. This clause, whereby the Red Cross is independent of the government, therefore, met with fierce debate. Although the independence principle eventually won recognition it was with the help of certain reserve clauses.
The Unity Principle of Red Cross Legislation
The Chinese Red Cross’ increasing belief in the legitimacy of the Red Cross institution raised for it the problem of persuading the State Council to include the ‘Red Cross Law’ in the state legislative plan.78 The Chinese Red Cross had discussed relevant legislation with the State Council Legal Department at the end of the 1980s, but the department had announced no clear decision on the matter. One particularly significant event: the return of Hong Kong, however, provided favourable circumstances through which to achieve legislation; it required addressing the question of the Hong Kong Red Cross organization's status on Mainland China. More important, the Hong Kong Red Cross organization had already created its own legal code, based on the Geneva Conventions and British Red Cross law. On occurrences, after the return of Hong Kong, of conflicting Hong Kong–Mainland China Red Cross practices, therefore, the Hong Kong branch simply dealt with the problem according to its own law. But there was no other way of resolving such problems because China's mainland had yet to pass corresponding legislation. This situation stressed the need for Chinese Red Cross law.
The Chinese Red Cross’ deepened integration into the International Red Cross Movement gradually enabled its understanding and acceptance of the Movement's basic norms and principles. The Constitution of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement stipulates: ‘Any country that has a Red Cross or Red Crescent organization must be open to all people and must be active nationwide.’79 This is the ‘unity principle’ of the Red Cross, whereby a country's Red Cross organization must be: ‘this country's only Red Cross or Red Crescent organization, and it must be led by a Central Committee’, if it wishes to be acknowledged by the International Red Cross Movement.80 The law's main concern is the internal structure of a country's Red Cross organization; the unity principle implies administrative unity. From the perspective of internal affairs, the organization requires only that there be a central authority (such as a general headquarters), responsible for allocating resources and determining operations, whose work is to formulate an overall plan. As regards foreign relations, National Red Cross branches wishing to participate in the International Conference need send just one representative of this central authority to act as a full member.81
The unified institutional norms of the International Red Cross Movement, however, did not immediately apply Red Cross pressure on the domestic legislative process. It was only when the principle was challenged that it exerted force.82 China's central government signed a joint communiqué with the British government in 1984, agreeing on Hong Kong's return to China. It raised the matter of the Chinese Red Cross’ correctly handling of its relations with the Hong Kong Red Cross. The Hong Kong Red Cross was established in 1950, originally as a branch organization of the British Red Cross. The Hong Kong Red Cross formulated laws, according to the Geneva Conventions and their supplementary articles, as well as to British Red Cross Law, that provide legal protection of their operations in Hong Kong. A principled demarcation between the Chinese Red Cross and the Hong Kong Red Cross was obviously necessary, as the Hong Kong Red Cross would otherwise enjoy a high degree of autonomy after Hong Kong's return. If no legal procedure existed to demarcate and define relations between the two organizations, chaos could well ensue, to the extent that both organizations might simultaneously appear at international conferences. This problem grew in prominence as the date of Hong Kong's return approached. The Chinese Red Cross made good use of this opportunity. It pointed out to the related State Council department that the lack of Red Cross Law could affect government and foreign affairs. The Foreign Ministry responded with a request for advice on how to resolve the problem, noting, ‘Although the Red Cross is a people's organization, it has a relatively strong governmental characteristic. Therefore, when dealing with the post-1997 Hong Red Cross’ relationship with the mainland Red Cross central organization, with the International Red Cross organization, and with other countries’ Red Cross organizations, one must consider the pertinent regulations of the Hong Kong Special Zone Basic Law, and also consider the unity principle of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.’83
Influence on domestic politics of international norms is usually achieved through domestic political actors. Martin and Simmons find that, ‘Even if agreements whose goal is to provide aid, such as the OECD, do not have strong enforcement mechanisms, they can still use interest groups to form an alliance between domestic support and international agreement to increase the agreement's influence on the domestic political agenda.’84 The Chinese Red Cross’ introduction of the unity principle into the legislative process clearly played an important role in this respect. The Chinese Red Cross’ first mention to the government of the unity principle as a means to motivate legislation appears in the: ‘Request for Instructions on the Chinese Red Cross Law Application’ of 1991. The Chinese Red Cross clearly stated in this document the unity principle: ‘Unity specifically requires a country to permit only one Red Cross organization. Because Hong Kong and Taiwan both have legislation, it naturally creates a problem of protecting rights and interests. Taiwan and Hong Kong are both part of China. Hong Kong will be returned in 1997, and Taiwan will sooner or later be united with the mainland. If at the appointed time the Chinese Red Cross appears to rely on Hong Kong's or Taiwan's law, this will obviously be inappropriate. This requires that we see the importance and urgency of China's Red Cross Law.’85 The Chinese Red Cross’ explanation of the need for legislation received a rapid and sympathetic response from the government. The first clause of the June 1996 State Council Routine Business Committee's discussion of the draft of the ‘Red Cross Law’ states, ‘The Chinese Red Cross is the national Red Cross organization of the People's Republic of China. While formulating and explaining this law, we must take note of relations with the Red Cross organizations of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.’86
An international norm's degree of agreement with mainstream political culture, in a more general sense, determines whether or not it is accepted by a country and eventually influences domestic processes.87 In other words, persuading legislative decision makers to accept an international norm requires the norm in question's agreement with the legislative decision makers’ political culture background. The unity principle won the approval of China's legislative decision makers and produced an effect during the legislative process because it concurred with the intense importance accorded sovereignty by Chinese government decision-makers. The devastation and humiliation that China has suffered in modern times makes the government of New China especially sensitive to matters of sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is a main reason for the effectiveness of the International Red Cross Movement's unity principle.
The Independence Principle of Red Cross Legislation
The independence principle relates to the Red Cross’ relationship with the government. The relationship between the Chinese Red Cross and the Chinese government after the establishment of New China was very close. The 1950 constitution of the Chinese Red Cross defines the Chinese Red Cross Central Administration as: ‘a health relief organization under the leadership of the People's Government’.88 The State Administrative Council decided in 1951 that the Politics and Law Central Committee (or the Ministry of Internal Affairs in its stead) would provide day-to-day Red Cross Central Administration leadership. The Red Cross health services would be lead by the central government's Health Department; the Foreign Ministry would direct operations involving foreign affairs.89 The Chinese Red Cross maintained this semi-official organizational characteristic for some time. Although not a government department, government influence on the Chinese Red Cross was nevertheless strong. This phenomenon is consistent with the emphasis that China's government at the time placed on ‘big government’ culture and social control.
The Chinese Red Cross’ ‘government’ characteristic conflicted with the International Red Cross Movement's independence principle, one of the seven stipulated in the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Constitution passed in 1986. The principle states: ‘This movement is independent. Although each country's Red Cross assists that country's government, and is subject to the laws of that country, it must preserve day-to-day independence, so that it may at any time operate according to the principles of this movement.’90 Compliance with the so-called Independence Principle was a prerequisite for any country seeking international recognition.91 But it constituted an explicit regulation regarding the Red Cross’ relationship with the government. The Red Cross must be independent of the government because it may otherwise be unable to accomplish humanitarian work according to the principles of the Red Cross Movement. The Chinese Red Cross’ close relationship with the Chinese government after the establishment of New China, therefore, was incompatible with International Red Cross Movement's independence principle.
The divergence between this fundamental International Red Cross Movement principle and those of China's domestic political culture caused fierce debate during the legislative process. The debate was first raised within the Chinese Red Cross, which excluded the independence principle from the Chinese Red Cross Law draft.92 The ‘Chinese Red Cross Law (manuscript for soliciting opinions)’of 1990 still stipulated: ‘The State Council is in charge of the Chinese Red Cross Central Administration, and is led by the departments concerned within the State Council’. The lack of unified understanding within the Red Cross of its relationship with the government was the main reason why the stipulation was retained. In the Hubei Red Cross’ revisions to the manuscript for soliciting opinions is written: ‘Accepting the leadership of the State Council's ministries and commissions cannot be good.’93 The Shanghai branch of the Red Cross, however, while discussing the Red Cross’ relationship with the government believed, ‘The Red Cross should be lead by the corresponding government department’.94 The draft submitted in 1991 went a step further in naming the ‘concerned ministries’ in the State Council as the Health Department, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Foreign Ministry and the State Education Commission.
This clause was not revised and gave no cause for concern prior to the deliberation process of 1992, when the Chinese Red Cross submitted its draft law to the State Council for consideration. The Foreign Ministry called to question the draft's content relating to the Red Cross’ relationship with the government, raising the question: ‘As a people's organization, is it appropriate for the Red Cross to publicly accept government direction? In light of the fact that China is already a member of the International Red Cross Movement and that, according to the constitution of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, if a country wishes to be acknowledged by the International Committee of the Red Cross it must meet the conditions that "the legitimate government of this country has already according to the Geneva Conventions and national law formally acknowledged that the organization is structured as a volunteer health relief group, and it has assumed the duty of assistant to the work of the appropriate authorities", and, "it has an independent status, and thus it can carry out activities according to the basic principles of this movement." ’95 Other departments of the State Council, however, were concerned about whether or not the independence of the Red Cross conformed to national policy, and how the Chinese Red Cross would operate should a conflict of interest occur between the state and the Red Cross Movement. Although in the end the State Council Legal Department adopted the opinion of the Foreign Ministry, it advised reorientation of Red Cross status as that of an organization which: ‘observes the basic principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, is in compliance with the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols and the constitution of the Chinese Red Cross, and acts independently to develop its work’, while ‘working closely with the concerned government departments to develop activities’.96 The Legal Department came up with a compromise to appease the misgivings raised by other departments by its insertion of the phrase: ‘abides by the constitution and the law’ into the clause. It thus reads: ‘The Chinese Red Cross abides by the constitution and the law [and] observes the basic principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement’. The clause thus limits the organization's independence.97 It was the independence principle's inconsistency with the importance accorded to sovereignty by decisi