The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 5, 2012, 341–367
doi:10.1093/cjip/pos017

Socialisation as a Two-way Process: Emerging Powers and the Diffusion of International Norms

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Introduction

Since first introduced in 2002, the concept of 'Normative Power Europe (NPE)' has been widely discussed among scholars of International Relations.[1] In 2012, the original article on 'normative power Europe' was cited 1058 times, according to Google Scholar records. In contrast, few studies conceptualise emerging powers such as China and Brazil as normative powers. On the whole, the impact of emerging powers as normative powers is understudied.[2] Investigating the normative preferences of emerging powers is becoming increasingly critical. For centuries, it has been Western powers that have socialised non-Western countries into the West-dominated international society. In this socialisation process, the Western powers usually tell non-Western countries how to behave appropriately and how to follow the 'standard of civilizations'.[3] The presumption

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1 For the concept of 'normative power Europe', see Ian Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2002), pp. 235–58.

2 There are few studies that conceptualise emerging powers as normative powers. See Brantly Womack, 'China as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor', in Nathalie Tocci, ed., *Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor?* (Brusssels: The Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008); Xiaoming Zhang, 'A Rising China and the Normative Changes in International Society', *East Asia: An International Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2011), pp. 235–46.

3 Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). As one anonymous reviewer correctly points out, the West is not a monolithic bloc in terms of norm preference. In the 20th century, there was complex diffusion of norms in the West-dominated international society. The article does not ignore the diverse preferences within the West, but from an analytical perspective, this article will focus on emerging powers, not the West. The dichotomy of emerging powers vis-à-vis the West is

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is that the social norms and political values preferred by the West are the only possible way to achieve modernity.[4] With the emergence of non-Western great powers in the 21st century, however, this idea is increasingly challenged.[5] Emerging powers are sending a strong message to the West, 'Stop telling us how to behave'.[6] The following are recent examples.

In February 2012, China joined Russia in vetoing the United Nations Security Council resolution on Syria. The veto of Russia and China derailed the latest attempt to pressure the Assad regime to end its crackdown and highlighted the normative divide in international society.[7] China has been a norm-shaper in this issue area of humanitarian intervention, not a passive student of international norms. China participated fully in the United Nations debate on development of the concept of 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P).[8] Moreover, Brazil proactively promotes the new concept of 'Responsibilities While Protecting' (RWP) as a new norm of international intervention. RWP aims to establish basic criteria to assure that interventions by force always do the smallest damage possible. Brazil's proactive role is an interesting example of an emerging power trying to shape the debate on international norms.[9]

The global financial crisis strengthened the trend of the shifting balance of power between the emerging BRICS States (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and the West. This shifting balance of material power is changing the landscape of diplomatic influence and normative order. For instance, the 'China model' has gained momentum during and since the

for analytical purpose. For the analysis of various normative change in the international society, see Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: the Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., *The Power of Human Rights International Norms and Domestic Change* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

4 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1992).

5 Azar Gat, 'The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 4 (2007), pp. 59–69; Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order* (New York: Penguin Press, 2009); Charles Kupchan, *No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

6 For the discussion of resistance against West-dominated socialisation, see Charlotte Epstein, 'Stop Telling Us How to Behave: Socialization or Infantilization?' *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2012), pp. 135–45.

7 Minxin Pei, 'Why Beijing Votes With Moscow', *New York Times*, February 7 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/opinion/why-beijing-votes-with-moscow.html

8 Rosemary Foot, 'The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and its Evolution: Beijing's Influence On Norm Creation in Humanitarian Areas', *St Antony's International Review*, Vol. 2, No. 6 (2011), pp. 47–66.

9 Oliver Stuenkel, 'BRICS and the "Responsibility while Protecting" Concept', *The Hindu*, March 12 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article2985190.ece

global financial crisis.[10] 'It is a popular notion among Chinese political elites, including some national leaders, that China's development model provides an alternative to Western democracy and experiences for other developing countries to learn from, while many developing countries that have introduced Western values and political systems are experiencing disorder and chaos.'[11] Because of shifting power and perceptions, emerging powers have appeared as more assertive on the world stage. At Copenhagen, it became clear that Western leadership in global governance was eroding, and emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil demonstrated their solidarity by rejecting the Western agenda. The Copenhagen climate summit thus became a forum wherein different understandings of global responsibility clashed. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao emphasised the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities', and thus that China should be treated as a developing country. Premier Wen said that it was unjustified to ask developing countries 'to undertake emission reduction targets beyond their due obligations and capabilities in disregard of historical responsibilities, per capita emissions and different levels of development'.[12] China called for a greater say for developing countries towards their ultimate parity with the developed world.[13] The Copenhagen Summit hence symbolised the rapid rise of emerging powers on the world stage.

The aforementioned examples illustrate that the normative preferences of emerging powers have shaped crucial issues in global governance. Emerging powers such as China, India, Russia and Brazil will have seats at the international high table, and bring to it the new rules of the game.[14] At the same time, the international community faces many challenges, such as climate change and financial crisis, which cannot be solved by the Western powers alone. It is hence ever more crucial to investigate the ideas and preferences of emerging powers.[15] In the coming decades, the West must accommodate emerging powers while safeguarding the Western liberal order.[16] The attitude of emerging powers towards the existing order, however, is more complicated than conventionally assumed; emerging powers sometimes oppose the existing liberal norms, but at other times accept them. Furthermore, emerging

[10] Shaun Breslin, 'The "China Model" and the Global Crisis: From Friedrich List to a Chinese Mode of Governance?' *International Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 6 (2011), pp. 1323–43.

[11] Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, *Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2012), p. 10.

[12] 'Premier Expresses China's Sincerity at UN Climate Conference', December 18 2009, http://www.china.org.cn/environment/Copenhagen/2009-12/18/content_19094086_4.htm

[13] Gregory Chin and Ramesh Thakur, 'Will China Change the Rules of Global Order?', *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2010), pp. 119–38.

[14] National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2008).

[15] Ann Florini, 'Rising Asian Powers and Changing Global Governance', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2011), pp. 24–33.

[16] G. John Ikenberry, 'The Future of the Liberal World Order', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 3 (2011), pp. 56–68.

powers have diverse preferences, and there are significant limitations on co-operation among BRICS countries.[17] As the distribution of power within the international system shifts, will visions of global order compete and dominant international norms alter? Will emerging powers challenge the status quo of the existing order? The future shape of international politics largely depends on what roles the emerging powers decide to play.[18]

Socialisation is a useful concept that could help us understand the process of international political change. Most existing studies of socialisation in international relations, however, conceptualise it as a one-way process. Such a conceptualisation blinds us from understanding the complex interactions between emerging powers and international norms. Furthermore, when conceptualising the relationship between non-Western powers and the international order, most studies do not take into consideration the indigenous perspectives of these non-Western powers.[19] With respect to international political change, the existing theories in international politics often focus on how emerging powers are socialised into the existing international norms and orders.[20] There are few discussions on how these emerging powers will shape the emergence of new norms. There are, however, compelling reasons to focus on a two-way process of socialisation. First of all, socialisation in social theories could be conceptualised as a two-way process: people are not only the targets of socialisation but also active agents that influence the content and outcomes of the process.[21] Second, empirically speaking the one-way process is becoming increasingly incompatible with the two-way process of socialisation in international politics. In particular, how emerging powers might influence the evolution of norms has been relatively under-theorised, probably because this is a relatively new aspect of emerging powers' foreign policy.

[17] Stewart Patrick, 'Irresponsible Stakeholders?', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 6 (2010), pp. 44–53; Michael A. Glosny, 'China and the BRICS: A Real (but Limited) Partnership in a Unipolar World', *Polity*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2010), pp. 100–29.

[18] Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, 'After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline', *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2011), pp. 41–72.

[19] For some exceptions, see Amitav Acharya, 'How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism', *International Organization*, Vol. 58, No. 2 (2004), pp. 239–75. In addition, the English School has a similar problem of not taking consideration of non-western powers when conceptualizing the expansion of the international society. For critiques of the problem in the English School literature, see Shogo Suzuki, 'Japan's Socialization Into Janus-Faced European International Society', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2005), pp. 137–64; Shogo Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter with European International Society* (New York: Routledge, 2009); Xiaoming Zhang, 'China in the Conception of International Society: The English School's Engagements with China', *Review of International Studies,* Vol. 37, No. 2 (2011), pp. 763–86.

[20] See, for example, Alastair Iain Johnston, *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007)

[21] See Kent L. Sandstrom, Daniel D. Martin, and Gary Alan Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality: A Symbolic Interactionist Approach to Social Psychology and Sociology* (Los Angeles: Roxbury, 2002), pp. 65–66.

The article is laid out as follows. The first section will critically review the various conceptualisations of socialisation in international relations literature. It will also provide a conceptualisation of socialisation as a two-way process. The second section explains the connections among socialisation, legitimacy and international political change. Socialisation is a critical component of hegemonic order, and also a key concept for understanding international political change. The third section will evaluate socialisation as a one-way process: why the emerging powers internalise certain existing norms. The fourth section will evaluate socialisation as a two-way process: why the emerging powers are dissatisfied with certain other norms, and how they are shaping the evolution of international norms. The fifth section analyses a power diffusion model and the diffusion of international norms. The conclusion will explore the theoretical and policy implications.

Socialisation in International Relations Theory

In social sciences, socialisation is a process whereby an individual acquires a social identity and learns the norms, values and behaviour appropriate to his or her social position.[22] International relations scholars have borrowed the concept of socialisation to conceptualise the interaction between states and international society.

In international relations literature, different theorists conceptualise socialisation from different perspectives. Neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz treat socialisation as an emulating process of competitive behaviours imposed by an anarchic international system.[23] Following Waltzan neorealism, Joao Resende-santos argues that military emulation is a security-enhancing strategy in response to external threats, and that emulation is a form of balancing behaviour.[24] The neorealist process of homogenisation is not actually socialisation in common-sense usage, but a typical process of selection and competition. While Kenneth Waltz's structural model is rather spare, Cameron Thies tries to enrich neo-realism by specifying the conditioning effects of competition and socialisation operating on behalf of the international structure. He develops a model of the socialisation process that uses role theory to demonstrate how interstate interaction is structured at the micro-level. Consistent with neo-realism, the model assumes that socialisation is heavily conditioned by material capabilities, and

[22] For socialisation in social sciences, see Talcott Parsons and Robert Bales, *Family: Socialization and Interaction Process* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956); Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 130.

[23] Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

[24] Joao Resende-santos, *Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

operates mainly on the adjustment of state behaviour.[25] Constructivists conceptualise socialisation as a process of the diffusion and internalisation of norms.[26] Different from the logic of consequence, constructivists demonstrate the effects of socialisation by analysing the logic of appropriateness.[27] In particular, the question is that of how cooperative behaviour is possible without salient material incentives. Constructivists have investigated different mechanisms of socialisation, such as social influence, emulation and mimicking.[28]

Bringing socialisation into international relations literature sheds new light on international politics.[29] Socialisation particularly helps to uncover the mechanisms and processes of norm dynamics in international politics. For instance, socialisation could spread norms, and could also consolidate norms through internalisation.[30]

Most existing studies of socialisation, however, conceptualise socialisation as a one-way process, which is not necessarily wrong but is at least incomplete. For instance, Checkel defines socialisation as 'a process inducing actors into the norms and rules of a given society'.[31] Johnston conceptualises socialisation as a process through which social interaction leads novices to endorse expected ways of thinking, feeling, and acting.[32] Johnston also argues that there are two common themes in international relations literature: first, socialisation is most evidently directed at, or experienced by, novices and newcomers; second, the internalisation of the values, roles, and understandings held by a group that constitutes the society of which the actor becomes a member.[33]

Many existing studies have empirically examined how new actors are learning and internalising the existing international norms. For instance, Johnston argues that China has socialised into the existing international norms of arms control through three mechanisms of mimicking, persuasion

[25] Cameron G. Thies, 'State Socialization and Structural Realism', *Security Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2010), pp. 689–717.

[26] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 82, 101.

[27] For the distinction between logic of appropriateness and logic of consequence, see James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders', *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1998), pp. 943–69.

[28] For different processes of socialisation, see Alastair Iain Johnston, *Social States*.

[29] For instance, Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', *International Organization*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (2005), pp. 801–26; Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Conclusions and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing and Beyond Europe', *International Organization*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (2005), pp. 1013–44.

[30] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', *International Organization,* Vol. 52, No. 4 (1998), pp. 887–917.

[31] Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe', p. 804.

[32] Alastair Iain Johnston, 'Treating International Institutions as Social Environments', *International Studies Quarterly,* Vol. 45, No. 4 (2001), p. 494.

[33] *Ibid*., p. 495.

and social influence.[34] In a particular period of time, socialisation as a one-way process reflects the main concerns of a rising China. How to shape the evolution of international norms is not a principal concern of China's foreign policy in that period. In this sense, the one-way process of socialisation described in Johnston's *Social States* is justifiable and reasonable.[35]

As a general pattern, however, the current focus of socialisation as a one-directional process is biased and incomplete.[36] It is necessary to move the research forward in the following respects.

First of all, from a theoretical perspective, socialisation in social theories is often viewed as a two-way process: people are not only socializees who learn social norms; they could also act as proactive agents who could influence the content and outcome of the socialisation process.[37] A one-way process of socialisation often ignores the agency in international politics.[38] It is crucial to recognise the role of agency in shaping social and political change. In international normative politics, China is not only the receiver of international normative pressure; but it is also an active agency that is shaping the further evolution of international norms.[39]

Second, socialisation in international relations literature has certain theoretical biases, which will blind us from understanding the complex interactions between emerging powers and international norms. The current conceptualisation of socialisation in international relations has largely ignored the role of non-Western powers in shaping the evolution of international norms. Instead, socialisation in international relations literature focuses on socialising non-Western powers as aliens or infants. The

[34] Alastair Iain Johnston, *Social States*. See also Xiaojun Li, 'Social Rewards and Socialization Effects: An Alternative Explanation for the Motivation Behind China's Participation in International Institutions', *The Chinese Journal of International Politics,* Vol. 3, No. 3 (2010), pp. 347–77.

[35] Alastair Iain Johnston, *Social States*.

[36] There are a few exceptions that do not conceptualise socialisation as a one-way process. For instance, Shogo Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire*; Maximilian Terhalle, 'Reciprocal Socialization: Rising Powers and the West', *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2011), pp. 341–61.

[37] Kent L. Sandstrom, Daniel D. Martin, and Gary Alan Fine, *Symbols, Selves, and Social Reality*, pp. 65–66. Socialization as a two-way process is widely accepted in the literature of sociology and social psychology. However, most literatures in international relations do not conceptualise socialisation as a two-way process.

[38] For the discussion of 'agency' in a general sense, see Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische, 'What is Agency?', *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 103, No. 4 (1998), pp. 962–1023.

[39] For instance, most studies of China's interaction with international norms have conceptualised this as one way process in which China responds to the international pressure. See Ann Kent, 'States Monitoring States: The United States, Australia, and China's Human Rights, 1990-2001', *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2001), pp. 583–624; Ann Kent, ''China's International Socialization: The Role of International Organizations', *Global Governance*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2002), pp. 343–64. For the studies that pay more attention to the active role of the Chinese state, see Chen Dingding, 'China's Participation in the International Human Rights Regime: A State Identity Perspective', *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2009), pp. 399–419; Rana Siu Inboden and Titus C. Chen, 'China's Response to International Normative Pressure: The Case of Human Rights', *The International Spectator*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (2012), pp. 45–57.

perspective of the socializees (non-Western powers) is hence often missing; it is always the Western powers that tell the emerging powers how to behave.[40] Furthermore, socialisation literature also presumes that some states are already socialised into an international society, and that other states (mostly non-Western powers) must be adopted into this club of nations.[41] If, however, the non-Western powers are not founding members of the West-dominated international society, these non-Western powers have no inherent obligations to abide by the existing rules of the game in the first place. When non-Western powers enter into the international society, therefore, the rules of the games should at least be renegotiated.[42]

Third, resistance, anti-hegemonic movement, and 'weapons of the weak' have a long tradition in social sciences in general and international relations in particular.[43] As James Scott puts it, 'relations of dominations are, at the same time, relations of resistance'.[44] The current concept of socialisation has largely ignored the resistance of norms from non-western powers.[45] In reality, non-Western powers will not passively accept pressure from the dominant Western powers.

Fourth, norm diffusion in international politics is not simply about whether and how ideas matter, but also whose ideas matter.[46] In other words, many studies on socialisation do not carefully examine the question of who is socialising whom.[47] The existing constructivist and liberal studies on norms dynamics often focus on cases of normative transformation in which 'good' international norms prevail over the 'bad' local norms. Thus, socialisation tends to be apprehended as a bettering of the socializee (non-Western powers), because of an implicit teleological assumption of normative change as international progress. As Acharya emphasises, however, many local beliefs and practices are themselves part of a legitimate

[40] Charlotte Epstein, 'Stop Telling Us How to Behave', pp. 135–45.
[41] Maximillian Terhalle, 'Reciprocal Socialization', pp. 341–61.
[42] *Ibid.*
[43] James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). For the application in international relations, see Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005); Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, 'After Unipolarity'.
[44] James Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, p. 45.
[45] Resistance is related to the notion of 'anti-socialization'. See Shiping Tang, 'Foundational Paradigms of Social Sciences', *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2011), pp. 227–8. It should be noted that anti-socialisation is different from a two-way process of socialisation. That said, resistance is still related to a two-way process of socialisation. Resistance (or anti-socialization) could prepare conditions for a new process of socialization. In other words, once the resister with an anti-hegemonic ideology becomes new dominant power, the new power could socialise others with new norms. Thanks to Tang Shiping for pointing this out.
[46] Amitav Acharya, 'How Ideas Spread', pp. 239–75.
[47] Alice D. Ba, 'Who's Socializing Whom? Complex Engagement in Sino-ASEAN Relations', *Pacific Review*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2006), pp. 157–79.

normative order, which conditions the acceptance of international norms. Thus, it is necessary to provide a dynamic explanation of norm diffusion that describes how local agents reconstruct foreign norms to ensure the norms fit these agents' identities.[48] In norms dynamics, local actors will not either wholly accept the existing norms or totally reject them. Instead, localisation involves both resisting and reframing international norms in a particular context. Furthermore, socialisation of emerging powers is not only concerned about normative localisation; emerging powers could also play a more active role in spreading their own ideas and norms in international society. Through a two-way process, therefore, emerging powers will shape the further change of international norms.

Finally, from an empirical perspective, the dominant orientation of socialisation cannot explain certain new patterns of interaction between emerging powers and international norms. With respect to international political change, existing theories in international politics often focus on how non-Western powers are socialised into the existing international norms. There are few discussions on how these powers will shape the emergence of new norms. Empirically, the one-way process of socialisation is increasingly incompatible with the two-way process of socialisation in international politics. The other side of the story—how emerging powers might influence the evolution of norms—has been relatively under-theorised, but it is also becoming more salient in international politics. To understand international political change, it is crucial to investigate the behaviours and perspectives of emerging powers.

Based on these theoretical and empirical reasons, this article conceptualises socialisation as a two-way process of interaction between nation-states and the existing international society. Socialisation as a two-way process is similar to the notion of 'reciprocal socialisation': 'rising powers are socialised into the existing international order, while reshaping the order when they enter'.[49] Empirically, this article focuses on how emerging great powers are shaping the emerging change of international norms. The spread of norms is not a one-way process in which local actors act as the students of transnational norm entrepreneurs. A more interactive understanding of the process is warranted in which non-Western powers are not just passive novices in international norms but proactive agents that shape their further evolution.

Socialisation, Legitimacy, and International Political Change

Socialisation is a useful concept for us to understand the nature and process of international political change. This is because the maintenance and change of international order involves a socialisation process.

[48] Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).
[49] Maximilian Terhalle, 'Reciprocal Socialization', pp. 341–61.

Socialisation is an indispensable component of the maintenance of hegemonic order. Any hegemonic system has both a materialist foundation and an ideational basis. In international politics, the concept of hegemony refers to concentrated material capabilities and also to ideological control by means of the hegemon's monopoly on the production of social, cultural, and symbolic capital. Through these non-material mechanisms of social domination and reproduction, the hegemon ensures that the arbitrariness of the social order is either ignored, or posited as natural, thereby justifying the legitimacy of existing social structures.[50] 'Material distributions of power alone tell us little about the kind of politics states will construct for themselves.'[51] It is the pervasiveness of ideological hegemony that normally guarantees international stability without resort to coercion or violence by the dominant power. How is the hegemonic order accepted by the secondary states and followers?

Socialisation plays a vital role in maintaining the hegemonic system: the elites of the secondary nations buy into and internalise norms that are articulated by the hegemon, and therefore pursue policy consistent with the hegemon's notion of international order.[52] From this perspective, hegemonic order emerges from the diffusion of a set of normative ideals.[53] The hegemon and the elites in the secondary states also socialise the masses and public into the norms. There is a close connection between leading states and the shifting international norms. There are three phases of international norms: (i) the emergence of new norms often proposed by leading states; (ii) a majority of secondary states follows the proposal; (iii) the norms are internalised as universally valid principles.[54] Generally the preferences and characteristics of the leading states shape the features of international norms.[55]

The fundamental change of international order concerns the shifting legitimate norms in international society. Normative concerns have always informed the study of international politics. In a general sense, 'Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations.'[56] Norms

[50] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).

[51] Martha Finnemore, 'Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn't All It's Cracked Up to be', *World Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (2009), pp. 58–9.

[52] G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (1990), pp. 283–315.

[53] *Ibid*., p. 284.

[54] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', pp. 887–917.

[55] Yan Xuetong, 'International Leadership and Norm Evolution', *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2011), pp. 233–64.

[56] Stephen Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', in Stephen Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 2.

could also be regarded as 'collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity'.[57] In international politics, norms have both regulative and constitutive effects on nation-states. Students of politics have struggled with questions of morality and normative issues. Realism in international politics is often criticised for ignoring normative issues. Realism, however, does not ignore the role of morality and norms in international politics. For instance, classical realism has highlighted the trade-off between normative concerns and strategic considerations. Both Hans G. Morgenthau and E.H. Carr emphasise the importance of morality in international political change.[58] It is more appropriate to say that classical realism has emphasised the tension between normative concerns and strategic considerations, and that ideas and morality still matter for classical realists.[59]

As the normative basis of political order, legitimacy means the recognised authority to rule in a community. 'Legitimacy is, by its nature, a social and relational phenomenon... The concept only has meaning in a particular social context.'[60] In a domestic context, a government is legitimate to the extent that its rules are considered rightful by both the dominant and subordinate members of society.[61] Scholars often make the distinction between normative theories of legitimacy that set out general criteria in terms of which the right to rule can be appraised, and empirical theories which take as their focus the belief systems of those subject to government.[62] Rule is legitimate when its subjects believe it to be so. From such a starting point, the practical way to study legitimacy is through the belief systems of the relevant actors. Legitimacy is a social fact that is meaningful only to members of the community who accept it and, in turn, a fact that testifies to the existence of that particular community. Thus, for there to be legitimacy there needs to be a community/society.[63]

57 Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 5.

58 Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 146–69; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, 2006), pp. 233–70.

59 Michael C. Williams, 'Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (2004), pp. 633–65.

60 Martha Finnemore, 'Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure of Unipolarity', p. 61.

61 Michael Hechter, 'Introduction: Legitimacy in the Modern World', *American Behavioral Scientist,* Vol. 53, No. 3 (2009), p. 280. The classical definition of legitimacy in social sciences, see Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Free Press, 1947), pp. 124–31. In the Chinese history, political legitimacy was crucial and it was often related to the 'Mandate of Heaven', See Hok-lam Chan, *Legitimation in Imperial China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1984); Dingxin Zhao, 'The Mandate of Heaven and Performance Legitimation in Historical and Contemporary China', *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2009), pp. 416–33.

62 Ian Clark, 'Legitimacy in a Global Order', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. S1 (2003), pp. 75–95.

63 *Ibid*.

In international politics, legitimacy means the recognised authority to rule in the international hierarchy. How is legitimacy possible in an 'anarchic' international system?[64] Similar to the legitimacy in a domestic society, legitimacy in international politics presumes the existence of an 'international society', where different countries recognise certain fundamental rules of the game but are also differentiated in terms of power, prestige, and responsibilities.[65] In addition, David Lake builds a theory of relational authority to conceptualise legitimacy in international relations. Relational authority locates legitimacy in a social contract between a ruler, who provides a social order of value to the ruled, and the ruled, who comply with the ruler's commands necessary to the production of that order. Through the lens of relational authority, one sees that relations between states are better described as a rich variety of hierarchies in which dominant states legitimately rule over greater or lesser domains of policy in subordinate states.[66]

Legitimacy is related to the fundamental issue of international political change. The critical turning points in the history of international society can be recounted as shifts in the prevailing conceptions of international legitimacy, and the fundamental question is that of who has the authority to make the rules of the game and maintain the new world order. In other words, the systemic change of international relations could be viewed as a transformation of the parameters of political legitimacy.[67] To be more specific, the legitimacy of the 'right to rule' on the part of a great power may rest on three factors: victory in the last hegemonic war, provision of public goods, and widely accepted ideology.[68] Thus, legitimacy becomes the decisive yardstick for measuring fundamental change in international society.[69] As aforementioned, elites in the secondary states are socialised into the existing norms, and their recognition of the normative ideals articulated by the hegemon is a vital part of the legitimacy of the hegemonic order.[70] Furthermore, hegemony may be strengthened and maintained if the mass public of secondary states is socialised with hegemonic conceptions of world order, state identities, and underlying ideologies. The mass public's socialisation with

[64] For the concept of 'anarchy' in international politics, see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

[65] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2002); Barry Buzan and Mathias Albert, 'Differentiation: A Sociological Approach to International Relations Theory', *European Journal of International Relations,* Vol. 16, No. 3 (2010), pp. 315–37.

[66] David A. Lake, 'Relational Authority and Legitimacy in International Relations', *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2009), pp. 331–53; David Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).

[67] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 34.

[68] *Ibid*., p. 34.

[69] Ian Clark, 'Legitimacy in a Global Order'.

[70] G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', pp. 283–315.

hegemonic ideas, which amounts to a cultural transformation in secondary states, may take place as a result of propagation by the dominant state and secondary state elites, or as a result of important international and domestic events caused by the hegemon, and then come to feed back on the political structures and processes of secondary states in ways conducive to the maintenance of hegemony.[71]

International political change could be understood in a cyclical pattern of world politics. This article synthesises previous theories of international political change, and also makes two modifications.

First, this article has made more explicit the connection between the ideational factors and international change. While realism focuses on the shifting distribution of material power and social constructivism on the distribution of ideas, it is promising to examine the interactions between the material and ideational factors.[72] According to various models of power transition and power circle in world politics, nonmaterial factors such as prestige, role, and legitimacy are crucial. The gap between material power and ideational power constitutes a major disequilibrium in the international system, and this disequilibrium drives the major international political change.[73] Most theories of power transitions and power circle, however, do not develop explicit theories on international legitimacy and norms. It is hence useful to reemphasise the legitimacy contestation in international political change. Amid the shifting balance of power, emerging powers could choose to de-legitimise the hegemon's global authority if they are dissatisfied with the status quo.[74] This delegitimation creates the conditions for the emergence of a revisionist counter-hegemonic coalition. During this phase, the revisionist power voices its dissatisfaction with the established order and forges the social purpose that will become the foundation of its demand for a new world order. During the delegitimation phase, the major struggle focuses on the competing visions of international order and normative preferences. An alternative vision of order will pose the most serious challenge for any existing hegemonic order. In domestic politics, an alternative

[71] Qingxin Ken Wang, 'Hegemony and Socialization of the Mass Public: The Case of Postwar Japan's Cooperation with the United States On China Policy', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2003), pp. 99–119.

[72] Scholars often analyze the distribution of power and the distribution of ideas/cultures separately. For instance, see Robert Powell, 'Stability and the Distribution of Power', *World Politics*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1996), pp. 239–67; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* pp. 246–308.

[73] Robert Gilpin describes the disequilibrium as the gap between power and prestige, and Charles Doran describes the disequilibrium as the gap between power and foreign policy role. See Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*; Charles F. Doran, 'Systematic Disequilibrium, Foreign Policy Role, and the Power Cycle', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1989), pp. 371–401; Charles F. Doran, *Systems in Crisis: New Imperatives of High Politics at Century's End* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[74] For the strategy of delegitimation, see Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power*, pp. 160–78.

ideology that can credibly compete will be most threatening to any existing bourgeois regime.[75] In identity politics, Ted Hopf argues 'the greatest threat to the Self is a compressive alternative identity, an Other that can be understood as a replacement'.[76]

Second, the current international political change conforms to the early phases of the power cycle model, and the contestation of legitimacy is a crucial dimension of international politics. This phase occurs within the larger cyclical pattern of (i) a stable order, (ii) the deconcentration and delegitimation of the hegemon's power, (iii) arms build-ups and the formation of alliances, (iv) a resolution of the international crisis, often through hegemonic war, and (v) system renewal.[77] The nuclear age, however, makes power transition by means of a deliberately waged hegemonic war unthinkable.[78] In other words, unlike previous theories of power transition and power circle, we do not think hegemonic war is going to be the key mechanism of international political change in the 21st century.

Above all, socialisation is crucial to the process of international political change: socialisation will help define whose norms and ideas are accepted as legitimate in the international society, and what kind of social purpose a new world order will embrace.

Socialisation as a One-way Process: Emerging Powers as Norm Takers

Socialisation as a one-way process is not necessarily wrong, but it is incomplete. This section will discuss why emerging powers are accepting some existing norms, and will also evaluate to what extent emerging powers are still norm-takers.

Socialisation as a one-way process is pertinent to the early stage of the development of emerging powers. This is because of several reasons. First of all, at an early stage, the top priority of emerging powers is to integrate with the existing norms so as to be accepted as normal countries in international

[75] Antonio Gramsci, *Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (New York: International Publishers Co, 1971).

[76] Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 8.

[77] For similar cyclical patterns of international politics, see George Modelski, 'The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1978), pp. 214–35.

[78] John Mueller, *Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Robert Jervis, 'Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 96, No. 1 (2002), pp. 1–14; Shiping Tang, 'Social Evolution of International Politics: From Mearsheimer to Jervis', *European Journal of International Relations,* Vol. 16, No. 1 (2010), pp. 31–55; Charles Glaser, 'Will China's Rise Lead to War?' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 2 (2011), pp. 80–91. For a counter-argument, see Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, 'The End of MAD?', *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (2006), pp. 7–44; John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001).

society. Thus, learning new norms could benefit the newcomers. Second, at the early stage, emerging powers are not strong enough to impose their own agenda in international society; they face a hegemonic system dominated by the West. International hegemony refers not only to concentrated material capabilities but also to ideological and institutional control.

The early interaction between emerging powers and international society could illustrate the argument. In the first two decades of China's reform era (1980–2000), the country's major theme was to learn the existing norms of international institutions.[79] The Chinese slogan 'link up with the international track' (yu guoji jiegui) signals China's willingness to abide by international rules as the country begins to emerge as a major power, while Chinese thinking about international norms varies across time, sectors and issue areas.[80] Internationally, China's socialisation is related to China's efforts to become a 'normal state' in international society.[81] During this early stage of China's development, the major problematic of China's international studies is that of how to deal with its relationship with the existing international society. Integration could hence be regarded as a core issue of China's international relation theorising.[82] This one-directional process of socialisation could also be applied to the case of India. Experiencing various frustrations after independence, India learned hard lessons, and was gradually socialised into the international system by emulating the behaviours of other great powers.[83]

In addition, whether an emerging power is a norm-taker or a norm-maker might depend on the specific context. For instance, in China's foreign aid policy, China's socialisation into international norms varies with the thickness of the institutional environment. In Laos and Cambodia, China's enhanced collaboration with international organisation and improved transparency point to nascent socialisation of liberal international norms. China's aid to Myanmar, however, remains opaque and largely self-interested. At the regional level, Beijing is bolstering its influence over the norms and practices of regional developmental institutions.[84] In a general sense, emerging powers are still norm takers in some issue areas, and continue to

79 Alastair Iain Johnston, *Social States*.

80 Wang Hongying, 'Linking Up with the International Track: What's in a Slogan?' *The China Quarterly*, No. 189 (2007), pp. 1–23.

81 Pang Zhongying, 'China as a Normal State? Understanding China's Unfinished Transformation From State Socialization Perspective', *Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2004), pp. 340–69.

82 Qin Yaqing, 'Core Problematic of International Relations Theory and the Construction of a Chinese School', *Social Sciences in China*, No. 3 (2005), pp. 165–76.

83 For India's socialization into the great power system, see Baldev Raj Nayar and T. V. Paul, *India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 253–4.

84 James Reilly, 'A Norm-Taker Or a Norm-Maker? Chinese Aid in Southeast Asia', *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 21, No. 73 (2012), pp. 71–91.

internalise certain exiting liberal norms, including free trade, market economy and the openness of the international system.

Socialisation into the liberal order has strengthened the miraculous growth of emerging powers such as India and China. Emerging powers have been successful players under the existing liberal order, which states consider legitimate because it benefits not just the Western powers but all countries willing to invest in the system. Because the Western-led liberal order has provided emerging powers with unparalleled opportunities to become stronger, safer and more respected, emerging powers largely pursue a grand strategy of integration, participating in international regimes and forming a largely accommodative relationship with the community of Western nations. From this perspective, democratic liberalism is universally valid and all major powers including China will eventually become democratic.[85]

In summary, socialisation as a one way process is particularly relevant at the early stage of emerging powers' development, but socialisation as a one-directional process is incomplete. The next section will illustrate why socialisation as a two-way process could help us better understand the more complex interactions between emerging powers and international norms. As their power and influence grow, emerging powers will not passively accept the normative preferences of the Western powers. From this perspective, international legitimacy does not just mean emerging powers accept the status quo of the existing normative order. International legitimacy of great power status implies that the emerging powers want to have a say in defining which norms are legitimate in international society.[86]

Socialisation as a Two-way Process: Emerging Powers as Norm Shaper

Emerging powers do not accept all the rules of the game in the existing order, and attempt to shape the environment without directly confronting the hegemon. This is similar to the notion of 'reformist revisionist' proposed by Barry Buzan: these emerging powers are not challenging the fundamental rules of the game, but are trying to incrementally change the system or at least raise their voices within it.[87] In this process, emerging powers are

[85] For an optimistic view of China's democratic transition, see Yu Liu and Dingding Chen, 'Why China Will Democratize?', *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2012), pp. 41–63.

[86] This is different from some existing discussions of legitimate great power status, see Shogo Suzuki, 'Seeking ''Legitimate'' Great Power Status in Post-Cold War International Society', *International Relations,* Vol. 22, No. 1 (2008), pp. 45–63.

[87] Barry Buzan, 'China in International Society: Is ''Peaceful Rise'' Possible?' *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2010), p. 14. For a critique, Yaqing Qin, 'International Society as a Process: Institutions, Identities, and China's Peaceful Rise', *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2010), pp. 129–53.

not only acting as norm-takers; they are also increasingly acting as norm-shapers.

It is crucial to investigate how emerging powers are resisting certain norms and also trying to shape the evolution of international norms. The attitudes and behaviours of emerging powers could be viewed as those of rightful resistance.[88] Consistent with the notion of rightful resistance, emerging powers take advantage of opportunities and authorised channels within the order to make relative gains, and to contest particular behaviours of the hegemon.[89] The strategy of rightful resistance can have opposite goals. It can strengthen the state's position for the purpose of working within the established order, or for the purpose of waging a hegemonic bid to overturn that order when doing so becomes a viable option. Accordingly, the strategy works for both limited-aims revisionists and unlimited-aims revisionists.[90]

Although emerging powers cannot balance the economic and military power of the western powers in the short term, emerging powers have been contesting the current order in several ways. From a socialisation perspective, emerging powers are accepting certain existing norms and also trying to shape the further evolution of international norms. How do emerging powers act like norm-shapers?

First, emerging powers challenge the notion that Western ideas and culture are superior to those of the rest of the world.[91] Oliver Stuenkel, a scholar from the Getulio Vargas Foundation (a leading think-tank in Brazil), reflects on the American domination of ideas in international relations. He asks whether scholars from emerging powers could generate new ideas to solve global problems.[92] Chinese scholars and officials have recently emphasised that China should increase its 'power of discourse' (*huayu quan*) in international society. For instance, according to Li Shengming, vice-President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, discourse power is 'a powerful apparatus to advance a country's political and economic interests'.[93] China's intellectuals have rekindled an interest in the philosophy and history of traditional Chinese order. Contemporary philosopher Zhao Tingyang argues that traditional Chinese ideas provide a better

88 For the general notion of rightful resistance in politics, see Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, *Rightful Resistance in Rural China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

89 *Ibid*., pp. 2, 15–24.

90 For the discussion of limited aim revisionists and unlimited aim revisionists, see Randall Schweller, 'Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory', in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, eds., *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power* (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 1–31.

91 Kishore Mahbubali, *The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East* (New York: Public Affairs, 2008); Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World*.

92 Oliver Stuenkel, 'On the US-American Hegemony over Ideas That Change the World', June 4 2012, http://www.postwesternworld.com/2012/06/04/3381/.

93 Li Shengming, 'Discourse Power Masks Upper-class Interests', *Global Times*, June 22 2011, http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/662816/Discourse-power-masks-upper-class-interests.aspx.

philosophical framework for solving global problems, asserting that the Chinese theory of Tianxia (literally, 'all under Heaven') is simply 'the best philosophy for world governance'.[94] Certain elites in emerging powers raise doubts about the inevitability of democratic liberalism, humanitarian intervention and disrespect for national sovereignty. For instance, according to Yan Xuetong, if China wants to supplant the United States as a global leader, it must 'present to the world a better social role model'.[95]

Second, emerging powers emphasise their sovereignty and independence, and are hence hesitant to participate in the humanitarian interventions that the West often initiates. The normative preferences for sovereignty have significant impacts on the foreign policy behaviours of those emerging powers. For instance, in the case of the Darfur crisis, Beijing's interests are complex to the extent that concern about the implications of humanitarian intervention is more crucial than oil in determining its policy towards Sudan. China is thus more influential than liberal democratic states in formulating the rules of humanitarian intervention in Darfur due to a lack of political will in the West.[96] The normative preferences of China and Russia undoubtedly played a decisive role in shaping the decision with respect to the aforementioned United Nations Security Council veto on Syria.

Third, emerging powers are using multilateral forums to influence the evolution of international norms. The BRICS Summit has become an increasingly influential multilateral platform in international politics, and BRICS countries have played a progressively proactive role on the world stage. Moreover, regional organisations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, in addition to reflecting the interests of participating countries, strengthen the legitimacy and influence of these countries' normative preferences.[97] This behaviour is in contrast to their previous passive diplomacy.

Finally, emerging powers want to have a say in defining what kind of norms should be regarded as legitimate in international society. As

[94] Zhao Tingyang, 'Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept "All-under-Heaven" (Tianxia)', *Social Identities*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2006), pp. 29–41. For a comprehensive view of Zhao's Tianxia philosophy, see Zhao Tingyang, *Tianxia tixi: shijie zhidu zhexue daolun* (*The Tianxia System: A philosophy for the World Institution*)(Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu chubanshe, 2005).

[95] Yan Xuetong, 'Xun Zi's Thoughts on International Politics and Their Implications', *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2008), p. 159; Xuetong Yan, 'How China Can Defeat America', *New York Times* (2011), p. 29.

[96] Pak. Lee, Gerald Chan, and Lai-ha Chan, 'China in Darfur: Humanitarian Rule-Maker Or Rule-Taker?' *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2012), pp. 423–44.

[97] Thomas Ambrosio, 'Catching the 'Shanghai Spirit: How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 60, No. 8 (2008), pp. 1321–44; Chung Chien-Peng, 'China and the Institutionalization of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization', *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 53, No. 5 (2006), pp. 3–14; Jing-Dong Yuan, 'China's Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)', *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 19, No. 67 (2010), pp. 855–69.

mentioned earlier, Beijing has become a shaper of international humanitarian norms. Although Beijing has not obstructed the development of the R2P, it has placed its main efforts behind the state capacity-building functions of the R2P mandate. It has also worked to ensure R2P's focused application and a definition that constrains the operational methods associated with humanitarian intervention. Beijing has aimed to develop the norm in a direction that gives primacy to the preventative aspects of R2P in hopes of diminishing the instances where the norm of non-interference in the internal affairs of states is breached.[98] Certain emerging countries, such as India, Brazil, and South Africa, feel betrayed by the Western interpretation of the mandate under UNSC resolution 1973 to intervene in Libya. The UNSC resolution legitimated an initial series of strikes against Libyan air defences, but the emerging powers wanted the West to consider a settlement with Gaddafi after the initial strikes, and were shocked by the extension of the campaign into one of regime change. The Libya experience led to the formulation of the RWP concept, which seeks to introduce more rigorous criteria with respect to the use of force in humanitarian intervention.[99] Brazil introduced RWP at the opening of the United Nations General Assembly in 2011, and this new concept brought a refreshing perspective to debates on humanitarian intervention. RWP focuses on three major issues: the monitoring of UN Security Council-sanctioned use of force; the sequencing of the three pillars of R2P; and the need to exhaust all peaceful means before considering the use of force.[100] The example of RWP illustrates the trend whereby emerging powers do not just act as norm-takers; they also want to be norm-shapers in international affairs.

In summary, the relationship between emerging powers and international norms is much more complicated than previously assumed. Emerging powers are accepting certain norms while shaping the further evolution of norms in other aspects. It is essential to investigate how ideas matter and also whose ideas matter in world politics. Socialisation is not just a one-directional process through which emerging non-Western powers learn and internalise the existing norms; it is also a process through which emerging powers shape the evolution of international norms. The perspective of non-Western powers should be regarded as part of a legitimate normative order.

[98] Rosemary Foot, 'The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and its Evolution', pp. 47–66.

[99] For some background information of the concept of RWP, See Thomas Wright, 'Brazil Hosts Workshop on "Responsibility While Protecting"', *Foreign Policy*, August 29 2012, http://bosco.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/29/brazil_backs_responsibility_while_protecting.

[100] For the official statement of the Brazilian Government, see 'Letter dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General', The United Nation General Assembly, http://www.un.int/brazil/speech/Concept-Paper-%20RwP.pdf.

Power Diffusion Model: Emerging Powers and the Diffusion of International Norms

How are emerging powers shaping the likely trajectory of international norms dynamics? Where is the agency of emerging powers? According to certain existing studies, power diffusion is the most likely trajectory of world politics. This section tries to explore its implications for international normative change.[101] It will compare power diffusion models with alternative trajectories, and also explore the normative implications. In particular, this section analyses both the agency and limitations of emerging powers.[102]

Traditionally, the relationship between emerging powers and international society is understood as being either confrontational or cooperative: emerging powers might either revolt against the West or be integrated into the Western-led liberal order. Based on a power transition model, rising powers will delegitimate the existing authority and replace the current order with something entirely new.[103] Based on a liberal model, emerging powers are integrated into the existing liberal order, and are progressively internalising existing liberal norms.[104] In reality, the relationship is more complicated and nuanced. This article proposes that the power diffusion model is more pertinent to conceptualising the relationship between emerging powers and the international norms. Different from the other models, the power diffusion model makes the following propositions: first, the existing America-led unipolar system will not be replaced by a new hegemonic system, but by a more equal distribution of power; second, emerging powers are not eager to take greater responsibilities and will often take a shirker strategy; third, the

[101] Randall L. Schweller, 'Entropy and the Trajectory of World Politics: Why Polarity Has Become Less Meaningful', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2010), pp. 145–63; Randall Schweller, 'Ennui Becomes Us', *National Interest*, No. 105 (2010), pp. 27–38; Charles Kupchan, *No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn*; Barry Buzan, 'A World Order without Superpowers: Decentred Globalism', *International Relations*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2011), pp. 3–25.

[102] One anonymous reviewer raises the question: how could emerging powers exercise their agency in a power diffusion model if they do not have a coherent alterative vision? I have three responses. First, even in a power diffusion model, the agency of emerging power is still crucial, and I will discuss the agency in details. Second, it is acknowledged that power diffusion model is just one of several possible trajectories of world politics. As the normative implications of other trajectories have been analysed by some existing studies, this article will focus on an under-studied trajectory. For the normative implication of a power transition model, see Yan Xuetong, 'International Leadership and Norm Evolution', pp. 233–64. Third, despite the increasing profile of emerging powers, the influence of emerging powers is still limited, and this limitation is a reality that should be acknowledged in the analysis of international political change.

[103] For the discussion of delegitimation and power transition model, see Randall Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, 'After Unipolarity', pp. 45–7.

[104] For the discussion of liberal integration model, see G. John Ikenberry, 'The Rise of China and the Future of the West', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (2008), pp. 23–37; G. John Ikenberry, 'The Future of the Liberal World Order', pp. 56–68.

major problem of international order is not one of great power conflict, but of chaos.[105]

Rather than liberal integration or revolutionary revolt, the diffusion of power and diversification of normative order will be the more likely trajectory in international political change in the 21st century. Thus, the major challenge of the emerging international order is not great power conflict, but chaos. As discussed previously, socialisation is a two-way process, and emerging powers are not only accepting international norms, but also shaping their further normative evolution. This is different from the liberal integration model and power transition model.

Why is the power diffusion model a most likely trajectory of world politics in the 21st century? We could evaluate the trends from perspectives of material capabilities and social power.[106] From a perspective of material capabilities, the gap between the United States and the emerging BRICS will be narrowed, and the American-led unipolarity will end sooner or later. There are two reasons, however, why it is unlikely that China or any other emerging power will emerge as a new hegemon to replace the United States. They are that China has its own limitations and also faces the emergence of other competitive emerging powers.[107]

From a perspective of social power, emerging powers are dissatisfied with the existing hegemonic order. Emerging powers do not, however, provide a viable alternative vision. The emerging powers are dissatisfied with the existing order, but have not yet developed any attractive alternative visions to replace the current world order. In other words, we could see some evidence of delegitimation in the dynamic change of international order, but we have not seen any indicators of replacement by a new hegemonic order. The overall trend is consistent with the earlier discussion of norms diffusion in the international system. The emerging powers' growing material power has boosted their ideational self-confidence. As, however, there are diverse opinions among emerging powers, it is unlikely to exert a fundamental change on international norms.

Although we should not overestimate the influence of emerging powers, we should also acknowledge their agency. It is necessary to first analyse the diverse opinions among emerging powers. The stark dichotomy of emerging powers either confronting the existing order or becoming a full-fledged

[105] For instance, see Randall L. Schweller, 'Entropy and the Trajectory of World Politics', pp. 145–63; Randall Schweller, 'Ennui Becomes Us', pp. 27–38; Barry Buzan, 'A World Order without Superpowers', pp. 3–25.

[106] Barry Buzan, 'A World Order without Superpowers'.

[107] It is highly likely that China will replace the United States as the largest economy in coming two decades. However, in terms of comprehensive national power, China is less likely to catch up soon. For the analysis of the limitations of Chinese power, see Susan Shirk, *China: A Fragile Superpower* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Michael Beckley, 'China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure', *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2011), pp. 41–78.

member of it perhaps simplifies a complex reality.[108] Emerging powers do not have a coherent anti-hegemonic alternative vision. Emerging powers disagree on certain normative issues. In other words, the emerging powers know what they do not want—the continued hegemony of the West, but do not have a coherent vision of what should replace the existing West-dominated order.[109] The following are major normative issues on which the emerging powers do not agree.

The first main difference among emerging powers is that of liberal democracy. Certain rapidly rising powers such as India are Western-style democracies; others, such as China and Russia, are authoritarian regimes.[110] They hence have different ideas about domestic and international standards of political legitimacy.

The second main difference among emerging powers is that with regards to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. China and Russia, as recognised nuclear powers, generally oppose the spread of nuclear weapons, whereas India generally has an antagonistic attitude towards the international Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. From the perspective of India, the current norms and rules of the game are against its national interests.[111] Countries such as Brazil have an ambivalent attitude towards the norms of non-proliferation. Generally, Brazil opposes the double-standard that is practiced by the Western powers. The Brazilian view is that the international NPT regime has become a politically driven tool in the hands of the United States through which to selectively 'lay down the law' to weaker states. Why should Iran become a significant target of sanctions while Israel remains in a state of nuclear denial? Why does a member of the NPT like Iran get punished for allegedly seeking civilian enrichment technology, while India, which has chosen to remain outside of the regime and overtly challenge it, gets instead a sizeable reward from Washington?[112]

The third main difference among emerging powers is that with regards to the legitimacy of US hegemony. China does not necessarily reject the legitimacy of US hegemony,[113] but is using the notion of democracy against the United States to contest its hegemonic behaviour. Despite the promotion of liberal democracy having long been the capstone of US foreign policy, Chinese intellectuals both at home and abroad have critiqued the

[108] Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner, and Steven Weber, 'Chinese Ways', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 3 (2008), p. 166.
[109] Charles Kupchan, *No One's World*, p. 183.
[110] Azar Gat, 'The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers', pp. 59–69.
[111] Andrew B. Kennedy, 'India's Nuclear Odyssey', *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2011), pp. 120–53; Baldev Raji Nayar and T.V. Paul, *India in the World Order*.
[112] For the discussion of Brazilian perspective on the NPT, see Matha Spector, 'Memo for Discussion: Brazilian Visions for Global Order', National Intelligence Council Meeting, November 12 2010, p. 2.
[113] Wang Jisi, 'America in Asia: How Much Does China Care?', *Global Asia*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2007), pp. 27–28.

contradictions of US liberal democracy. In domestic politics, the US government has applied checks and balances to protect democracy and the rule of law, whereas in international politics it seeks to preserve its dominant status so that it can act without constraints. Russia has a more confrontational attitude towards the United States.[114] Brazil's major standpoint on the United States seems to be that of 'ducking': from the perspective of Brazil, it is not good to be under the radar screen of the United States. Brazil is hence cooperating with the United States on certain issues but not acting as a close ally.[115] India has the most positive attitude toward the hegemony of United States because of ideological and geopolitical reasons.[116] On the ideological issue, as the largest democracy, India is trying to build a strong relationship with the United States based on shared liberal democratic values. For geopolitical reasons, India is seeking to enhance its cooperation with the United States as a way to balance or soft-balance against a rising China. Unlike other emerging powers, therefore, India favours the continuity of US hegemony.

If the emerging powers do not have a coherent alternative vision to replace the existing West-dominated world order, how can emerging powers exercise agency?

First of all, the emerging powers' becoming modern great powers while retaining their traditional values will generate doubts that Westernisation is the only way to achieve modernity. As certain scholars have pointed out, the rise of the West took specific and distinct forms, and the conditions of the Western modernisation process were unique.[117] As contemporary emerging powers are rising in a remarkably different context, the pattern of Western modernity cannot simply be emulated by non-Western emerging powers. The world in the 21st century is headed towards multiple versions of modernity. That said, multiple versions of modernity do not mean that emerging powers will reject all Western ideas. As Peter Katzenstein argues, even if Sinicization is a process of 'making the world suitable to China and the Chinese', the Sinicization process should be better understood as a recombination of different ideas and practices, not a one-directional process.[118]

Second, the legitimate model of political order will be more diverse, and the 'standard of civilization' renegotiated. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Western strategists and scholars argued that liberal democracy

[114] Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, 'Why Moscow Says No', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, No. 1 (2011), pp. 122–38.
[115] Matha Spector, 'Memo for Discussion'.
[116] Evan A. Feigenbaum, 'India's Rise, America's Interest', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 2 (2010), pp. 76–91.
[117] Samuel P. Huntington, 'The West Unique, Not Universal', *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 75, No. 6 (1996), pp. 28–46; Martin Jacques, *When China Rules the World*, pp. 32–6; Charles Kupchan, *No One's World*, pp. 13–45.
[118] Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Sinicization and the Rise of China: Civilizational Processes Beyond East and West* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

would be the only legitimate format of governance, and the new wave of democratisation seemed to exemplify the trend.[119] The emergence of authoritarian great powers such as China and Russia, however, generates doubt that liberal democracy is the only game in town.[120] Although Beijing might not actively promote the so-called 'Beijing Consensus' as an alternative political model, Beijing is clearly trying to seek recognition of its political system as being one of the legitimate models of governance.[121] This does not mean that Beijing will reject any proposals of political reform.[122] It does mean, however, that the Western powers' influence on shaping domestic political change in China or Russia will be inherently limited. This poses a dilemma: the Western powers want to cooperate with the emerging powers in addressing common concerns on global issues, but also worry about the prospect of challenges from the emerging powers. The prospect of multiple models of modernity and conflicting values is not one that many Western strategists and policymakers would easily accept.[123] Certain strategists, however, such as Charles Kupchan, argue that the West should embrace political diversity in world politics rather than insisting that liberal democracy is the only legitimate form of government.[124] Steven Weber and Bruce Jentleson argue that the United States must take a different stance towards the rest of the world in the twenty-first century; as the American domination of ideas is eroding, the United States must now compete in the global marketplace of ideas.[125]

Third, Western domination of international norms is contested, and international normative order will hence be more chaotic. Emerging powers will not passively abide by the existing norms, and on some issues they will proactively seek to change some norms. For instance, while Brazil's notion of Responsibility While Protecting is a new development in international humanitarian norms, it might complicate the operation of the existing

[119] Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History and the Last Man', Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

[120] Azar Gat, 'The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers', pp. 59–69; for a counter-argument, see Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'Democracy's Victory is Not Preordained', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, No. 4 (2009), pp. 155–7.

[121] Joshua Cooper Ramo, *The Beijing Consensus* (London: Foreign Policy Center, 2004); Chan Lai-Ha, Pak K. Lee, and Gerald Chan, 'Rethinking Global Governance: A China Model in the Making?' *Contemporary Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2008), pp. 3–19. For the analysis of the limitation of the China model or the Beijing Consensus, see Scott Kennedy, 'The Myth of the Beijing Consensus', *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 19, No. 65 (2010), pp. 461–77.

[122] For the domestic debate of political reform in China, see David Shambaugh, *China's Community Party: Atrophy and Adaptation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).

[123] For instance, Robert Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* (New York: Knopf, 2008).

[124] Charles Kupchan, *No One's World*, pp. 187–93.

[125] Steven Weber, and Bruce Jentleson, *The End of Arrogance: America in the Global Competition of Ideas* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).

norm of Responsibility to Protect. According to certain analysts, RWP might meet with considerable opposition in the West, and it does not give answers to the real dilemmas of R2P operations.[126]

In summary, power diffusion is the most likely trajectory of world politics in the coming decades. While the existing literature has discussed the liberal integration model and power transition model of norms diffusion, the implications of power diffusion are relatively underexplored in international relations literature. Following a power diffusion model, socialisation is a two-way process: emerging powers will continue internalising certain norms while shaping the further evolution of norms in their own image. It is less likely, however, that the existing liberal norms will be entirely replaced by new hegemonic norms in the foreseeable future.[127]

Conclusion

In the coming decades, emerging powers will change the distribution of material power and also challenge the Western domination of ideas and norms in international society. The existing literature focuses on how emerging powers are learning and internalising the existing liberal norms. How emerging powers will shape the evolution of international norms is understudied. To redress this imbalance, this article has investigated the attitudes of emerging powers to international norms. By conceptualising socialisation as a two-way process this article analyses how emerging powers interact with international society: emerging powers are accepting certain international norms while trying to shape the further evolution of international norms as a whole.

First, emerging powers do not necessarily oppose all the existing norms. Socialisation as a one-way process is still relevant in the early stage of the emerging powers' development. At the early stage, the top priority of emerging powers is to integrate with the existing norms so as to be accepted as normal countries in international society. At the early stage, the emerging powers are facing a Western-dominated hegemonic system. For instance, as a rising great power, the major problematic of China's international studies is that of how to deal with its relationship with the existing international society. Integration, therefore, could be regarded as a core issue of China's international relation theorising. In addition, whether an emerging power is a norm-taker or a norm-maker might also depend on the specific context.

[126] Thomas Wright, 'Brazil Hosts Workshop on 'Responsibility While Protecting'.

[127] This analysis assumes that no country will become a new hegemon in the foreseeable future even if the hegemony of the United States is eroding. If, however, China emerges as a new leading power in the future, it will try to shape the world order in its own image and socialise other countries with its new norms. That will constitute the normative implications of a power transition model. See Yan Xuetong, 'International Leadership and Norm Evolution', pp. 258–64.

Second, emerging powers hold to significant normative differences on issues such as liberal democracy and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In other words, emerging powers know what they do not want, but do not have a consensus on what they do want for a new world order. While India and Brazil have become democracies, Russia and China still maintain authoritarian systems. For different reasons these emerging powers have taken different positions on the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Finally, despite the limitations of emerging powers, their agency is crucial to shaping international norms. Emerging powers have strong normative preferences that they try to make recognised as legitimate in international society. Emerging powers emphasise the importance of sovereignty and independence, and are hence often hesitant to support or participate in humanitarian interventions. Compared to the Western powers, contemporary emerging powers are rising in a remarkably different context. The pattern of Western modernity, therefore, cannot simply be emulated by the non-Western emerging powers. The world in the 21st century is headed towards multiple versions of modernity. The legitimate model of political order will be more diverse, and the 'standard of civilization' renegotiated. Although the emerging powers increasingly challenge the ideological domination of the West, they do not have a coherent alternative vision to replace the liberal world order. Thus, a global pluralist vision of world order is likely to emerge in the 21st century.

The discussion of emerging powers and international norms has significant implications for international normative order. First of all, the study challenges the conventional wisdom that emerging powers are either fundamentally challenging the status quo or integrated into the existing liberal order. The debate about America's century or China's century might miss the third likely trajectory: emerging world order will not be dominated by a single superpower, and the world must prepare for a 'world order without superpowers'.[128] As Charles Kupchan argues, the emerging world might be 'no one's world'.[129] In terms of normative order, both the Western powers and emerging powers must live in a more diverse world.

Second, a dilemma confronts the Western powers. One the one hand, the West must cooperate with the emerging powers to address the common concerns of global issues such as climate change and the international financial crisis. The West, however, also worries about challenges from emerging powers to the existing liberal order. As discussed previously, the emerging powers do not necessarily oppose all the existing liberal norms. Also, it is

[128] Barry Buzan, 'A World Order without Superpowers', pp. 3–25.
[129] Charles Kupchan, *No One's World*.

necessary to recognise that there are diverse opinions among the emerging powers on normative issues, and that the diverse opinions among emerging powers will continue to constrain their solidarity and reduce their prospects of building a coherent anti-hegemonic coalition. That said, the normative divide will constrain the prospect of effective global governance in the foreseeable future.